

357.05-  
U58  
C4j

GENERAL LIBRARY

JUL 27 1915

**JOURNAL OF THE  
U. S. CAVALRY  
ASSOCIATION**



COPYRIGHTED 1902  
by U.S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION

**July, 1915.**

# *In Time of Peace*

as well as in time of war it is of the utmost importance that safe, reliable nails should be used in shoeing Army horses.

Nails which split as the shoer drives them into the hoof may seriously cripple a valuable animal.

Nails which break off at the head under a sudden strain or shock are likely to cause much annoyance to the one who is riding or driving the horse.

## ***“Capewell” Nails are Needed***

To get the best results always specify for “CAPEWELL” nails. They hold under the severest strains. They can be driven without splitting or crimping.

Cavalry and Artillery horses, should always be shod with “CAPEWELL” nails. A wise precaution—a safe investment.

Best nail in the world at a fair price—not cheapest regardless of quality. Look for our Trade Mark.



The Trade Mark is a pattern on the head of each nail formed by lines crossing each other diagonally.

**The Capewell Horse Nail Co.,**  
Hartford, Conn., U. S. A.

Largest Manufacturers of Horse Nails in the World





JOURNAL  
OF THE  
United States Cavalry Association.

---

VOL. XXVI.

JULY, 1915.

No. 107

---

CAVALRY DRILL AND ORGANIZATION.

BY LIEUT. COLONEL FARRAND SAYRE, SEVENTH CAVALRY.

**D**ISCUSSIONS of the proposed changes in the drill and organization of the cavalry arm during the past three years have worn the subject threadbare, but it is one which concerns cavalry officers nearly, and a full and free discussion of it is more important to us now than at any former period.

Some prejudice has undoubtedly existed against the drill contained in the Cavalry Service Regulations, 1914, because it is believed to be of foreign origin, and in favor of the drill in the Cavalry Drill Regulations because the latter is believed to be of American origin and the outgrowth of our experience in the Civil War. This prejudice should not be permitted to blind us to the merits of the Cavalry Service Regulations. If by means of the drill and organization described in it our cavalry can be made to perform more efficient service against an enemy, to be better able to meet the various problems which confront us in the field, we should favor their adoption. I do not need to say that we should loyally carry them into execution, for that has been done already.

Those who have favored the new drill have alleged that the force of inertia has operated against it. Our officers knew

the old drill and it was supposed that they did not care to make the effort to learn the new one. But this condition has ceased to exist. Practically all are now familiar with the new drill, probably more so than with the old. The preponderance of the force if inertia, whatever it amounts to, is now on the side of the Cavalry Service Regulations.

The importance of the change is not apparent to all. So long as the change consists merely in a different way of doing the same thing it is not important. The precise method of deploying columns, forming column from line, changing direction, the question as to who is to hold the horses, etc., are not important. In the field American officers do not follow drill book methods very closely. But the change of organization and the double rank formation, involving as they do the questions as to the chief use of cavalry and the direction which our training should take, are of vital importance.

The Cavalry Service Regulations, 1914, are so dependent upon a change of organization that we can scarcely believe that they can be adopted in their present form unless our organization is changed or some probability is believed to exist that it will be changed. So long as the division of our regiments into three squadrons of four troops each has the support of law there will be difficulty in using the provisional organization into six squadrons. The passages: "Majors are assigned to command of half-regiments," "In line the majors are in front of the center of their wings," "The majors supervise the movements in their half-regiments," etc., (Pars. 452, 455 and 456) do not make it clear how the regiment is to be divided into three halves or how the third major is to be provided with a wing. The adoption of the Cavalry Service Regulations, 1914, will at once bring up the question of the necessity of legislation to change our organization to make it conform to the drill. Consequently, the change of drill cannot be considered apart from the change of organization.

Our cavalry is of a different type from European cavalry. So long as European cavalry is armed with the lance and we are not, this difference must be acknowledged and reckoned with.

Historically, our cavalry was developed from two regiments of dragoons, each composed of ten companies and main-

tained for service against Indians, and from one regiment of mounted riflemen organized immediately after the Mexican War, presumably on lines indicated by experience in that war. During the Civil War (1862) our cavalry gained its present organization. Between the Civil War and the war with Spain our infantry made frequent efforts to obtain the same organization for themselves but did not get it until 1898. Is it not logical to suppose that our cavalry, which was developed to meet our own needs and for use on our own terrain, should assume a somewhat different form from that developed in other countries? The French cavalry drill (Poinsett's Tactics) was adopted by our dragoons before the Civil War (1841). Two companies of dragoons were combined to form one provisional squadron for drill, very much as we are doing now, and Poinsett's Tactics, involving the double rank formation and two-company squadrons, was used throughout the Civil War by a considerable portion of our cavalry, especially in the eastern theaters of operations. Cooke's Tactics, based on a single rank formation, was published for the use of the Federal Cavalry in 1862. Wheeler's Tactics, also based on a single rank formation, was published for the use of the Confederate Cavalry in 1863. Thus the two systems, American and European, were tried out side by side in a war which lasted five years and gave opportunities for the use of cavalry under all conceivable conditions on our own soil.

The authors of Cooke's Tactics and Wheeler's Tactics (Gen. P. St. Geo. Cooke and Gen. Joseph Wheeler) claimed for the single rank drill that it was a great improvement on the double rank drill then in use. Gen. Cooke says in his preface: "In undertaking this important work I was led to give much consideration to a growing military impression in favor of an important change to a *single rank* formation. Whilst the conservatism or prejudices of European establishments have slowly yeilded, in the infantry arm, to the extent of reducing its formation from six to two ranks, the one great step from two to one rank in cavalry has not yet been made; but it was tested very successfully in the war in Portugal in 1833-34 in a British legion. I found that it greatly simplified all cavalry movements \* \* \*. Adopting then the single rank formation,

my work of revision became one of construction." General Wheeler says in his preface: "Much has been said regarding the relative advantage of single and double rank formation. We have seen that the depth of formation has been gradually decreasing during the last two thousand years. \* \* \* The most perfect system of formation is that which enables the commander to do the most service with a given number of men. \* \* \* With the single rank formation the brigade will be formed in four lines and inflict upon the enemy four successive shocks, each of which would be nearly as severe as a charge in two ranks, and the number of ranks being double, the amount of execution would certainly be much greater. Another advantage in single rank is the greater facility with which troops can be handled."

Forrest and Morgan used single rank formations from the beginning of the war. Wheeler began to use single rank in 1863 and did not return to double rank. In the eastern armies double rank was the nominal formation but single rank was used whenever the ranks were depleted and they were usually depleted. Gen. G. B. McClellan recommended the use of single rank for cavalry. In the Spring of 1865, Upton drilled his division in single rank. All of the cavalry in the western army used single rank during Wilson's Slema raid. When Gen. Cooke rewrote his "Tactics" after the war he adhered to the single rank. Gen. W. Merritt reviewed this work and highly commended it. Upton's "Tactics" was written after his war experience both in the eastern armies where double rank was used and with western armies where single rank was used; he adopted single rank.

In view of the weakness of our army in cavalry and the fact that cavalry cannot be expanded readily in war, it is apparent that our cavalry is not likely to be employed in masses as is contemplated in foreign armies. In any war in which we are likely to engage our cavalry will be more dispersed than is the case in Europe. Delaying actions, screening and reconnaissance will form a great part of the work of our cavalry and this will necessitate throwing a great deal of responsibility upon the commanders of small groups. For work of this character our present legal organization is ideal. Strong

regiments already divided into twelve permanent units capable of taking care of themselves separately are conveniently grouped into three permanent squadrons of four troops each. Economy of administration is secured in the regiment by bringing a maximum of strength under one administrative head. Facility of tactical handling is secured by the permanent grouping into three squadrons. In Europe economy is an important consideration, and this involves handling as large numbers of men as possible with comparatively few officers. Economy is not so important with us because we do not maintain our war armies in time of peace. With us the problem will be to make a small number of men cover as much ground as possible.

Experience on American soil shows that our cavalry should be grouped into companies (troops) of not to exceed 100 men under an experienced officer accustomed to the exercise of initiative (a captain) and that a loss in efficiency would result from raising this numerical strength above 100. Conditions in America differ from those in Europe in many respects. Our enlisted men possess more intelligence and initiative and, while they are capable of forming a cavalry superior to European cavalry, they are not so readily controlled as Europeans. They need more officers. And our troops must do their own horse training; they cannot expect to be furnished trained horses.

In Europe systematic recruitment replaces losses quickly and units are maintained at a practically uniform strength. It is a peculiarity of the American service that the strength of our units fluctuates greatly. This necessitates, for us, an elastic organization; and the organization of our cavalry is more elastic than the European organization.

The Cavalry Service Regulations are based on the principle that troops must always be formed in double rank except under certain exceptional conditions. History shows that the depth of both cavalry and infantry formations has steadily decreased from the earliest times to the present day. During the Civil War our infantry fought in double rank; combats between thinner lines was called "skirmishing." Now our infantry forms for combat a thick skirmish line which is practically a single rank; when our cavalry dismounts to fight on foot,

it will fight in single rank also. A change now from single to double rank would be like moving the hands of a clock in a reverse direction, retrogression rather than progress.

Infantry still maneuvers in double rank because it can change from line in double rank to column of march by wheeling by fours. Cavalry in single rank can change from line to column of fours, but if formed in double rank it cannot do so. In France, the column of platoons is the normal column of march; there the roads are wider and better than ours and the country off the roads is practically free from fences. We are always compelled to use the column of fours or the column of twos as our column of march because our roads are narrow and have frequent bridges which are still narrower. And when we leave the roads we find ourselves in a country intersected by fences, usually wire. Cavalry in column of fours can march expeditiously through a country intersected with wire fences by sending a few men ahead to open a panel in each fence. If we attempt to march in column of platoons, several panels in each fence must be removed and this would cause considerable delay. Of course, we can march in column of platoons between fences and pass through single panels "at will" but nothing is gained by doing so.

There is a disadvantage in training men and horses to march in a rear rank. Habitual marching in the rear rank does not give the training that a cavalry soldier should have. The reason most commonly given for the existence of the rear rank is that the rear rank men will press forward during a charge and will fill gaps in the front rank. Observation and experience show that the rear rank falls back during a charge, except when a rear rank horse bolts and then he is more likely to throw the front rank into disorder than to fill a gap. It is doubtful if any considerable number of rear rank men will find their way into the front rank during the charge; and those who do not do so are wasted, for the rear rank does not push against the front rank and adds nothing to the momentum of the charge. Only those who come into contact with the enemy produce any physical effect.

Of course, depth is essential in a mounted attack. A serious mounted attack should never be made in less than two

lines, even when a double rank formation is used. But by forming the same number of men in single rank a greater depth can be obtained. And the victory goes to the side which brings up the last formed reserve.

A single rank formation is less likely to fall into disorder during a charge and can be reformed much more quickly after a charge than a double rank formation. By forming the same number of men in single rank a broader front may be opposed to an enemy; this tends to protect our own flanks and to jeopardize those of the enemy. In a mounted combat one man on the flank is worth ten in front. If the front rank charges with the lance, a justification can be found for a rear rank armed with the saber on account of the difficulty of using the lance in the mêlée. But our front rank charges with the saber and can use is also in the mêlée.

Comparing a line of cavalry in double rank with two lines of equal length in single rank, it is believed that the greater advantages will be found with the latter. The double rank formation is cheaper because there are no officers with the rear rank. On the other hand the second line in single rank has an advantages over a rear rank in that it is still under control after the first line has closed with the enemy; it could change direction or deliver a second shock. Gen. F. K. Ward says in discussing the probable results of a collision between a single rank line and a double rank line (*Cavalry Journal, March, 1912*) of the effect of the rear rank: "It can add nothing to the momentum of its front rank at the instant of collision for it will be two yards behind it \* \* \*. Previous to the shock some of the rear rank men may move up into the front rank to fill openings occurring there but with well instructed men there will be no occasion for that at very many points. A single rank fairly well closed makes a formidable obstacle. It cannot be cleared or pushed aside. It may be knocked down but the horses doing it will have little or no go left in them for a while, even those that are not down themselves. While the single rank line may be pierced in some places by individual men \* \* \* the two lines will be brought to a halt and immediately after the collision the men remaining in the rear rank, being too close to avoid doing so, must plunge headlong

into the mass with more immediate damage to friend than foe." In discussing the probable results of a collision between a double rank and two lines in single rank, Gen. Ward says: "Throughout the advance to the attack, the rear rank of the double rank line must keep closed to the prescribed distance of two or three yards. On the other side when the rapid gait is taken up during the advance, the platoon commanders in the second (line) should take \* \* \* such a distance (say about seventy or seventy-five yards) that when the shock takes place they can halt their platoons just short of the engaged mass. They would then get there before the disengagement is completed, in perfect order, and in condition to take the most effective part possible in the mêlée to follow."

Drill in single rank is simpler than drill in double rank. There is less for the soldier to learn. The time required for mastering the technicalities of the drill in single rank is about half that required for double rank.

Aside from the question of the suitability of the double rank as a charging formation, what are the advantages claimed for the drill in the Cavalry Service Regulations, 1914? So far as I know them, they are as follows:

- (a) "The drill has great mobility."
- (b) Use of signals.
- (c) Leadership.
- (d) Fan shaped deployments.
- (e) That it shortens columns and facilitates the handling of cavalry masses.

(a) The expression "the drill has great mobility" is sometimes heard; but it is not clear what is meant by it. It is true that the horses were ridden pretty hard at the Cavalry Camp of Instruction at Winchester, Va., in 1913, but they might have been ridden just as hard if they had been formed in single rank and in troops instead of provisional squadrons. A form of drill might hamper or diminish the mobility of the troops being drilled, but could scarcely add anything to it. Mobility depends on the speed and condition of the horses, their shoes, packs, etc., not on the drill. If flexibility or pliability are meant, the advantage in this respect is all with the single rank drill. In double rank changes of direction are ordinarily made

by wheels by platoons on a front of sixteen men; in single rank similar changes are made on a front of four men. With the double rank formation, in order to march a route column to the rear or form a line to a flank in route column, each platoon must ordinarily make two changes of direction and march its own length before it is fairly started. The facts that wheels by fours cannot be made without loss of formation, that the right of each platoon must always be on the right or in front introduce an element of rigidity into the double rank drill which frequently causes delays, especially in movements to the rear or by the flank. The rallies, the wheels by fours and the individual about are expedients introduced to compensate for this lack of flexibility. They do not compensate for it fully because they are attended by loss of formation. This could readily be shown by requiring troops to execute some other movement immediately after a rally, a wheel by fours or the individual about. Suppose that a squadron comes under shrapnel fire and must move quickly to a flank for cover and immediately afterward finds a favorable opportunity for using rifle fire. If it is in single rank it can move quickly to a flank by wheeling by fours and can immediately dismount to fight on foot. If it is in double rank and gains ground to a flank by rallying it is thrown into such disorder that it cannot reform without considerable delay. The Cavalry Service Regulations say (Par. 481): "The line of platoon columns (or the line of squadron masses) favors deployment to the front and is advantageous in utilizing the small folds of the terrain; however, it is not favorable to a deployment to a flank." Similar formations in single rank may be deployed readily to a flank. A line in double rank is easier to lead, provided it continues to move to the front or makes only slight changes of direction, than a line in single rank of the same numerical strength, because it is shorter. If the same number of men were arranged in four ranks they could be led still more easily. In other words, a column is more easily led than a line. But in order to fight we must deploy. The maximum of fighting efficiency is to be expected from the line in single rank because every man can be brought into contact with the enemy; and the double rank is under the dis-

advantage that it cannot move to a flank or to the rear readily without loss of formation.

(b) Signals can be used quite as well with single rank formations as with double rank formations. They were used freely in most of our regiments before the appearance of the "Tentative Drill Regulations" or the "Cavalry Service Regulations." There is no basis of comparison of the two systems on this head. The fact that signals have been required in connection with the double rank drill has extended their use; and, even if we discard the double rank, signals will be more generally employed in the future than they have been in the past.

(c) Leadership exists in the Cavalry Drill Regulations in a slightly different form from that in the Cavalry Service Regulations. Under the Cavalry Drill Regulations the commander could always become the guide both in gait and direction by giving the command "Follow in trace." Exercises in leading were prescribed (Pars. 383, 384, 385, 386, 547, etc.) and the commander was always the guide when charging or rallying (Pars. 346, 532, etc.). Under the Cavalry Service Regulations he can cease to be the guide at any time by indicating the gait and direction (Par. 455). The commander often wishes to supervise the execution of his commands and he cannot do so while he is the guide. The arrangement prescribed in the Cavalry Drill Regulations is often the most practical one; but leadership could be made normal instead of exceptional without changing our formation and organization. The control of the gait is an important function of command. The commander should be the guide as to gait or should indicate it. The gait should not be subject to such mechanical rules as those of Par. 8, C. D. R., and the Cavalry Drill Regulations could be improved by omitting that paragraph.

(d) Fan shaped deployments may be used as readily by single rank formations as by formations in double rank. They have their limitations; the commander does not know exactly where either of his flanks will rest when the deployment is completed. For this reason they cannot be used in extending a line occupied by other troops or when for any other reason the location of a flank is important. The importance of fan shaped

deployments has been greatly exaggerated. They apply only to deployments to the front from column and deployments of this character are usually made by orders from the commander directing each unit to designated points, by designating units for the performance of certain duties or by personally leading them to desired positions. Deployments are ordinarily made to a flank when practicable. Cavalry avoids deploying to the front in the presence of an active mounted enemy because it cannot be done without holding the leading unit at a walk or trot. The commander will ordinarily prefer to direct the march of his column so as to bring it upon the ground which he wishes to occupy and then form line to a flank. In deployments to a flank the single rank possesses a great advantage over the double rank.

(e) A column of platoons in double rank is shorter than a column of fours of the same numerical strength, but the column of platoons cannot be used as a marching formation anywhere in the United States. The column of platoons does not possess, for us, the importance assigned it by the Cavalry Service Regulations. There seems to be no good reason for us to adopt formations which are suitable only for operations in France and Germany. The length of columns depends on the number of men who can march abreast, and this depends on the road. If it is known that the roads and bridges ahead of us are wide enough to permit eight men to march abreast, we can, under the provisions of the Cavalry Drill Regulations (Par. 662), march in column of eights. It is not likely that we will ever have an opportunity to march with a front of sixteen troopers. When it is desired to assemble a large number of men in a small space (for concealment, etc.) the "masses," "column of masses" and "line of masses," provided for by the Cavalry Drill Regulations, afford as dense formations as any in the Cavalry Service Regulations. Distances and intervals may be reduced to zero if desired.

The provisional organization of our cavalry regiments into seven units (six squadrons and machine gun unit) is difficult to handle. It is worse in this respect than the Russian and Austrian regiments of six squadrons and their organization is not so good as that of the German and French regiments,

which have four squadrons only. On this subject, Balck says (*Taktik*, Vol. II): "Six-squadron regiments actually offer a temptation to make detachments, as they are unwieldy in difficult country, cannot, even under favorable conditions, be controlled by the voice of a single leader, and necessitates the introduction of an intermediate unit between regiments and squadron, the so-called 'division,' consisting in Russia of two, in Austria of three squadrons. Four-squadron regiments are more easily managed, and are capable of deploying quickly in any direction—even from the most favorable formation, the column of platoons and the regimental column (mass). They can form line from route column more quickly than the six-squadron regiment (this movement taking four minutes in the former and six minutes in the latter), and their size actually demands that each regiment be kept intact and employed as one unit. \* \* \* Thus, tactical considerations argue for four-squadron regiments, considerations of economy for six-squadron regiments."

In regard to three-squadron regiments he says: "Three-squadron regiments possess great mobility, but they are so weak that the personality of the regimental commander is not properly utilized." Here it should be remembered that the European squadron is smaller than the American unit of the same name.

In regard to single rank for cavalry, Balck says: "Lord Wellington objected to a second rank, even when cavalry had to charge cavalry, because it did not augment the shock power but increased disorder. Prince Frederick Charles likewise believed the single rank formation to be the formation of the cavalry of the future. It is claimed that the single rank formation has greater mobility than other formations; that it facilitates movements and assembling after a charge; and, that it suffers less from fire. On the other hand, it is claimed that the single rank formation is difficult to handle and easily pierced, and that it breaks easily during movements, whereas a second rank, if provided, fills gaps occasioned by losses and resists any hostile troopers that may have succeeded in breaking through the front rank."

Conservatism and considerations of economy have prevented the single rank formation of cavalry from being tested to any considerable extent in Europe; it has, however, been thoroughly tested on the American continent, and the objections, which Balck, mentions "that it is difficult to handle" and that "it breaks easily during movements" have been found to be groundless. There seems to be no good reason for thinking that it is "easily pierced;" the utility of the men who "fill gaps occasioned by losses" does not justify the existence of the entire second rank; and "hostile troopers who may have succeeded in breaking through the front rank" can be taken care of better by a second line than by a rear rank. On the other hand our observation and experience warrant us in believing that the advantages which he mentions are real and important.



## AN OFFICERS' ENDURANCE RACE.\*

BY MAJOR F. C. MARSHALL, ELEVENTH CAVALRY.

THE Eleventh Cavalry is very fortunate in the active spirit of its officers, and in their devotion to the development of horsemanship in their regiment. This spirit has been manifested in a number of ways, but in none more than in the inducements offered by officers and their civilian friends to secure excellence in that direction by all sorts of competitions.

Cups are offered and competed for annually for steeple chases, point to point races, jumping contests and polo. An annual Horse Show stimulates officers to secure suitable mounts, and enlisted men to care for and train the horses assigned to them to get the best results from them.

These prizes for excellent performances were, however, limited to what might be called the embroidery of cavalry work: none of them taught sense of direction and orientation that cavalrymen must possess, or demonstrated the endurance of horses and men.

After one of these races—a three mile point to point race over very rough country, with many jumps—I was in conversation with a group of youngsters. We were talking about the need for developing a knowledge of what our horses could do, under service conditions, and I said: "The kind of race I would like to see pulled off is a long distance race, at night, over unfamiliar country." The youngsters came back at me with: "All right, Major, you give a cup and we'll show you what we can do." I replied: "I believe I will."

The result was that the letter contained in General Orders No. 6, Headquarters Eleventh Cavalry was written, which order is as follows:

\*This report of a very novel and interesting endurance race has been compiled from letters and reports and is credited to Major Marshall, although not written as an article and not so authorized by him.—*Editor.*

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CAVALRY.

General Orders }  
No. 6. }

FORT OGLETHORPE, GA.,  
March 29, 1915.

1. The following letter from Major F. C. Marshall, Eleventh Cavalry, to the Commanding Officer is published for the information of the regiment:

FORT OGLETHORPE, GA.,  
March 22, 1910.

*From:* Major F. C. Marshall, 11th Cavalry.

*To:* The Commanding Officer, 11th Cavalry.

*Subject:* Trophy for Officers' Contest.

1. The duties devolving on Cavalry Officers, connected with distant patrolling in time of war, will call for frequent long rides into unknown country, an expert knowledge of the capabilities and endurance of horses, and, more than all, a sure sense of direction and location, in order that the officer may deliver the information he has collected to the person who is to use it.

2. In order to stimulate preparation for these duties among the officers of this regiment, I wish to donate a trophy to be competed for annually, during time of peace, by officers of the Eleventh U. S. Cavalry, subject to the following conditions:

a. Each officer shall ride his own horse.

b. The hour of starting shall not be earlier than 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

c. The course over which the test is made shall be triangular, not less than sixty miles in perimeter, as the crow flies, the turning point not to be located within two miles of a city or village of more than 500 inhabitants. These turning points to be determined by the Field Officers of the Regiment, and are not to be announced until the competitors are ready to mount for the start.

d. No restrictions are to be imposed as to uniform or equipment. During the competition officers may use any sources of information as to roads, short cuts, etc., that would

be available to a patrol leader operating in friendly territory in time of war.

e. In determining the winner but two elements shall be considered and they shall have equal weight; the time consumed in the test, and the condition of the officer's horse at 8:30 o'clock on the morning of the day after the test is completed.

f. The trophy shall be kept in the personal possession of the successful officer until another officer shall win it, or until he leaves the regiment, when it shall be turned over to the Adjutant for safe keeping until again competed for.

3. It is recommended that the first competition be held during the last week of April, and that competitors be handed, just before the signal to mount, instructions similar to these:

Go to ..... and report from there to the Adjutant by mail; then go to ..... and report to him from there also by mail. Then return to Fort Oglethorpe, and report in person to the Commander of the Guard.

F. C. MARSHALL.

2. The acceptance of the trophy is announced and it will be known as the "*Marshall Trophy*."

The thanks of the regiment are extended to Major F. C. Marshall.

3. The date of the first competition will be announced later.


By order of Colonel LOCKETT:

V. LAS. ROCKWELL,  
*Captain and Adjutant, 11th Cav.*

The response was most gratifying. Officers at once began to train their horses and to study their capabilities from this new angle. The race was run on April 27, 1915, and commenced at 3:06 P. M. The following officers participated in the race: Captains Parker, McKinlay and Swift, and Lieutenants Hunsaker, Flynn, Viner, Crutcher, Clark and Robertson.

The course prescribed is outlined on the accompanying map, the only requirements being that each contestant should report at Cedar Grove and Villanow, each choosing his own route and direction of travel. The distance by the nearest practicable route was seventy-one miles, but the actual

distance was several miles farther, due to the turns and detours in the roads not shown on the map.\*



Four officers elected to go by Cedar Grove: Captain Parker and Lieutenants Hunsacker, Viner and Robertson.

\*The map referred to was the Ringgold quadrangle of the U. S. Geological Survey. The sketch map here reproduced is made from that map. The route taken by the contestants who went first to Cedar Grove was via Crawfish Spring, Pond Spring to 893, thence west and south to Cedar Grove, thence back along this same road to 893 and on through Blue Bird Gap to Lafayette, Naomi and Villanow. From Villanow the route to the Post was back through Wood Gap, Maddox Gap to Naomi and thence through Rock Spring to Fort Oglethorpe. The other contestants, with the exception of Lieutenant Clark took the reverse route over the same roads. Lieutenant Clark was the only one to take a different route in going to Villanow, he having taken the apparently somewhat longer and rougher road through Wood Station and Gordon Spring.

The other six took the reverse route. The excellent judgment of the first group was demonstrated by the fact that they were the first four officers to complete the race.

Captain Parker was the first to arrive at the Guard House, at 11:45 P. M. He covered the distance in eight hours and thirty-nine minutes, after receiving his order. He actually delayed at the Post until 3:20 P. M., studying the map and estimating the situation. His actual time was eight hours and twenty-five minutes.

Lieutenant Robertson finished second at 12:28 A. M. Lieutenant VINER third at 1:15 A. M. Lieutenant Hunsacker fourth at 2:00 A. M., and Lieutenant Clark at 3:40 A. M. Five officers finished in less than thirteen hours, and the other five got in early in the morning.

When it is considered that none of these officers knew where the course was to lie until they were ready to mount, that all were entirely unfamiliar with the greater part of it, that the turning points were in obscure places, hard to find, that two mountains had to be crossed on roads that were little used, and that it was dark in four hours and a half after starting it must be admitted that the performances of these officers were notable indeed.

Captain Parker has written a very interesting memorandum, which, with two pictures of the winning horse, is herewith shown.

Lieutenant Robertson has two excellent thoroughbreds. One, a horse 16 hands  $1\frac{1}{4}$  inches in height, that won the race for the Roger Bayley Cup (the race that led up to the conversation noted above) was rejected in favor of the other, a smaller animal, a mare, 15 hands 2 inches, weighing 1,000 pounds, because Lieutenant Robertson believed she had more stamina and was a better weight carrier than the larger horse. He did not go into the systematic course of training described by Captain Parker, but he gave the mare a lot of slow work every day, and an occasional ride of two hours or so on hard roads. His work was all, practically, at a slow, steady trot.

Lieutenant Robertson presented himself for the race with the load reduced to the smallest possible. He carried no food either for himself or for his horse. He carried no whip or spur,

and takes the greatest pride in the spirit of his mare, who seemed to realize that she was racing, and needed absolutely no encouraging. Both he and his mare drank at every opportunity. He travelled the course at a ten mile trot nearly all the time. At first he dismounted and ran up hill, but he soon discovered



Q. E. D.

OWNED AND RIDDEN BY CAPTAIN FRANK PARKER.

Bay gelding, nine years old, 15-3 hands, sired by Panpankeewis (Virginia thoroughbred) out of standard brood mare. He came from the Front Royal Remount Depot.

that he could make better time by dismounting and running alongside down hill. To save time he always dismounted at the trot, and mounted at the walk. He carried a map, compass, watch and matches, but seldom used them, orienting himself by the stars and the moon, and keeping to the right

road by continual questions asked of people he met. He did not take time to consult either his map or his compass. At Lafayette, about half way of the course, he dismounted near a drug store, and massaged his horse's legs with witch hazel, rubbing the forelegs from the lower arm, and the hind legs from the gaskin, briskly for ten minutes. At Villanow he repeated this massage for three minutes. He occasionally galloped up the gentler slopes, and walked up very few, in spite of the fact that the race carried him across three narrow and steep ridges 400 to 500 feet high. She never hung her head on the road, but was bright and alert every minute. When she got to her stall, after the race, her mouth was swabbed out and her back and legs rubbed with aromatic spirits of ammonia. He wound up with brisk leg massage with witch hazel, then wound all four cannons with flannel bandages, wrung out in cold water. After forty minutes she was fed hay. Forty-five minutes later she got a small quantity of water, and one and one-half hours later, two quarts of oats. She ate and drank with a relish, but did not lie down during the night. In the morning she ate her regular ration of hay and grain with a relish.

I enclose Lieutenant Clark's memorandum, because he set the pace for the group of contestants that went first to Villanow.


You will note that he met Captain Parker when the latter had completed about three-fifths of the race, and at once changed his pace and his plans. He could see, of course, that the race was lost, but he made a plucky finish and is entitled to a lot of credit.

Lieutenant Viner's horse was cold blooded. It was a small horse too, and the finish he made, competing with thoroughbreds, was really remarkable.

Lieutenant Hunsaker's horse was carrying at least a hundred pounds of fat that might have been worked off, and was soft in consequence. Lieutenant Hunsaker weighs twenty-five pounds more than any of the men who finished ahead of him, and this, with the hundred pounds of fat his horse carried, caused him to lose. His pace was well set to the capacity of his horse, and his race run was with splendid judgment.

None of these horses suffered the slightest injury as a result of the race; all of them have been doing their daily work ever since the race.

Long distance military races have been frequently run before, but I have never heard of one that was run over as long a course as this one, at night, and over obscure trails, in country



SHENANDOAH.

OWNED AND RIDDEN BY LIEUTENANT I. L. HUNSAKER.

entirely unknown to any of the contestants. They did not even know where the race was to be run until they were about to start.

Villanow and Cedar Grove are not villages at all, but are merely postoffices located in cross-roads, country stores. Blue Bird Gap is criss-crossed with a net work of wood roads, any of which is as plain as the shortest road through the Gap, and it

was here that the delays occurred that caused the last six of the contestants to finish so much behind the first hour.

In a personal letter to me, Captain Parker says: "I avail myself of this opportunity to express my deep satisfaction in being the first winner of the Marshall Trophy, a prize which heralds a departure in our cavalry in the department of mounted sport, and which, in my opinion, represents more practical value, from the cavalry standpoint, than any other trophy that I have seen offered during my service."

The cup bears this inscription: "Presented by Major F. C. Marshall to the officers of the 11th Cavalry, for annual competition in long distance riding, at night, over unfamiliar roads."

---

#### REPORT OF CAPTAIN FRANK PARKER.

Referring to your letter on the subject, I shall divide this report into the following:

- A. PREPARATION OF HORSE.
- B. MY OWN PREPARATION.
- C. NARRATIVE OF THE RACE.

##### A. PREPARATION OF HORSE—*About twenty-eight days.*

First week—four hours a day.  
Second week—five hours a day.  
Third week—six hours a day.  
Fourth week—except last two days. 7 hours a day.

Gait—walk and trot.  
The time and pace of the trot being progressively increased.

This schedule was affected by an accident, causing the last week's work to be kept at six hours a day.

The work during the first week was slow; walk and trot, with an occasional halt to allow the horse to relieve himself, if he wished. Constant attention was paid to regularizing the gaits, especially the trot. Commencing the first week with the eight mile trot, the last week's work was done at the ten mile trot.

*Food.*—Oats and hay only, fed at first call and 10 A. M. whole, at 2:00 P. M. and 6:00 P. M., crushed and mixed with sugar (two pounds per day). Ration reached about twenty pounds of oats after first week and was maintained at that. Hay regular allowance.

Sugar is a tonic and stimulant, is entirely digested, keeps up the flesh, and gives a relish to the oats.



SILVER DICK.

OWNED AND RIDDEN BY LIEUTENANT J. W. VINER.

*Horse Shoes.*—Light steel shoe and rubber pad. The rubber pads are necessary where the training is on hard roads, as was the case.

#### B. MY OWN PREPARATIONS.—

A circle of twenty miles radius about the Post showed that the southeast and southwest quadrants would probably contain the race triangle, due to the position of the Tennessee River and so I became fairly familiar with the general topo-

graphy of these quadrants. Polo and the conditioning of my horse kept me in good physical condition.

C. NARRATIVE OF RACE.—

Received instructions at 3:06 p. m. to proceed to Cedar Grove, Villanow or vice versa, and return to Post. I went to my quarters at once, put on a pair of enlisted men's cloth leggins, carefully studied my map, saw that Pigeon Mountain must be negotiated before dark and at once decided on Cedar Grove as my first objective, leaving the gently rolling country from Naomi to the Post for my last lap. I applied the following ideas. Outline a schedule and stick to it as far as conditions will allow.

Slow, steady trot up hill, and increase of pace down hill.

On steep slopes, both up and down, dismount and run as far and as fast as possible. Increase the pace progressively during contest. Let horse drink frequently.

Relieve the horse of your weight, ten to fifteen minutes in each hour, if possible, choosing the terrain where it will help the animal most and least interfere with rate of progress, *i. e.*, best terrain for this purpose steep descent.

Keep on the hardest and smoothest part of the road if you have rubber pads on your horse.

*Run against time and not against the other competitors.*

My schedule was to reach Lafayette at 7:00 p. m., and the Post at 11:20 p. m., eight hours.

My first effort was to average nine miles an hour to Lafayette, but Pigeon Mountain and the vile, abandoned trail leading over Blue Bird Gap spoiled that figure and I was lucky to reach Lafayette with an average of eight miles to the hour, according to map, at 7:10 p. m.

The distance, so far, by the straight lines drawn on the map, is thirty-one miles, but it is easily thirty-three, allowing for the turns and twists of the route.

I stopped in Lafayette about ten minutes, got something to drink, and information as to the next lap, and left at 7:20 p. m. I now had forty miles by the map to do, and I proposed doing it at the rate of ten miles an hour.

I reached Villanow at 8:10 p. m. and the Post at 11:45, covering what is easily fourty-two miles in four hours and

twenty-five minutes, which, taking the distance as measured on the map at forty miles, gives an average of nine miles an hour for this stretch. I ran beside my horse frequently while on the portion of the route Lafayette, Villanow, Naomi, but thereafter only occasionally not averaging more than five minutes on foot to the hour.



ROMEON.

OWNED AND RIDDEN BY LIEUTENANT CUYLER L. CLARK.

My horse showed no signs of weakening. He came in with his head up, and I at no time had to urge him, and always had to pull him down to the walk on the steep slopes even toward the end.

The only part of the route difficult for man and horse was Pigeon Mountain. The trail from 893 to Marsh (U. S. Geological Survey) appears to have been abandoned, or but little used for a long time. It is no longer a road, and a pack animal

would find the latter part, toward Marsh, fairly difficult. Pigeon Mountain is covered with trees and heavy under-brush, and I was much relieved when I found myself at Marsh. At Layafette I secured the services of a guide who accompanied me in a buggy far enough to get me safely on the road to Villanow, and later, awaiting my return, on the road to Rock Springs.

I wish to state that prior to the start I made no preparations for this race beyond my horse's and my own, and that I received no assistance except that of the guide at Lafayette.

I wish to call attention to the fact that my horse was injured on April 11th, striking his knee with violence against a solid jump, and that at the start of the race he was still lame. The lameness however, was due to inflamation of the membrane covering the knee, and he stood the training, with one day's lay off just after the accident, appearing to improve steadily and going smoothly after twenty minutes of warming up. I called the Judges attention at the start to his lameness, showing him at a trot, and stating that the lameness would not be affected by the race as neither muscle nor tendon were involved.

I reached Cedar Grove at 5:35 P. M., Lafayette at 7:10 P. M., Villanow at 8:10 P. M. and the Post at 11:45 P. M.

I believe the total distance of this race to be at least seventy-five miles, and that my average speed was about nine miles an hour.

---


#### REPORT OF LIEUTENANT CUYLER L. CLARK.

I left the Post at 3:20 P. M. followed the Lafayette Pike to a point three quarters of a mile south of Lee and Gordons Mill and took the road to Woods Station, where I arrived at 5:30 P. M. Thence I proceeded to Nickajack Gap and south by a wood trail to Gordons Spring, east to Villanow Pike, and south to Villanow, where I arrived at 8:40 P. M.

Here, although I found three men ahead of me on the road west, I halted one half hour, and fed one half of a full feed of oats to my horse.

I left Villanow at 9:10 p. m. At Woods Gap I met Capt. Parker going east and decided to increase my gait. By so doing I overtook all three men ahead of me at Lafayette, which point I reached at 10:30 p. m.

At Lafayette I inquired of the sheriff for road information. Following his advice, I took the main pike through Bluebird Gap to Davis Cross-roads, thence south two miles and west two miles to Cedar Grove. Leaving Cedar Grove at about 12:00



INDEAL.

OWNED AND RIDDEN BY LIEUTENANT W. A. ROBERTSON.

m. I returned to Davis Cross-roads by the same route previously followed and proceeded from that point to the Post by the Pike through Frick Gap, Pond Springs and Crawfish Springs. I arrived at my destination at 3:40 p. m.

During the first third of my journey I allowed my horse to take his own gait, which I estimated at five miles per hour, but I dismounted at all steep hills. During the second third of my journey I endeavored to make up for lost time. My gait from Villanow to Lafayette was ten miles per hour. The rest of

the way, due to frequent delays in searching for roads, the best rate that I could make was seven miles per hour. During this part of my journey I found it necessary to dismount and lead frequently, but rode at a trot and at a canter all the time when mounted. I found that the canter, when employed for short distances, relieved my horse of the weariness due to continuous trotting.

Throughout the journey I employed no guide. The weight of my horse was 825 lbs. My own weight, with equipment complete, was 172 lbs.



## BREEDING TO COLOR AND CONFORMATION— MENDELISM.\*

BY VETERINARIAN ROBERT VANS AGNEW, FIFTH CAVALRY.

**T**HE foundation color in horses really consists of only two pigments, although there are innumerable shades and varieties of color which we see daily before us.

An individual hair is a hollow shaft surrounded by a layer of characteristic cells that bear the pigment. Covering this is a layer of long, roughened, epithelial cells that serve as a protection and correspond to the surface cells of the skin. It is this layer of cells that gives to wool the valuable felting property, as the roughened fibers of one fiber assist in clinging to another. In the horse this layer is comparatively smooth.

The inside layer is of interest since in colored horses it is the part that bears the pigment.

Rather evenly distributed through this structure in all except white, or so-called gray hairs, there is a basic ground pigment that is reddish-yellow in appearance. It is difficult to determine under the microscope whether this is entirely a fine granular pigment or whether it is partly diffuse, as though stained with a sap or dye. It is quite uniform except for a greater density at the tip.

When this pigment is present in large amounts it gives a strong red under the microscope and produces externally what is known as the dark chestnut. In proportions quantitatively less, it shades more in to a yellow and shows sorrels and duns.

The hair of the bay or brown presents exactly the same condition microscopically, but looks different externally because the black skin, mane and tail, and dark extremities give it a *stronger* look.

---

\*Synopsis of a lecture to the Staff Class at the Army Service Schools.

This may seem a dogmatic statement to those who are sure that they can distinguish the different colors externally; nevertheless, it is impossible to separate chestnut, bay and the colored hairs of the strawberry roan when the three are mixed together.

The second pigment is composed of larger black granules that have a tendency to lie in clusters. These granules obscure the red ground pigment and produce the deep black of the mane, tail and body. The body hairs over the shoulders, sides, croup, thighs and belly do not seem to carry quantitatively as much pigment in proportion to the red as the hairs of the head, neck, limbs, mane and tail. Consequently, when fading under a hot sun takes place, the extremities hold their black color longer than the body.

It is the presence of the basic ground pigment underneath that gives the rusty color to the hairs. The hollow shaft or medulla of the hair has a very important function since the pit of air serves to help reflect the rays of light and gives a much more opaque appearance.

Hereditary factors determine whether the color be intense or dilute in nature, *i. e.*, whether there be much or little pigment. In the cat, the black is an intense condition of this second pigment, in the maltese or blue, a dilute condition. So in the horse we find mouse color a dilute black, sorrel a partly dilute chestnut, and dun a dilute bay, or a more greatly dilute chestnut, according to kind.

Many other mechanical factors operate to produce roans, grays, browns, piebalds and others, but in all of them only these two fundamental pigments occur.

In breeding for color we have certain statistics to go on. We have to thank Gregor Mendel for his profound experiments in laws of heredity and color. He has enabled the breeder to anticipate color and characteristics in perpetuating a breed.

It is not in my province to expound his theory very fully, but I strongly urge upon you the necessity of reading one of the several treatises upon Mendelism, as it is called.

Before Mendel, breeding was more or less haphazardous. For ages man no doubt was, in spite of his ignorance, improving his domesticated races of animals and plants, but it was not

until Aristotle's time that we have any evidence of hereditary phenomena. The accepted laical and biblical view was that the male furnished the seed and the female provided the soil, and many centuries elapsed before the female was recognized as being more than a passive agent. As the time went on, the microscope was evolved; by it we made vast strides in our lore of the sexes, and we find that the male contributed spermatozœa and the female the ovum. They were to be seen, we could classify and name the different cells that we could see so easily. So we called these sexual cells, whether ovules, or spermatozœa, by the general term of gametes, or marrying cells. And we called the individual formed by the fusion or yoking together of two gametes, a zygote.

This zygote is regarded as a double structure formed by the component parts of the gametes into a partnership for life. But when the zygote in turn came to form gametes, then this partnership was broken and the process reversed.

This intricate relationship between the gamete and the zygote baffled all researches until Mendel practically founded the modern science of heredity, just as Darwin had given us his great idea on the Evolution of Species.

Darwin's Origin of Species came out in the year 1859. Before that, in spite of much experimental hybridization, the determination of the relation of the species and varieties to one another seemed as remote as ever, but Darwin's theory was so consistent and lucid and he had such an array of facts marshaled together in support of his ideas that it rapidly gained the approval of the great majority of biologists and thinking people throughout the world. For the next forty years zoologists and botanists were busily engaged in classifying the great masses of accumulated anatomical facts by the light of this theory of Darwin.

Briefly put, his theory was this: In any species of plant or animal the reproductive capacity tends to outrun the available food supply and the resulting competition leads to an inevitable struggle for existence. Of all the individuals born, only a portion, and that often a very small one, can survive to produce offspring. But according to Darwin, the nature of the surviving portion is not determined by chance

alone. No two individuals of a species are precisely alike and among the variations that occur some enable their possessors to cope more successfully with the competitive conditions under which they exist. In comparison with their less favored brethren, they have a better chance of surviving in the struggle for existence, and consequently of leaving offspring. He completes his argument by assuming also a principle of heredity by which the offspring tends to resemble their parents more than other members of the species.

Parents possessing a favorable variation tend to transmit that variation to their offspring, to some in a greater and to others in a less degree. Those possessing them in a greater degree will again have a better chance of survival and will transmit the favorable variation in an even greater degree to some of their offspring.

Thus a competitive struggle for existence, working in combination with certain principles of variation and heredity, results in a slow but continuous transformation of the species through an operation which Darwin termed "*Natural Selection*."

The coherence and simplicity of this theory electrified the world and was so enthusiastically accepted that it diverted attention from the way in which species originate and, consequently, checked further knowledge of hybridization. That is why Mendel's experiments which he gave to the world in 1865, six years after Darwin announced his theory were not given the attention that they deserved. Therefore, it was not until the year 1900 that they were rediscovered, as it were, and their great value and significance brought to light. Mendel after eight years of experiment with the common pea, discovered that he could with certainty determine the character of the gametes and the zygotes.

Now Mendel found that the gametes could carry a character both dominant and recessive, but that the individual gamete could only carry one of any alternative pair of characters so that by breeding from the gamete of one character with another gamete of the same character, one could perpetuate that character in the zygote. Also, that in breeding from a gamete of one character with a gamete of another character, one could get both dominant and recessive characters, but in

the second and succeeding generations, certain of these characters would separate into the original pure character in a regular ratio.

Shortly after Mendel's discovery, a need was felt for terms of a general nature to express the constitution of individuals in respect of inherited characters, and the words proposed were homozygote and heterozygote.

An individual is said to be homozygous for a given character when it is formed by two gametes each bearing that character, and all the gametes of a homozygote bear that character in respect of which it is homozygous.

When, however, the zygote is formed by two gametes of which one bears the given character, while the other does not, it is said to be heterozygous for the character in question and only half the gametes produced by such a heterozygote bear the character. By this an individual may be homozygous for one or more characters, and at the same time may be heterozygous for others.

Though a heterozygous individual may be indistinguishable in appearance from the homozygous one, they can be readily separated by the breeding test. For instance, suppose that one of you has a chestnut mare and wishes to get a bay foal from her. We know that bay is dominant to chestnut and that if a homozygous bay stallion is used a bay colt will result, so in your choice of a sire you must look up the previous record of the stallion and select one that has never given anything but bays even when put to either bay or chestnut mares.

In this way you assure yourself of a bay colt from a chestnut mare, whereas, if the record shows that he has had chestnut foals then he is heterozygous and the chances of his getting a bay or a chestnut foal are equal.

Thus we are fairly certain of getting the color that we want, but of the other and finer attributes that the breeder may seek to perpetuate in variations of species, these are dependent upon the earlier life conditions of the individual and not upon the constitutions of the gametes by which it was formed. The science of heredity does not help us in these variations as yet.

Also we know that grays and chestnuts mated only to their own color produce either grays or chestnuts, and black with black about eight per cent. chestnuts (often dark), the rest always blacks. When parents are brown their foals may be of any color, but the majority will be brown.

Parents of lighter colors transmit them more frequently than the darker ones.

Chestnuts and blacks produce most often browns, chestnuts less frequently and least seldom of all, blacks.

Brown and black produce more browns than blacks.

Chestnuts and dark browns produce more chestnuts. Chestnuts and light browns produce more brown. Chestnut color is the most suitable to get rid of the gray color; some of the foals will be brown. The chestnut color in half breeds is exceedingly sure of transmission.

In thoroughbreds the bay color is predominating. Having decided upon our color, we will proceed to take up the art of mating.

Now, the most important thing in practical breeding, is to favor the brood mares more than the mating stallion, *i. e.*, with which stallion the mare would have the best chance of producing the type of horse that is required.

One must endeavor to equalize the faults of the brood mares by corresponding merits of the mating stallions.

These faults may consist of mis-placed forelegs, weak hocks, too long middlepiece, high leggedness, narrowness, straight shoulders, etc.; defects of constitution, as hard and soft; of temperament, as hasty, idle, goodnatured, malignant, courageous and cowardly; of performance, as speed alone, or staying qualities, and action of walk, trot, gallop; of feeding, as gluttony or finickiness, and last of all, in lack of quality, beauty and vigor.

Experience seems to recommend the pairing of old stallions and young mares, and *vice versa*.

If possible it is wise to go back of the parents to the ancestors as reverions to them are frequent, and these atavistic surprises often confound a breeder who does not consider them.

With thoroughbreds the type desired can be achieved by much closer inbreeding than with the halfbred.

With halfbreds the object must not be too far removed from the type which the mare herself possesses, *i. e.*, a small wiry mare should not be bred to a coarse large boned stallion, and *vice versa*, if one wishes to breed further than the *first result*.

The breeding of thoroughbreds with draft stock has been tried almost everywhere, and while favorable results in the *first generation* have been attained, the *progeny* of these coarse cross breeds have been as a rule failures, because it is just the coarseness and weakness of the draftee and the light build of the thoroughbred that are transmitted. To breed good strong horses we have to improve the build and substance of the brood mares, a very difficult and lengthy proceeding and one that is really unpleasant, because in strengthening or enlarging a breed one has to bring in so many bad and ugly traits at first. But one must recollect that after the ugly result is attained it is much easier to *beautify* it, especially in halfbreds.

Therefore, we must look for a large *handsome mare*, with plenty of good hard bone, and breed her to a large *handsome horse* with *plenty* of bone. The thoroughbred, except in very isolated cases, cannot produce the substance required for hunters and chargers. So we must look for it in the halfbreds, both mares and stallions.

But it is doubtful even if the halfbreds of the first generation from the thoroughbred can produce the required substance; it would take two generations, supplemented with proper mating, good feeding, care and exercise to obtain the required breed.

This breed would probably be ugly but strong; coarse, but distinctive in outline; lack quality, harmony and action; but if persisted in would give the substance which we are seeking for, and once the substance is obtained, then the objectionable qualities can be bred out by ennobling blood.

The Irish are famed for their *hunters*, had this large, coarser bred stock in their mares, and luckily have managed to keep some of them, though they have injudiciously tried to introduce the still coarser draft breeds with lamentable results.

This, then, is the problem that confronts us in America today: Where can we get the proper stallions and mares with substance enough to carry weight and go fast without effort.

We have numerous breeds in America, some of them quite new, as the trotter and the saddle horse, but unfortunately we have no hunter breed. It does seem a pity that men of money and influence do not try to produce this breed, for it can be done. Ireland is doing it and England has had it, but foolishly let it die out. Still we can see the pictures of their old hunter stock, the sight of which makes one almost weep to think that such grand animals were allowed to dwindle to a few scattered inferior ones.

I can not urge too much the great importance of the value of this hunter breed, and beg that whenever the occasion arises you will strongly insist on and help towards encouraging the breeding of this *magnificent type of horse*. The time has come when we should form a Hunter's Association, just the same as The Thoroughbred, The Trotter, The Saddler, The Percheron, The Shire, and all the other breed associations, and give our hunters their proper pedigrees to which they are surely entitled. The young men of this generation would then leave to the next generation a very glorious inheritance, one perhaps that in time of war might be the means of saving their country for them, as many other countries have been saved before by the horse.

In the brood mare a large body or trunk is to be sought, even if it is out of proportion. They carry their foals better. It is not necessary to have a too large framed mare, the smaller and more wiry mares seem to produce the better progeny.

But in the stallion we must look for a distinctively sharp build, with free movements, a courageous eye, robust health, and with a thin mane and well carried tail. These are the signs of a good mating stallion.

Also, a short neck is better than one too long, long pasterns are preferable to short upright ones, and even too long pasterns are preferable to short upright ones, and straight hind legs are superior to crooked ones, and a bucked more desirable than a calf knee.

The best height for a mare is about 15—1 to 15—3, and for the stallion, 15—3 to 16—1.

Greater heights bred are as a rule at the cost of capabilities, and this fact needs bearing in mind, as the trend of foolish

people is for exaggerated height and breeders are forced to cater to the public taste.

Stallions should not be used to cover mares before they are four years old. Though we have cases of good foals from stallions in their second year, notably the trotter, Hambletonian 10, who as a two-year-old produced Abdallah, who was a very noted sire himself.

But age is an indifferent factor as long as the stallion keeps his health and vigor; in fact, many breeders contend that old stallions produce stayers.

Therefore, the health of stallions is a very important matter and feed and exercise contribute more than anything to this health. Exercise your stallions enough to keep them hard and strong; also, do not shut them up where they can not see anything but four walls; this seclusion tends to make them vicious. The quantity of food must be regulated to suit each individual case.

Stallions which cover too many mares in a season are inclined to have light boned stock and they themselves will become more infertile. Mares can be covered at three years old, but should not before that age. It is better to breed mares at three and four than later on in life. If bred young, the births are easier, the mares are more fertile, and have more milk, and the foals are bigger and stronger.

The most prominent products of mares are generally produced between their eighth and thirteenth years. Half-bred mares are more fertile in their earlier years than in their later years, say from fourteen to twenty.

It is necessary that brood mares outside the grazing time should have gentle exercise of some description up to the day of foaling, and for a couple of weeks after the event.

The feed must suit the individual, and vary according to the soil on which it grows; also, it must have good bone producing qualities.

In pasture the mare should get a certain amount of grain, as the grass is not sufficient to produce that hardness and stamina that we want in the foal. Breed your mare so that she will drop her foal as the fresh grazing comes in. The foal then gets the benefit of the green grass and a more abundant

supply of milk, from its mother; it aids in the growth and stature of the early born animal. The longer the pasturing lasts the better for the foal.

The time of pregnancy in a mare is on an average almost exactly eleven months, or 334 days.

Male foals as a rule are carried a few days longer than female foals. A well fed mare in good health will foal a few days shorter than one ill fed, etc.

A better foal is produced if carried several days under the eleven months than one which is carried several days over that time. This is evidently caused by immediate conception at the first heat and the prompt commencement of a healthy foetal development at the first covering.

When the foal is born its nervous system is in a very highly developed state, so that in a very few hours it can walk, run and skip. Also, it is in full possession of all its senses, such as sight, touch, hearing, smell and taste, and with an almost equal amount of intelligence as its parents. Obedience to man is practically all that it has to learn.

Most foals when two or three days old seem to be very long legged and badly out of shape, but in the course of a few months they generally grow out of all their structural faults, such as too long, soft pasterns, long hind legs standing out behind; bent knees either way; long, upright pastern, all sideways leanings; bending of hind pasterns, called knuckling, is quite common and is nearly always straighten.

But a short neck, long back, large head, drooping hind-quarters, high or low withers, and all trunk faults, do not alter.

Most of these crooked faults can be surely straightened if the hoofs are kept perfectly level and true. This is very important and I cannot impress on you too much the fact that a horse's foot must be kept level all his life. This is one of the greatest principles of horsemanship, and will be taken up again later on.

The foal being born, one must see that its bowels work properly, and here nature helps by providing that the first milk of the mare is of a peculiar composition, remarkable for the amount of protein it contains, as much as fifteen per cent., while ordinary milk only contains four or five per cent. It

also contains large granular corpuscles containing fat. The use of this milk is to act as a natural purge in order to clear out the intestinal canal of the newly born foal.

However, it is principally by the proper dieting of the dam that the foal keeps in good health, and green grass plays the most important part as it tends to keep both the dam's and her foal's bowels in proper condition. If no grass is to be had, then vegetables, bran and steamed hay, or linseed meal, should be given.

Halter the foal as early as possible, and handle it all over, so that when it is a month old one can trim its feet.

It can be taken for granted that a foal can eat as many pounds of oats as it is months old, so that a four months old foal will eat four or five pounds of oats per day. At that time it will eat that amount of hay also.

Between five and six months is the proper time to wean the foal. If they suck longer than that they make poor use of the oats and hay and are inclined to get fat, which makes them harder to train afterwards.

Weaning must be done as quietly and gently as possible, with much care and consideration to be shown the foal so as not to interfere with its steady development.

The oats can be increased to ten or twelve pounds a day in the case of thoroughbred foals intended for racing, but six pounds will be enough for the halfbreeds, with good pasture.

In good pasture grass, rich in potash, like alfalfa, plenty of salt is required; therefore, it is necessary to have salt constantly in the mangers.

In winter proper exercise must be given daily. If possible, graze the year round, as this is the par excellence of all exercise for foals. By the time a foal is a year old and has to be exercised it may be necessary to shoe it. This must be very carefully done, and any faults, such as intoeing, outtoeing, club feet, upright feet, sloping feet, narrow heels, flat feet, etc., must be corrected by special shoeing to counteract these abnormalities.

During the yearling and two year old periods we increase the grain and hay and exercise according to the individual requirements of the animals and the nature of the food; for

instance, in damp weather the hay is generally of poor quality, so we increase the grain allowance, and in dry years of good hay we use more of it at the expense of the oat ration.

This brings our horse up to three years, where we commence his education as a carrier of man, and where we will leave him for the present.



## CAVALRY ORGANIZATION.

BY CAPTAIN S. D. ROCKENBACK, ELEVENTH CAVALRY.

**O**RGANIZATION and the strength of fighting units should be determined from military history, particularly our own military history, with special regard to the probable employment, terrain and the psychology of the American soldier. There is one object in organizing a military force—success in battle, maximum loss to the enemy in the least possible time and with a minimum loss to ourselves. We have been bickering for three years over cavalry organization. In this there appears very little seriousness and but a proposal of a partial foreign organization which in its incompleteness does not improve the cavalry either in peace or for war.

In our Civil War we developed a cavalry force and organization psychologically suited to the American soldier and our own terrain, and great versatile cavalry leaders who surpassed all others in their diversified employment of cavalry. The thoughts of these leaders were recorded and are accessible to us all. Their operations are studied by all foreign cavalry organizers and leaders. The useful cavalry in the present Great War has been forced to adopt the methods for the employment of cavalry used by Stuart and Sheridan.

Decide upon the fighting unit, a unit of fixed strength at all times, requiring an organization and provisions to keep the unit at its combat strength. Read the correspondence of McClellan, Lee, and Stuart from Antietam to Fredericksburg and it becomes clear that cavalry regiments due to faulty organizations had to fight with a deplorable and not a desirable strength. The great lesson of our Civil War and of the Spanish-American War was that we need a reserve for the Regular Army, but first of all we need a reserve in the Regular Army. The Regular Army went to Cuba 50% recruits, only

50% efficient. It was gone in a month for further offensive action, due to no depot battalions to replenish it. The British Regular Army was gone by the first of last November.

In time of peace the German cavalry division (Guard Cav. Div.) has four brigades of two to three regiments of five squadrons of five platoons. In time of war (for combat) the cavalry division has three brigades of two regiments of four squadrons. Excess of peace organizations over combat organizations: one brigade of three regiments of five squadrons of five platoons—or three regiments of fifteen squadrons. In time of war the trained excess regiments are organized into new divisions or used as divisional regiments and the fifth squadrons become the depot squadrons and remain at the regimental stations, replacing losses in the combat regiment with trained men and horses. Thus and thus only can the strength and efficiency of the fighting regiment be maintained; our Civil War demonstrates it, and foreign cavalry applies it.

An illustration:

Troop N, Xth U. S. Cavalry has on the 24th of May:

Aggregate.....	81
Present and Absent.....	78
Training remounts.....	13
Charge of stables.....	2
In quarters—1 mess sgt., 2 cooks, 2 room orderlies.....	5
D. S., absent sick and furlough.....	6
Recruits.....	1
Sick.....	3
S. D., veterinary hospital and exchange.....	2
Machine gun troop.....	2
Headquarter troop.....	1
Total absent from drill (combat).....	37
Total present for drill combat.....	41

This is an existing condition and must be faced.

Let us assume the following combat troop:

Troop commander.....	1
Platoon leaders.....	4
First sergeant.....	1
File closer sergeants.....	4
Trumpeters and messengers.....	2
Platoons, 4.....	96
Total combat strength of troop.....	108

To keep the troop at this fighting strength the following are necessary:

Platoon leader.....	1
Mess sgt., cooks and assistants.....	5
Q. M. and Stable sgt.....	2
Farriers, horseshoers, saddlers and wagoner.....	7
Substitutes for sick and absent.....	11
Total.....	26
Aggregate for troop.....	<u>134</u>

Squadron:

Squadron commander.....	1
Squadron Staff Officers.....	1
Squadron N. C. S. O.....	2
Trumpeters and messengers.....	2
Orderlies.....	2
Troops, 3.....	<u>402</u>
Aggregate for squadron.....	<u>410</u>
Strength of combat squadron.....	<u>332</u>

Regiment:

Commander and staff,  
Headquarter troop including band,  
Machine gun troop,

(In order to perform its functions) Pioneer detachment with steel pontoon boats and explosives, Sanitary detachment (including two veterinary surgeons with 12 assistants); and motor cycle detachment, telephone detachment:

3 squadrons.....	1,230
1 depot squadron.....	410
Combat strength of regiment.....	<u>1,000</u>

This organization is not given for criticism or discussion but to illustrate that organization must have for its object the maintenance of a certain combat strength and in order to do this, the aggregate strength of the regiment must be sixty per cent. stronger than its combat strength. If this is not considered and adopted we will continue to ossify expensive officers by not giving them sufficient employment in time of peace. Consider the troop cited above, 41 men, never the same 41. If three officers occupied themselves mentally and physically even eight

hours per day in training these 41, they would be overtrained to a frazzle. The actual case is even worse, the Captain has been a commissioned officer nearly twenty-four years; he is assisted (?) in training his army of 41 by a major, a lieutenant colonel, a colonel, and frequently a kindly (??) word of advice from the adjutant and chaplain. Face it, it exists. What are we going to do about it? My testimony after nearly twenty-four years of commissioned service is that under the organization and system we have, it is impossible to make a troop efficient for war. It is the overhead cost that counts, why can't we get the men to work with. Suppose we got the 41 ready for combat without stunting their mental and physical growth, what would be left of them in a week's, a month's campaign, without a depot squadron to send up trained men and horses? We delude ourselves with the idea that we have a great excess of regular officers in time of peace, we must, but we must have something to train them with. I would have learnt more in two years with a full troop in a full squadron, in a full regiment, in a full brigade, in a full division, than I have in ten times that length of time under the existing conditions. Yet, the American public expects the regular officer to be super-trained in the art and science of war practically. The facts are he has never had the opportunity to learn the first essential—to handle men in large combinations—to reduce friction.

There is but one object for us—efficiency for war. The country counts on the Regular Army being efficient. It does not know that we have not a single well balanced fighting team—a field army. We know that the elements cannot be maintained efficient beyond the briefest campaign, that the regular cavalry is riding to a certain quick fall on the war course.

Decide quickly the necessary combat strength of the Regular Army organized as a fighting team, its peace strength with depot battalions must be sixty per cent. greater. We are organized on the reverse of this; we have of the unit we possess only available forty per cent. of a proper combat strength.

We do not admit that the Regular Army is inefficient, but when we say it is efficient the American public should understand our mental reservations. It is efficient not considering

any possible or probable use against modern troops, only up to fifty per cent. of its total strength, and it would not last a brief campaign against a modern army, even could we find one so small as to take us seriously and fight us.

It is commonly said the Regular Army has worked steadfastly for a well balanced, well organized force and gotten the best possible under our legislators. In the light of the present raging conflict which is rending and tearing Europe and putting to question our civilization, there is no room for sham. We know the object and need of an army in the United States and its size and organization. There should be no compromise, either a proper army or none at all, and once for all remove the delusion from the minds of the public as to their protection. When a ship not designed for battle with the tornado sinks, it is the captain who is blamed, not the directors of the company.

As there is considerable ignorance and doubt as to German organization the following published organization may not be uninteresting. The regiment one encounters in peace or war may seem entirely different from anything published, this is hard to grasp when it is realized that the Germans go from peace to war without change. They don't change, the organization is designed to give a certain combat strength. Everything necessary to maintain that combat strength is added, but none of the units or detachments changed.

#### 1914 PEACE ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN ARMY.

Eight army inspection districts; or 25 army corps; or 50 divisions; or 106 infantry, 55 cavalry, and 50 field artillery brigades; or 217 infantry, 110 cavalry, 101 field artillery and 23 foot artillery regiments; or 651 infantry and 18 Jäger battalions, 550 cavalry squadrons, 642 field artillery batteries (2,700 guns with reserve to make 4,968 guns in war), 25 army service corps, 50 foot artillery (199 batteries), 35 pioneer, and 33 railway and telegraph (traffic) battalions.

## COMBAT STRENGTH.

	<i>Infantry.</i>	<i>Cavalry.</i>	<i>Artillery.</i>	<i>Pioneers.</i>	<i>A. S. C.</i>	<i>Total.*</i>
Peace Strength..	428,700	85,300	129,200	24,000	11,600	791,000
Per cent. of whole..	54.2	10.8	16.3	3.0	1.4	.....
Per cent. of inf.....	100.0	20.0	30.0	6.-	2.7	.....
War Strength..	3,600,000	100,000	300,000	100,000	200,000	5,000,000
Per cent. of whole..	72.0	2.0	6.0	2.0	4.0	.....
Per cent. of inf.....	100.0	2.7	8.1	2.7	5.4	.....

\*Includes sanitary and special troops.

## WAR ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN CAVALRY.

Cavalry corps are organized during operations according to need.

*Cavalry Division.*—Except the Guard Cavalry Division existing in time of peace (4 brigades), cavalry divisions are only formed in case of war.

(a) Staff of division commander: 1 general staff officer, 2 aides, 1 division quartermaster with subordinate division supply officials, 1 division surgeon, 1 judge advocate, staff guard, field postmaster. Containing about 100 men, 75 horses, 12 wagons.

(b) Troops: 3 cavalry brigades of two regiments of 4 squadrons (in time of peace 2 to 3 regiments of 5 squadrons each); 1 machine gun battalion (6 guns, reserve guns with ammunition column); 1 battalion of horse artillery of 3 batteries of 4 guns; 1 light ammunition column; 1 cavalry pioneer detachment; 1 bicycle detachment (may have 140 bicycles).

Total strength: 24 squadrons, 3 batteries, about 5,000 men, 5,300 horses, 200 vehicles.

*Details of Organization:—*

<i>Unit.</i>	<i>Men.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	<i>Vehicles.</i>	<i>Combat Train.</i>	<i>Heavy Baggage.</i>	
Squadron.....	180	180	3	12 led horses	1 2-horse sqdrn. wagon. 1 2-horse csy. wagon. 1 4-horse forage wagon.	
Regiment (4 squadrons)..	749	753	19	58 led horses 2 riding horses of the pack leaders. 2 sanitary pack horses. 1 2-horse cav. sanitary wagon. 1 2-horse tele. wagon. 2 6-horse cav. pontoon wagons. (carrying 2 steel boats, capacity 8 men with saddles and equipment.)	58 led horses 2 riding horses of the pack leaders. 2 sanitary pack horses. 1 2-horse cav. sanitary wagon. 1 2-horse tele. wagon. 2 6-horse cav. pontoon wagons. (carrying 2 steel boats, capacity 8 men with saddles and equipment.)	1 4-horse staff wagon. 4 2-horse sqd. wagons. 5 2-horse csy. wagons inc. market wagon. 5 4-horse forage wagons.

NOTE.—1. In the two cavalry bridge wagons are carried 32 dynamite cartridges in 8 dynamite cartridge pockets, which when necessary can be packed on a horse, and tools for the destruction of telegraph lines.

2. Sanitary equipment: 1 regimental surgeon, 2 asst. surgeons, 6 men assistants, 2 mounted men with pack horses, 2 pair sanitary pack pockets, 8 bearers, 1 2-horse sanitary wagon.

3. Telephone equipment: Two telephone groups; 1 officer, 4 non commissioned officers, 6 men, 4 km. wire, material for connecting with existing lines, 350 m. cable for stream crossings.

4. Four bicycles to each regiment of cavalry.

<i>Unit.</i>	<i>Men.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>	<i>Vehicles.</i>	<i>Combat Train.</i>	<i>Heavy Baggage.</i>
Brigade (8 squadrons).....	1508	1516	39		
Machine gun battalion (abteilung).....	130	90	14	4 off. horses. 6 spare horses.  1 4-horse spare wagon. <i>Battery:</i> 6 4-horse guns. 3 4-horse amm. wagons.	1 2-horse wagon. 1 2-horse csy. wagon. 1 2-horse forage wagon.
Battery horse artillery.....	150	200	14	5 led horses. 8 spare horses. 1 6-horse store wagon.	2 6-horse supply wagons. 1 4-horse csy. wagons. 1 4-horse forage wagon.
Light ammu-ni-tion column.....	150	200	25	4 off. horses.	1 6-horse supply wagon. 1 2-horse csy. wagon. 1 4-horse forage wagon.
Pioneer detach- ment.....	34	6	1		

Bicycle detachment: May be up to 140 wheels.

## NOTES ON THE EUROPEAN WAR.

BY AN OFFICER ABROAD.

**A**S an introduction, I believe that the most important thing to remember in listening to accounts of observations is that every account is colored by the viewpoint of the observer, his prejudices, what lessons he wishes to draw from what he sees and above all by local conditions. For example: I had had first hand information about the wonderful success obtained by the wireless method of signalling observations of artillery fire from aeroplanes back to the batteries, and had been telling people around the Embassy that this was the *only* method; Captain —— came back from another part of the line where they had been using a method of signalling, by different maneuvers of the aeroplane in the air, he of course told everybody that this method was the whole thing; again a young officer from the Staff of an English Corps visited the Embassy one day and in conversation with Captain ——, he said that the German shell fire was having very little effect, material or moral, due to the fact that the shells were bursting in the soft ground and did nothing but throw up a great mass of dirt. During my visit to the army with ——, I heard quite a different story; that the shell fire was having a great deal of effect, material and moral. It is a point to notice that when I was on the visit mentioned the ground was frozen hard, while it was not so at the time the other remarks were made.

We are still quite primitive and the "big noise" as they speak of it at the school of fire, referring to the sound of the guns, is liable to affect a man's reasoning, and this is the case with many other things we will encounter at such times. Continuing this thought I often asked as to the comparative losses from artillery and rifle fire. None of those questioned gave me a figure for artillery fire of less than fifty per cent. of the total losses, and one estimate ran as high as seventy-five per cent.

These figures are undoubtedly absurd but it goes to show how our minds are impressed by what may be called primitive reasoning. This may sound like an attempt at an essay, but I am only trying to dwell on what I consider vital, and that is that we must fight, and fight hard, in order to avoid drawing erroneous lessons from the present conflict while at the same time we are struggling to draw from it the great truths of modern fighting.

---

As the officers of this post are all of the cavalry or field artillery, and the time is limited, I have tried to pick out a few points in my notes which bear on these two branches.

Among the things which stand out in my mind to a very marked degree, the first three are: *First*, the importance of artillery; *second*, the value of *our* cavalry; and *third*, the importance of aeroplanes. The latter is so intimately connected with artillery and reconnaissance work that I mention it. Of course, as is always the case, the men on foot with the rifle have the main and hardest part of the work and how heroically they have done it can be attested by their terrific losses.

Taking up first the cavalry; Major ——, a cavalry officer of the English army, stated to —— as we were walking away from a battery: "This isn't much of a war for cavalry." General —— stated to —— that aeroplanes had practically supplanted cavalry in reconnaissance," and ended the remark by saying "And you know that I am a cavalryman." If there is one thing that I came back with and absolutely sure of, it is the fact that the worth of cavalry like ours has been brought out in this war and very decidedly so.

I do not wish to stick my oar in on a question which belongs only to the cavalry but would like to offer as the opinion of a layman that our successful cavalry leaders in the Civil War, on both sides, knew the game pretty well. I overheard the following remark by Major ——, one of General ——'s Aids: "Why did you come over here to study cavalry? You can learn more about it from your own cavalry, your use of it

in the Civil War and a little from our South African War. Those are the sources from which our cavalry has learned."

Again, "Why didn't you teach them to get off their horses?"

The opinion seems to be general that the English cavalry has made good. They have made some brilliant charges where it was necessary but they have made good by getting off their horses and shooting. I quote from a note of October the 12th: "Talked with a Major of the English army this afternoon for a few minutes at the Embassy \* \* \*. The British are very much disappointed with the French cavalry. The English cavalry has been backing up the infantry splendidly. He spoke of one case which he said was typical. The Germans succeeded in breaking through the line at a point. A regiment or brigade of cavalry, I do not remember which, came to their support, dismounted and drove the enemy back by fire action. He said 'The French don't understand that work, you can't get them off their horses.' He agreed that the English had learned a lot in the South African War."

With respect to mounted action, from note of September 8th: "Talked with a Lieutenant of the 9th Lancers near the Gare Montparnasse on this evening. Asked him \* \* \*. He also stated that the Germans had approached the English lines with the leading elements dressed in French uniforms; they opened a murderous fire at close range, killing many of the lancers; none of this party escaped, the 9th Lancers driving them into a village and leaving none alive." My recollection is that this was what he called a pig-sticking contest, that is the execution was carried out with the lances, but I am not certain of this point.

I had occasion to notice English cavalry several times. Their horses seemed to be in splendid shape. On October 4th, in company with ——, we ran into the trains of the 5th cavalry brigade, English army. There were groups of troopers scattered along with the column; some of these men belonged to the 12th Lancers who covered themselves with glory at Mons in protecting the retreat of the English army. Looking at the horses, it is hard to realize what these troops had been through; the mounts were all in the finest condition and looked

well groomed. Quite noticeable was the fact that practically all of the men were walking and leading their horses. This look of being well cared for showed up distinctly among the horses in the \_\_\_\_\_ Corps, in November near \_\_\_\_\_. We saw the horses of one squadron being exercised, two horses to each man; the other men were serving in the trenches. The men take turn about in the trenches, those behind the line keeping the animals in shape. The horses mentioned above pertained to English troops, not natives. The Native cavalry was mounted on small Asiatic horses. Major \_\_\_\_\_ stated that they had stood the work well. Those we saw were not in very good flesh, but wiry looking and with the ever present well cared for look.

I firmly believe that two of our normal cavalry brigades with its proper proportion of artillery, available on the Allies' left about September 6th, would have meant disaster for von Kluck, and who knows what that would have meant. Why there was no cavalry there I cannot say, in fact I cannot say there was none, but this much is certain, that the French cavalry had not been profitably handled. To tell the truth, it had been worse than wasted, for it had accomplished nothing and the horses were practically worn out by this date. This was admitted quite frankly by several French cavalry officers with whom \_\_\_\_\_ talked. The principle trouble was that they killed their mounts trying to pick a mounted fight with an enemy who had too much intelligence to take a chance on being stuck with a lance or a sword, when he could sit down in a hedge and pick them off with his rifle. The poor, chivalrous, charge-loving Frenchmen ran down his adverasry terribly for this, stating that the Germans were afraid to meet them on horse back. By the time they had learned their lesson, their big chance to act as cavalry was gone. They did manage to get together some of their cavalry to oppose the German screen during the first part of the extension of the lines to the North about October first; but here again the idea of mounted action ran into a very serious snag. The country is flat, full of canals, wet ditches along the roads, wire fences, and about every obstacle one can imagine, in a highly cultured district; a friend of \_\_\_\_\_, Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_ of the \_\_\_\_\_ Dragoons, was

seriously wounded during this fighting. In the hospital in Paris he described the fighting to ——, and his description of the terrain coincided exactly with ours that we obtained later when we passed over it. Many detachments, both French and German, were exterminated, that is exactly the word I want, by getting bottled up in villages, which in this locality consist of a long continuous line of houses and connecting walls and following the road for sometimes several kilometers. —— asked him a question, the gist of which was whether he was mounted or dismounted when wounded. His reply shows very well the ruling idea of the French cavalry: he drew himself up and said, "On my horse, of course." They are now in the trenches, for the most part unburdened with horses. According to a Major of the —— Dragoons I talked with, this is a good thing, as the horses are only a bother under such conditions. The English cavalry are now armed with the bayonet, and I understood that at least some of the French cavalry were also. The French dragoons and cuirassiers wear their steel casques in the field covered with khaki colored cotton. I understood before the war that the cuirassiers would wear their cuirasses into campaign but I do not know whether they did or not. While —— was taking the picture of the group of German dead that he referred to as being quite near to Paris, we were waiting for him in the car on the road. We saw several cars coming from the direction of Paris at a good fast rate. As they approached I was rather nervous to see a Hussar standing up in the leading car with his carbine in a very disagreeably handy position. He calmed down only on getting right up to us. Our car, a Mercedes, of well known German make, evidently aroused his suspicions as some one in the party suggested. This was not surprising as there were Germans scattered all through that part of the country for quite a while after the retreat to the Aisne. He asked us where we had come from and what was ahead of him on the road to Soissons. He seemed glad that the French were at Soissons and after thanking us hurried on. He was followed by two other cars with Hussars, in each. I mention this to show that the action had been so rapid during the preceding days that even with their

wonderful system, everybody didn't know just where everybody else was.

---

To my knowledge, gained for the most part indirectly, the French are using the 75 mm., 105 mm. and 155 mm. Rimalho howitzer, all rapid fire and the 155 mm. and 120 mm. heavy rifles, slow fire. The English had their 18 pdr. and 4.7 inch rapid fire rifles; and on November 22d they had one 9.2 inch heavy siege howitzer or mortar, with more of the latter type being hurried to completion.

The 75 mm. at the beginning of the war had shrapnel and shell. I do not know about the other types of French guns. The 75 mm. now has nothing but shell. In the English army, at least in the Indian corps, the artillery on November 22d had nothing but shrapnel; and they were hoping and praying for shell, which they expected soon. The 9.2 inch had shell, and I believe shell alone. Among those I questioned the opinion seemed quite general that the German shrapnel fire had not been very effective, or rather as they expressed it, it had proven quite worthless. This was ascribed to the fact that the German shrapnel nearly always burst too high. The volleys of shrapnel that we observed at Soissons were very regular in their action, both French and German. The French bursts gave one the impression that a right line could be drawn through the four bursts. With one exception, the statements that I heard tended to show that the German shell fire was very effective materially, and terribly effective morally. We have heard much about the effect of the French 75 mm. shell, so I will pass over that.

The French and English use the breast collar which seems to have given satisfaction. The French 155's and 120's are drawn by tractors, whether to the exclusion of horse power or not I cannot say. The English use a tractor for their new 9.2-inch which is transported on three carriages like the big Krupp guns.

I rather imagine that the observation of fire at the beginning of the war was carried on according to preconceived ideas

on the subject, that is, by observation somewhere near the battery firing. In the lines as they stand at present, this has entirely been done away with. The fire is observed from aeroplanes or by officers well up near the target. Of three batteries that I was in, one had an observer at 800 yards from German trenches, the others at 600 and 800 yards respectively. In these three cases telephone lines connected the observer with the battery. The first a French battery near Bethancourt, on October 4th, was using the telephone. The other two, English batteries, on November 22d, were using the buzzer. I heard nothing but buzzer, buzzer, buzzer, from the English Artillery officers. You must use the buzzer, and get your lines off the ground using every means at your disposal. Their communications were working splendidly, while those of the French battery mentioned were only good enough to scrape along with. I will speak of the aeroplanes later if there is time.

As Captain —— told us, the ranges have proven much greater than was expected. The average of the 75 mm. has been about 5,000 meters and the same officer who told me this stated that this gun has fired with success up to 7,000 meters.

As to position of limbers during action, the battery at Bethancourt has their limbers about 200 yards in rear of the right of the battery, in column, flank toward the enemy, but well protected by a wood. The horses were in harness and had been so ever since they had been in the position, four days. At Soissons, the limbers of the battery that —— mentioned, which we saw silenced, were slightly to the left and rear of the battery; from where we were it looked as if they were protected by the hill and a clump of trees. In the —— Corps the horses were back in farms in the vicinity; they would not be harnessed and brought up unless matters should become very serious looking.

With respect to supply of ammunition, I know nothing except that their system worked perfectly as far as I could gather. We will be able to get this from officers who have done their service with the French artillery.

The distance covered by the artillery in daily marches at the beginning of the war was very great, especially on the whip

end of the immense wheeling retreat. Captain —— of the French artillery stated that the batteries in his part of the line made on an average of between 60 and 70 kilometers, with two hours of rest, per day. The French artillery also made some very long forced marches in moving up to the north around the left flank.

I saw the horses of the battery at Bethancourt being watered. This was done one team at a time in a small stream about 600 yards in rear of the battery. The horses were ridden into the stream. On the retreat a great many horses were lost from exhaustion, which came on more quickly due to the fact that there were poor facilities for watering, and no time to stop for water as a rule.

The study of shelter during the progress of the war is very interesting. The battle fields to the North of Meaux, those of the battle of the Marne nearest Paris, are literally covered with German pits, beautifully constructed. They started making their cover as soon as they got into position, this was shown in two positions. In one taken up right in the macadam pike on the edge toward the enemy, and where I counted between 140 and 150 rounds per gun, the shelter had not been completed, and showed how hastily it had been thrown up. Everything available had been used, including empty ammunition baskets, sticks, limbs of trees, etc. The road was sunken about two and one-half feet and they had used this protection to its fullest advantage. In another position where we found abandoned guns and caissons, the earth protection had just been started, a little bit being thrown up to fill the gap between shield and ground with evidence of intention to elaborate this. As far as I can find out the French at this time used no artificial cover for their guns but took positions far in rear of the covering crests whenever possible. Captain —— stated that this accounted for the fact that the German artillery seldom reached the French artillery with their fire at this part of the campaign, as they ranged on the covering crests and immediately searched. The activity of the aeroplanes with the artillery was very limited at this time, if they were used at all. At Bethancourt, where the semi-siege work had been going on for some time, the battery was very well protected not from hostile fire but from

observation from aeroplanes; with this to be noted, that they had a position right at the side of each gun for use in firing at planes which might discover them, pits for trails. Over a month later the English batteries were even better protected from being discovered by planes, and each gun crew had an excellent bomb proof with entrance about eight feet from the trail. I noticed that in neither the French nor the English batteries was there any attempt at cover for the crews while they might be serving the pieces. The reason is simple, there was absolutely no intention of staying at the guns if they should be taken under fire. The instructions of the English batteries as to the procedure in case they might be discovered by a German plane, are interesting in this connection. If a German aeroplane should be sighted in the vicinity by the man constantly on the lookout, a whistle signal would be given; at this all the personnel was to remain perfectly motionless; if the airman should drop a ranging bomb, the personnel was to leave the guns and clear out, waiting for the storm to pass. According to every body the storm always came along quite promptly after the bomb, and the vicinity of the battery would always be decidedly unhealthy. I noticed that there was no intention here in wasting time in getting out by firing at the aeroplanes. The bomb proofs were for emergencies, like being taken unawares. This is an assumption of mine, I do not recollect any statement of this kind.



## ORGANIZATION OF A VOLUNTEER CAVALRY REGIMENT—A PROBLEM.\*

BY CAPTAIN W. S. GRANT, THIRD CAVALRY.

### PROBLEM.

#### *Situation:*

THE United States has become involved in war with a foreign power. The U. S. Regular Army and National Guard, whose organizations have been completed by recruitment, and state volunteers, have been concentrated on the western coast and are now engaged with a hostile invading army.

The magnitude of the war has necessitated the use of volunteers, and, upon authorization from Congress, the President has issued a proclamation calling for volunteers from the Nation at large. The quotas of the State of Kansas and Missouri are to form the Fourth Cavalry Division, which is to organize equip, etc., at Jefferson Barracks, Mo., and Forts Riley and Leavenworth, Kan. The Second Brigade of this division is to organize at the latter point.

You have been appointed colonel of the 25th U. S. Vol Cav., 2d Brigade, 4th Cavalry Division, and upon your arrival at Fort Leavenworth (at 10 a. m., April 1, 1915) you receive the following instructions from your brigade commander, who is also post commander:

"The 25th regiment will organize at this post. The cavalry, engineer and artillery barracks and stables in the post and Otis, Root and Schofield Halls are assigned the regiment for quarters, messing, etc. The other two regiments of the brigade will be camped south of Merritt Lake.

"Three cavalry captains of the Regular Army have been appointed the lieutenant colonel and two majors of the regi-

\*Solution of a problem at the Army Staff College—1914-15.

ment. The other major is a lawyer of Kansas City, Mo., who served as a captain in the Spanish American War. All these officers are now in the post. All other officers have been appointed by the President from the State of Kansas and will reach here tomorrow or the next day.

"The War Department has wired me that it can furnish your regiment only 800 men and 800 horses and that they will arrive here in two lots of 400 each on the 14th and 15th of this month. You will secure the necessary men and horses for the rest of your regiment in that part of Kansas east of Wichita, Salina and Belleville, all inclusive.

"The full equipment, except horses, records, enlistment papers, etc., for your regiment can be secured from the proper post staff officers. The post hospital is in operation and can be used for men needing hospital treatment.

"The parade grounds in the post and the territory from Atchison Pike (inclusive) to the north to Plum Creek and to the west to Kennedy's ridge is assigned your regiment for instruction purposes. You can have use of the post target range on the last ten days of each month.

"The Division Commander has directed that the brigade be ready for field service by August 15th. Regimental commanders will have until July 31st for the instruction of their regiments. You will submit to me, as soon as practicable, your program of instruction. Show the subjects to be covered by each day's instruction to include July 31st.

"A hundred prisoners from the U. S. Disciplinary Barracks will be at your disposal for any preliminary work."

*Required:*

1. A discussion of the steps taken and the methods adopted by you for the recruitment, organization, equipment, quartering, messing and instruction of the regiment.
2. The program of instruction you will submit to the brigade commander.

*NOTE.—Assume the following:*

The full quota of officers for the regiment report for duty by the evening of April 3, 1915. The only military experience they have had is such as could be gained in military schools

and by spasmodic connection with state militia regiments. One half of the officers are fairly well trained horsemen. The medical officers and the hospital corps non-commissioned officers have had no military training. They are competent as far as the medical profession is concerned.

By regimental recruiting, etc., the regiment is filled up to war strength (men and animals) by April 17, 1915. Among the enlisted personnel are found some fifty ex-soldiers and national guardsmen. The others come from all classes and professions appertaining to the district in which recruited.

#### SOLUTION.

Upon receiving my instructions from the Brigade Commander I at once go to the quarters which I select in Root Hall, and before ordering the lieutenant colonel and the three majors to report to me, I carefully go over the notes which I have made of the Brigade Commander's instructions, and read those papers pertaining to the men, animals, and equipment of my regiment, which have been referred to me. The following points become apparent:

1. That of the entire regiment there are present on this date, April 1st, only the lieutenant colonel and three majors.
2. That by the night of April 3d all regimental officers will have reported for duty.
3. That since the Government can furnish only 800 men and 800 horses, I must arrange for the recruiting of 456 men, and the purchase of 514 horses. (See T. of O., p. 14, Organization of a Cavalry Regiment.)
4. That the men and horses furnished by the government will not arrive before the 14th, on which date half will arrive, and half on the 15th.
5. That consequently if the recruiting officers, and the officers sent out to purchase horses, are directed not to forward any men or horses until about the 12th, the colonel can get a period of a week or over for instruction of officers, absolutely unhindered by the confusion of the arrival of men and animals.
6. That recruiting officers be sent out at first opportunity.

7. That an officer, accompanied by a veterinarian, be sent out without unnecessary delay to purchase horses.
8. That the barracks and stables accommodations assigned the regiment, must be divided up among the various organizations.
9. That the most pressing duty is to find out the exact number of quarters available, assign them as field officers' sets, captains' sets, lieutenants' sets, etc., and arrange for the messing of the officers so that immediately upon arrival they can move into their rooms, and find a mess already established.
10. That the commissioned personnel must be assigned to staff positions and organizations.
11. That steps be taken to put the drill ground assigned in proper shape.
12. That it is highly desirable that all the D. and A. cards of the enlisted personnel should arrive before the men themselves, in order that men may be arranged in classes from these cards with reference to their previous occupations, and the states from which they come, so that to each organization could be assigned its proportionate share of old soldiers, foremen, clerks, horseshoers, farriers, cooks, etc., from which the non-commissioned officers and enlisted specialists could be drawn and so that no one organization would have too great a proportion of men from one state or locality.
13. That each organization must be built around the cook—in other words the first thing the men will need is food, and that consequently it is highly desirable that cooks be obtained and installed in the organization kitchens before the men arrive, so that, when the latter come, the mess of each organization will be running. Since the men furnished by the War Department will not arrive in time, it therefore seems desirable to have the recruiting officers make especial efforts at once to enlist a sufficient number of cooks.
14. That it is also desirable to have the first sergeants, mess sergeants, quartermaster sergeants and troop clerks on hand at once, but this is manifestly out of the question as all these men could not be picked from the Kansas recruits to the exclusion of those men furnished by the War Department.

15. That before the bulk of the men and horses arrive it would be a good thing to have some well broken horses on hand for officers' instruction in riding, and enough men who know something about horses to care for them.

16. That it is to be remembered that the troops are to be prepared for field service, and that the barracks and quarters are merely to facilitate matters. It is not necessary, nor is it wise, to fit them up as we would for permanent or even semi-permanent occupation. Everything must be calculated on field service lines, plus such comforts as will not interfere with efficiency or ability to quickly move out.

17. That since the colonel has his officers for some time before the men arrive, and since the lieutenant colonel and two majors are cavalry captains of the Regular Army, the colonel can start in training the officers along exactly the same lines that the men are to be trained; and, by continuing the officers' drill and classes after the men arrive, he can keep the officers always a few days ahead of the men, so that no drill of enlisted men will occur before the officers themselves have had exactly the instruction in that drill which they are to give their men. This will insure uniformity in instruction, economy of time, and will add to the prestige of the officer among his men.

18. That he must telegraph for the necessary manuals, blanks, etc.

The above problems are quite sufficient to be solved before others are undertaken.

The Colonel then calls up Major A and informs him that Otis, Root, and Schofield Halls will be used as officers' quarters and direct him to secure plans of the buildings, assign the rooms into sets of quarters to accomodate all officers so that the latter as they arrive can select quarters suitable to their grades. After consultation with the field officers he also informs Major A that four officers' messes will be established—headquarters mess, and three squadron messes, and to take such steps as will cause these messes to be in operation not later than noon on the 2d of April—such prisoners from U. S. Disciplinary Barracks as he may need in getting the equipment together being available on telephone call.

With regard to the purchase of horses, the lieutenant colonel being a captain of cavalry, and not entirely essential at this time to the work in hand is directed under competent orders to proceed to Salina, Wichita, and Belleville, to purchase 514 horses for the regiment. He is informed that a veterinarian will be sent to aid him not later than April 4th, but as it will take a few days to spread his information, and for the horses to commence to come in, he had better start at once. He is especially directed by the Colonel to secure without delay about sixty well broken, gentle horses, and ship them to Fort Leavenworth at the earliest possible date for the use of the officers' riding class.

With reference to the recruiting, the Colonel wants all his captains at Fort Leavenworth to take advantage of the officers' drills. Consequently he determines to send out three lieutenants as recruiting officers, one to Wichita, one to Salina, and one to Belleville. Who these lieutenants will be he cannot tell until the 2d at the earliest, when he can get a chance to look over the new arriving officers. He intends to give the recruiting officers special instructions to endeavor to obtain sufficient cooks for all organizations, and also to get some men accustomed to horses, all to be forwarded to Fort Leavenworth as soon as possible.

The problem of assignment of barracks and stables, while not of pressing necessity, the colonel desires to have solved while he is unhampered by a swarm of officers. So he examines the cavalry, artillery, and engineer barracks and stables, and divides them up among the prospective organization marking on a map the divisions thus made. He finds a certain amount of carpentry work to be done in order to equalize space, and is able to secure the services of some quartermaster carpenters, who, aided by prisoners from the Disciplinary Barracks are able to make the necessary arrangements before the arrival of any troops.

With the aid of the three majors, the colonel draws up the following schedule for drill and instruction of officers, pending the arrival of the enlisted men.

*Schedule of Drills and Instruction for Officers, April 4, 1911.*

Senior Instructor: Major B; Assistant Instructors: Majors A and C.

*Sunday, April 4th:*

9:00-9:45 A. M. A talk to the officers by the colonel outlining the scheme of instruction he has in mind, touching on the necessity of team work, on the disciplinary methods to be observed, and on the objects to be attained.

10:00-11:30 A. M. A conference on organization and equipment. Sheets should have been prepared showing the organization of a cavalry regiment, and all the articles of equipment that are needed. In other words, everything that effects organization and equipment should be compiled from the various general orders circulars, manuals, etc., into a few sheets so that the officer will have the data in compact form. Each of them will be furnished with a set of these sheets, and each orderly room as well. These sheets will be explained to the officers and the methods of obtaining the necessary equipment will be outlined.

2:30-4:30 P. M. A conference on paper work, including the most essential books, records, reports, etc., needed in an organization, and the object of each one. (Volunteers are very prone to ask: Why is such a thing this way?)

5:00-6:00 P. M. With aid of prison wagons and prisoners obtaining a complete set of equipment for enlisted man from from ordnance officer and quartermaster, for each officer.

*Monday, April 5th:*

7:30-8:00 A. M. Setting-up drill, particular attention being paid to the absolutely correct positions to be assumed, the absolutely correct methods of performing the movements, etc., all as contained in Cavalry Service Regulations, pp.31-34.

8:30-9:30 A. M. To form the squad, to dismiss the squad, position of the trooper dismounted, or attention, the rests, eyes right or left, facing, salute with the hand, to march in quick time and to halt. (C. S. R., pp. 29-31, 36, 37.)

10:00-10:30 A. M. Conference on the Uniform Regulations.

11:00-12:00 A. M. Swimming test: those who qualify to be excused from further instruction.

1:30-3:00 P. M. Nomenclature and care of rifle. Sighting Drills. (S. A. F. M., Chap. 1.)

3:30-4:30 P. M. Conference on Manual of Interior Guard Duty.

Lessons in Manuals assigned for April 6th. (The evening is supposed to be devoted to these manuals, the lessons assigned being gone over carefully, in order to see in print the lessons learned at drill that day, to look over the subject matter of the drills for the following day, and to prepare the officer's mind for more advanced training.)

*Tuesday, April 6th:*

7:30-8:00 A. M. Setting-up drill.

8:30-9:30 A. M. To form the squad; to dismiss the squad; position of the trooper, dismounted, or attention; the rest; eyes right or left; facing; salute with the hand; to march in quick time and to halt; to mark time; side step; back step; to march by the flank; to march to the rear; change step.

10:00-10:30 A. M. Conference on the uniform and military courtesy and etiquette.

11:00-12:00 M. Swimming lessons for those not qualified; the others will be allowed leisure in which to attend to personal duties, such as providing themselves with uniform, studying the manuals, etc.

1:00-3:00 P. M. Nomenclature and care of rifle, sighting drills; (review) positions and aiming drills. (S. A. F. M. Chap. II.)

3:30-4:30 P. M. Conference on Manual of Interior Guard Duty.

Lessons in Manuals assigned for April 7th.

C. S. R., Steps and Marching, pp. 35-37.

Individual Instruction with Arms, pp. 38-42.

Manual of Interior Guard Duty, pp. 12-20.

S. A. F. M., pp. 35-47.

(It will be noticed that the drills each day start out with what has been learned the day before, and take up several new movements. The same way with the lessons assigned.)

*Wednesday, April 7th:*

7:30-8:00 A. M. Setting-up drill.  
8:30-9:30 A. M. Steps and marching; manual of the rifle. (C. S. R., pp. 38-43.)  
10:00-10:30 A. M. Conference on the uniform and military courtesy and etiquette.  
11:00-12:00 M. Swimming lesson for those not qualified.  
1:00-3:00 P. M. Position and aiming drills; deflection and elevation correction drills. (S. A. F. M., Chap. III.)  
3:30-4:30 P. M. Conference on Manual of Interior Guard Duty.

*Lessons in Manuals assigned for April 8th:*

C. S. R. Individual instruction with arms--pp. 38-42, 43-50.  
S. A. F. M., pp. 40-51.  
M. I. G., pp. 14-31.

*Thursday, April 8th:*

7:30-8:00 A. M. Setting-up drill.  
8:30-9:30 A. M. Manual of the rifle and marching under arms.  
10:00-10:30 A. M. Conference on troop papers, record, reports and returns.  
11:00-12:00 M. Swimming lessons for those not qualified.  
1:00-3:00 P. M. Deflection and elevation correction drills.  
3:30-4:30 P. M. Conference on Manual of Interior Guard Duty.

*Lessons in Manuals assigned for April 9th:*

C. S. R. pp. 43-50. Care of horses, pp. 114-123.  
S. A. F. M., pp. 47-57.  
M. I. G. D., pp. 21-42.

*Friday, April 9th:*

7:30-8:00 A. M. Setting-up drill.  
8:30-9:30 A. M. Manual of the rifle and marching under arms.

10:00-11:30 A. M. Exhibition of enlisted man's equipment, assembling of same, how worn, methods of adjustment, where articles are carried, etc.

1:00-3:30 P. M. Gallery practice.

4:00-5:00 P. M. Conference on Manual of Interior Guard Duty.

*Lessons in Manuals assigned for April 10th:*

C. S. R. Care of Horses, pp. 114-123; p. 124 to shoeing; Care of Saddlery, pp. 127-129.

S. A. F. M., pp. 47-57.

M. I. G. D., pp. 34-52. Stable Guards, pp. 65-69.

The colonel thinks it best to carry the schedule no farther for the present, as he hopes to have horses by the 10th for the use of the officers.

The above schedule is finished on the night of the 1st. So on the morning of the 2d of April, the following arrangements have been made:

1. Lieutenant colonel has left to purchase horses.
2. Barracks and stables have been assigned.
3. Officers' quarters are ready for choice and occupancy; and officers' messes are ready to receive officers at lunch.
4. Schedule of officers' drills and instruction has been drawn up.

On the 2d and 3d of April the officers keep constantly arriving. They are allowed to choose quarters according to their rank as they arrive, there being little choice in the quarters assigned each grade.

As each officer reports he is handed a blank to be filled out and turned in immediately, in which he is to state his previous occupation, any previous military experience, profession, etc., so that the colonel may be able by a scrutiny of the blanks thus filled in to determine tentatively on his staff officers, and to intelligently make the assignments of officers to organizations and squadron staff positions, and to pick out his recruiting officers.

Three first lieutenants are picked out as recruiting officers and are sent respectively to Wichita, Salina and Belleville

which they are to make their headquarters. They are assigned recruiting districts as follows: First District: Wichita, Winfield, Oswego; Second District: Salina, Marion, Emporia; Third District: Belleville, Marysville, Holton.

The colonel also gives them instructions to this effect: "You will each enlist 152 men. I want each of you to make endeavors to enlist nine cooks at once, preferably men with previous experience as army cooks, or men who have cooked for ranches, field hands, farm laborers, etc. You will also endeavor to enlist at once about twenty-three men each who have had experience in the care and handling of horses. You will arrange to forward these men here not later than the 11th if possible. You will hold the other recruits at your stations, sending them forward so as to reach here in two equal batches, on the 12th and 13th, except in certain cases where you may receive instructions from me to send forward individual men. You will forward to my office the D. and A. cards of the men you enlist promptly, so that I may tabulate these men under previous occupations before their arrival."

One of the veterinarians is selected who is ordered to report to the Lieutenant Colonel at Wichita.

On the night of the 3d the officers are assigned to organizations, and the staff officers are appointed. All these assignments are subject to later change, but only in case of absolute necessity in the interest of the efficiency of the regiment.

So on the night of the 3d the officers have been assigned to quarters and messes, they know the organization to which they are to belong, the recruiting officers have left, and the purchasing of horses is under way.

On the morning of the 4th the schedule of drills and instruction for officers goes into effect.

As days go on I receive information from the recruiting officers that they have been able to obtain the necessary number of cooks, some good, some indifferent, and also about sixty men who are accustomed to the care of horses. So I have these men forwarded at once to Fort Leavenworth, which they reach on the 9th. I have them divided up among the organizations so that each of the fourteen organizations have two cooks, and four or five other men.

About the same time I receive information from the Lieutenant Colonel that he has been able to procure the sixty horses desired, so I have those shipped, reaching Fort Leavenworth on the 10th. These I have sent to one of the troop stables, and arrange for their care by the men already on hand.

In the meantime the D. and A. cards of the men to be sent by the War Department have arrived, as well as some from the recruiting officers. The Colonel starts a classification of these men by nature of precious occupation and State from which they come. By the time the men arrived he has practically all the men tabulated in this way, and based on this tabulation has assigned them by name to organizations. He has taken care to divide up the men among the organizations so that each will have its proportionate share of old soldiers, foremen, clerks, drivers, saddlers, wagoners, laborers, farmhands, machinists, etc., so that the troop commander in organizing his troop will have material for non-commissioned officers and other troop specialists required.

When the men arrive in the different batches, representatives of each organization is present, each man is informed of the organization to which he belongs, and the representative marches off the different squads to their barracks.

It will be remembered that the Colonel's schedule went through the 9th only. On the 9th he learns that the sixty horses will arrive the next day, so on the night of the 9th he publishes the schedule for the 10th, as follows:

*Saturday, April 10th:*

7:30-8:00 A. M. Setting up-drill.

8:30-9:30 A. M. Marching under arms, and manual of saber in so far as it affects the officer in his daily handling of that arm, and omitting combat training.

10:00 to 11:30 A. M. Conference on mess management, components of ration, how rations are obtained, field cooking equipment, etc.

1:00-3:30 P. M. Gallery practice.

4:00-6:00 P. M. The officers will be formed as a troop, marched to the stables, and will be required to groom, feed, water and bed down the horses for the night. The method

of keeping equipment at the stables, and in general, all the rules for stable management will be carefully explained to them.

8:00-10:00 p. m. Conference in which will be discussed all points that have come up during the week that may need clearing up. The sheets furnished the officers, showing the organization of a regiment, squadron, troop, etc., the equipment required, etc., will all be gone over carefully, as well as the question of mess management again.

By the morning of Sunday, the 11th, therefore, the officers will have had careful and minute instruction in all that pertains to organizing, equipping, and feeding their men, and will have received careful instruction in the basic dismounted drills. The week's course, full as it has been with new ideas following each other rapidly, will of course not have been thoroughly assimilated by each officer, and much more time is really needed, but it furnishes the best groundwork that can be given in so limited a time. The week commencing on the 11th and ending on the 17th will have to be devoted principally to shaking down the organization, receiving and caring for men and horses, etc. As recruits and horses will come in at various times, it will be impossible to get up any kind of complete schedule for this period that can be adhered to. However, the instruction of the officers must continue, and the Colonel determines to have some drills for them continue throughout the week. Outside of this, squadron commanders are informed that they will exercise such supervision over their squadrons during the week as will result in their thorough equipment, in everything prescribed, before the night of the 17th.

His schedule of instruction for the officers during the period April 12th to 17th, follows: It is understood that exigencies may demand that a few officers possibly one to each organization, or only one to a squadron, may have to be excused from these drills at times.

*Monday, April 12th.*

7:00-7:45 a. m. Manual of the pistol, dismounted. (C. S. R., pp. 50-52.)

2:30-4:30 p. m. Horses will be brought up with halters on only, and each officer will saddle and bridle his own horse;

horses will then be inspected, mistakes corrected, and the officers will be given mounted instruction in the preparatory exercises. C. S. R., p. 58.

*Tuesday, April 13th:*

Same as for Monday, including in the Manual of the Pistol, Pars. 135 to 142, S. A. F. M.

*Wednesday, April 14th:*

Same as on Tuesday.

*Thursday, April 15th:*

Same as on Wednesday including work on the snaffle, p. 69, C. S. R.

*Friday, April 16th:*

Same as for Thursday.

On the night of Saturday, the 17th, all men and animals are present, the organization is complete, the equipment is practically all on hand and the entire regiment is ready to begin training. There will probably be some equipment still to be obtained, but it will have to be gotten during periods when no work is assigned.

Before continuing with the scheme of instruction it might be well to take up the question of equipment, and discuss the methods employed to fit the regiment out in the least practicable time.

The mess furniture, etc., drawn for the officers' messes will not be taken along. The first equipment needed, aside from materials for the regimental headquarters office will be the sets of enlisted men's personnel and horse equipment, issued to officers for instruction purposes. This equipment will ultimately be absorbed in the troop equipment. The next equipment drawn, as noted above, is the kitchen utensils and necessary mess furniture for the organization messes. For this messing should field ranges be issued only? The Colonel prefers the cooks to use the ranges installed in the barracks. It is simpler; the cooks do not have so much to learn

at one time. The regiment is to be taken into the field for from two to three weeks before the 31st of July, and they can get accustomed to the field cooking equipment there. Mess furniture used in barracks will therefore not be taken into the field; except of course the meat cans, knives, forks, etc., which the soldier will use in the post.

When the cooks and men who take care of the horses arrive, they should be at once supplied with uniforms. The furnishing of the men with uniforms is the item which will take up the most time. Every effort should be made to cut down on the time. Whenever practicable, each batch of recruits should be taken the day they come in, their sizes taken, and each man fitted out with at least two O. D. shirts, one breeches, one leggins, and one campaign hat. As the captains have to spend so much time at drill, it might be well if they should direct one of their lieutenants to study up minutely the subject of getting men's measurements, method of trying on, method of obtaining clothing, and the amount of clothing each man should be provided with at the start.

The majors have from the 11th to the 17th, inclusive, in which their organizations must thoroughly be equipped. Let us look at a list of what this equipment consists of in general for one organization:

Arms and equipment of enlisted man (personal and horse).

Field kit.

Surplus kit, and surplus kit bags.

Six wire cutting pliers.

Signal outfit.

Farrier's supplies: 1. Medicine and dressing; 2. Farrier's kit.

Horseshoer's supplies: 1. Field forge; 2. Tools; 3. Branding irons; 4. Horseshoes; 5. B. S. coal; 6. Horseshoe nails.

Saddler's supplies: 1. Tools, leather, etc.; 2. Stictching horse.

Orderly Room Supplies: 1. D. L., orders, blank forms, etc.; 2. Field desk.

Extra ordnance, consisting of extra articles of enlisted man's equipment, spare parts, gallery rifles, etc.

Cleaning material.  
Lanterns.  
Engineer equipment: Tools, topographical instruments, etc.  
Axes.  
Field ranges, complete with utensils.  
Field picket line, with pins, sledges, shears, etc.  
Tentage.  
Ammunition.  
Wagons, mules, and harness.  
War Department Manuals, Ordnance publications, etc.  
Extra Q. M. Property, such as shelter-tent halves, etc.

In addition the bands needs instruments and music, the headquarters troop needs transportation, the machine gun troop needs mules, etc.

The problem of obtaining this equipment is chiefly one of method on the part of the supply departments involved, since the proper staff officers at the post have sufficient supplies (except horses, records, and enlistment papers) to supply all organizations. Take for example the horse and personal equipments of the enlisted man. These can be put up by prison labor in separate bundles, a bundle to a man, and each organization can draw them as soon as it has the transportation without trouble. A little system will economize time and make the matter one which will interfere little with instruction. There is one point to be observed however. The organizations should not be compelled to bow to the decision of the staff departments as to when they should draw the different things but the staff departments should arrange for the drawing of articles after due notice from the organization or regimental commander. The object should be not to fill the barracks and storerooms with an enormous mass of supplies that no one in the organization knows the purpose of in the beginning. They should be drawn at intervals, the men becoming acquainted with the uses of, and method of care of, a few articles, before drawing more. In this way a gradual acquisition of all the supplies needed will be made.

Let us now return to the subject of the instruction of the regiment. The Colonel can resort to one of two methods.

He can get up a schedule showing exactly what shall be taught in each drill hour each day, or he can divide the remaining three months and a half into periods, and state what he desires the organizations to be proficient in at the end of each period. He of course can get the majors to confer and get up schedules for their squadrons in their turn for each period he designates. For example, he can say, "Period April 18-30. Organizations will be proficient at end of this period in individual instruction, dismounted, with arms." The majors can in turn say: "Period April 18-30, sub-period, April 18-22, assigned to individual dismounted instruction without arms. Sub-period, April 23-30, assigned to individual dismounted instruction with arms." But in this case it rests with the captains as to how they will bring their organizations up to the proficiency required in each particular thing at the end of each sub-period. The question arises, "Are the captains competent, and have they had enough experience to warrant such an experiment being tried when every minute is valuable?"

In any case drill hours would be prescribed by the colonel. Nor can he let the captains have entire initiative during these drill hours, restricted only by knowing that proficiency would be required in such and such a thing at the end of each sub-period?

We must remember that the initiative of the officer should be trained, that he should be allowed to be supreme in his own sphere. We must also remember that he will daily be under the observation of the colonel and the field officers, and at least the experiment should be tried of giving him as much independence as possible—a balance must be struck between the amount of supervision by the field officers, and the amount of freedom allowed him in carrying out the schedule.

For the officers the colonel will himself prescribe the subjects of each day's drill, for the officers correspond to an organization of which he is the captain. He therefore draws up his order dividing the time available for training into periods, gets the majors to divide up the periods into sub-periods, arranges his own schedule for the training of the officers in such a way that they will receive instruction in the subjects assigned the sub-periods before those sub-periods open, and

prescribes hours for drill, all of which are contained in the following orders.

The discrepancies, conflicting duties of administration, and readjustments of the schedule will have to be made from day to day, dependent on progress made.

(Heading of order omitted.)

(Many calls are omitted because they have nothing to do with instruction.)

1. The following list of calls will go into effect at midnight of April 17-18.

Reveille	5:30 A. M.
Setting-up drills for 15 minutes after reveille.	
Breakfast	6:00 A. M.
1st Call—drill	6:35 A. M.
Assembly	6:45 A. M.
Recall	7:45 A. M.
First Call—officers' drill	8:15 A. M.
Assembly	8:20 A. M.
Recall	9:05 A. M.
First Call—second drill	10:00 A. M.
Assembly	10:05 A. M.
Recall	11:05 A. M.
First Call—officers' conference	11:20 A. M.
Assembly	11:25 A. M.
Recall	11:55 A. M.
First Call—third drill	1:25 P. M.
Assembly	1:30 P. M.
Recall—fourth drill and stables	3:55 P. M.
Assembly	4:00 P. M.

No recall from this last drill but stables will be over by 5:45 P. M., officers' school, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays 7:30-8:30 P. M.

2. During the last ten days of April, May and June the entire afternoon from 12:30 to 4:30 P. M. will be devoted to target practice on the range, and such drills as conflict with this instruction will be suspended.

3. Non-commissioned officers' school will be held daily, Sundays excepted, at such hour as organization commanders may designate, and will last one-half hour. The instruction will in general follow the lines already established, and contained in this order, for officers, omitting such advanced instruction as in the opinion of majors, may be dispensed with.

4. Majors are assigned to the supervision of troops as follows: Troops A, B, C and D—Major A; Troops E, F, G, and H—Major B; Troops I, K, L, and M—Major C; Machine gun troop, Lieut. Col. C.

5. The following scheme of progressive instruction will be carried out:

*First Period: April 18 to June 15.*

During this period captains will have their troops for instruction. At the end of this period troops must be proficient in the following:

School of the trooper dismounted.

School of trooper mounted, including preparatory exercises; work on the snaffle; work on the bit; use of saber, mounted; mounted inspections; movements in platoon, mounted and dismounted. On account of lack of time certain items will be omitted in this instruction which will be observed by consulting the schedule for sub-periods, following.

Packing the saddle.

Pitching tents, shelter, pyramidal, wall and common.

Target practice, including course in S. A. F. M. through gallery practice, and firing at 200 yards, slow and rapid.

Manual of interior guard duty.

Stable management and care of horses.

Pistol and revolver practice, including preliminary drills and position and aiming drills.

In order to concentrate on a few things at a time, this instruction will be carried out according to the assignment of sub-periods following: at the end of each sub-period a rigid inspection will be made of each organization to ascertain whether it comes up to the standard of proficiency required in the subjects in which instruction has been given in that sub-period.

*1st Sub-period.—April 17-24:*

1st Drill.—School of the Soldier, dismounted, without arms.

2d Drill.—Nomenclature and care of rifle, sighting drills, position and aiming drills, deflection and elevations correction drills, gallery practice.

3d Drill.—School of the Soldier, dismounted, without arms.

4th Drill.—Gentleing horses, stable management, care of horses, stables.

From the 20th to 24th inclusive, those men who show the greatest aptitude in gallery practice will be given instruction on the range.

*2d Sub-period.—April 25-30:*

1st Drill.—School of the Soldier, dismounted, with arms.

2d Drill.—Nomenclature and care of rifle, sighting drills, position and aiming drills, deflection and correction of elevation drills, gallery practice.

3d Drill.—School of Soldier dismounted, with arms.

4th Drill.—Gentleing horses, work on the longe, care of horses, stables.

During this period more of the more apt men at gallery practice will be given instruction on the range.

*3d Sub-period.—May 1-15:*

1st Drill.—Movements of troops dismounted, with arms, that may occur after an organization has dismounted to fight on foot.

2d Drill.—Position and aiming drills, gallery practice.

3d Drill.—Instruction in use and care of equipment, folding saddle blanket, assembling of saddles, packing saddles, shelter tent pitching, pyramidal, and other tent pitching.

4th Drill.—Gentleing horses, longeing, preparatory exercises in school of the soldier, mounted, stables, care of equipment.

*4th Sub-period.—May 16-30:*

1st Drill.—Mounted drill, the platoon, (C. S. R.)

2d Drill.—Gallery practice, preliminary drills and position and aiming drills with pistol.

3d Drill.—Mounted drill, preparatory exercises in School of the Trooper, mounted; work on the snaffle.

4th Drill.—Longeing, instruction in saddling with full pack. Stables.

During the period May 22-31 the range practice for all men at 200 yards will be completed.

*5th Sub-period.—June 1-15:*

1st Drill.—Mounted drill, the platoon, and dismounted movements therefrom.

2d Drill.—Revolver and saber drill.

3d and 4th Drills may be combined.

All work under packed saddle; mounted drill, the platoon, mounted saber drill, etc., care of equipment.

*2d Period.—June 15th to July 8th:*

During this period the troops will be combined in squadrons as contemplated in Cavalry Service Regulations, and the senior troop commander will have charge of the drills in each squadron. Target Practice for all men back to and including 600 yards, slow and rapid fire, will be completed. Revolver range practice will be completed. (Of course time does not permit of the men firing the entire course—that is the prescribed number of scores. Instruction in scouting, marching, etc., will be given, as well as going into shelter tent camp.)

*3d Period.—July 9th to July 31st:*

It is contemplated during this time to move the entire regiment to the drill ground and go into camp, taking all field equipment. There problems in minor tactics will be undertaken, marches will be made, individual cooking will be taught, and during the latter part of July field firing on the Leavenworth range will be indulged in.

---

NOTE: The foregoing article was not written for publication but was turned as a solution to a problem and secured from the Instructor. It is published at this time as so much is being said about the practability of raising volunteers for war. It will be seen that, although nearly four months has been allotted in this much congested schedule, the regiment is even then only partially prepared for field service in war. In fact double this time would hardly suffice to put a volunteer cavalry regiment in proper shape for going to the front.—*Editor.*



## Reprints and Translations.

### COLOR AND MARKINGS OF HORSES.\*

*In some Cases They Affect an Animal's Usefulness.*

BY ALFRED STODDART.

THE time-worn maxim, "A good horse cannot be of a bad color," must be qualified in war times. There has always been a prejudice against the use of white or light-colored horses for military purposes, always excepting some special regiments such as the famous Scots Greys, for instance. Now we hear that in the European armies they are painting white horses khaki color in order to render them less conspicuous to the enemy.

Naturally the question suggests itself: Why should not dun-colored horses be in demand for cavalry use? The color blends admirably with the shade of khaki employed by the English and United States armies. The dun-colored horse has never been highly esteemed and, other things being equal, his color is apt to bring his price down at least ten per cent. Why is it, therefore, that a determined effort has not been made to pick up dun-colored mounts for army use? Perhaps this is the answer: Dun-colored specimens rarely occur in well bred horses—that is in thoroughbreds or even in halfbreds, which latter classification includes any horse with thoroughbred blood in his veins. It is a color that is almost never found in the Arab or barb. Then, too, dun horses are apt to be undersized and it would be difficult to secure any number of them of the size prescribed by military regulations.

\*From *The Country Gentleman* of March 27, 1915.

This color is quite common among our Western ranch-bred ponies. A few years ago, before the introduction of thoroughbred and trotting blood on the ranches, the dun-colored ponies were probably as numerous as those of all other colors added together. Duns are frequent in all breeds of ponies, especially those that are semi-wild, such as the Exmoor and the Welsh. Norwegian ponies are almost invariably dun-colored. Darwin's theory that dun was the original color of the horse does not seem unreasonable in the light of the above facts. No doubt nature intended him to possess the inconspicuous khaki-colored coat that is now being bestowed upon him by art, for we find her taking similar precautions with all her wild things. It is a curious fact that wild animals of all kinds are almost invariably of one standard hue, while the same animals domesticated develop many colors.

The mule stripe down the back, so often found in the dun, with its branches from the withers forming what is sometimes called the "sign of the cross" on the back of an ass, together with the zebra-like rings not infrequently seen on the legs of dun horses, simply adds to the evidence in support of the Darwinian theory and attests to the kinship of horses with the quagga and other wild species.

In spite of the fact that good horses come in all colors, even experienced horsemen have certain well-defined prejudices in regard to color. The dealer knows that the most marketable shade is the bay. It is the conservative color. Many people will not use a horse of any other hue. It is the standard color in many army and police specifications, and a horse of this color can be most readily matched. But apart from these considerations there are many others bearing upon color.

Dun-colored horses are considered hardier than others, possibly because they are likely to be of some semi-wild strain. The horseman's personal experiences are apt to influence his prejudices. I have seldom met with a roan that did not possess the qualities that entitled it to be called "good," and many persons share this opinion—or superstition—regarding roans.

Horses' coats are divided into three classifications by veterinary authorities—primitive coats, derived coats and

conjugate coats. The primitive coats are those of the foals at birth. Derived coats are those that are formed later by the mixture of white with the original coats. Conjugate coats are those formed by the mixture of two different coats. These divisions are subject to numerous sub-classifications, to enumerate which would be tedious. It is said, however, that all the varied colors of the horse's coat are formed from two kinds of pigment only, and that the different hues are produced by varying degrees of density in the cells that contain the pigment. It is interesting to note that if a few hairs are plucked from a bay horse, a chestnut, and even a dun, and they are thrown together, it will be found almost, if not absolutely, impossible to sort them properly.

The colors are differently designated in some localities. Thus there are districts where they will stare at you when you speak of a chestnut horse and ask you whether you do not mean a sorrel. Sometimes the distinction between sorrel and chestnut is a matter of shade, the first term being employed to describe the darker coloring and the second when speaking of a light-colored horse. Then, too, some persons use the term chestnut to describe a dark-brown horse, and, as a matter of fact, veterinarians recognize the chestnut bay as a variation of the bay color. As its name implies, it is the color of a ripe chestnut.

The subject of white feet has given superstition and prejudice something to work upon for many generations. Our grandfathers used to quote a little rime: "One white foot buy him, two white feet try him," and so on, which expressed, if it did not go far to create, the prejudice that still exists against a horse with more than one white foot.

The prejudice is so old and so deeply rooted that very few horses marked in this manner now come into the market, or, more properly speaking, very few are bred. But if they were there is absolutely no reason why they should not be as good as other horses. No doubt the theory was warmly supported by grooms and others whose duty it was to look after the horses, for a white foot must be kept clean.

The color of a horse is by no means a guide to his breeding, but there are certain radical characteristics in the various

breeds of horses that manifest themselves in the color of the animal. Thus the Arab is almost invariably solid colored, or what passes for solid color, either chestnut, bay or gray. So is his descendant, the thoroughbred. Percherons are almost invariably gray or black, and the Clydesdale is as uniformly bay. The Suffolk Punch is curiously and consistently chestnut and Shetland ponies, contrary to the very general idea that they are often parti-colored, are almost invariably of solid colors, with black or dark points. In all of these cases specimens of colors are likely to be regarded with suspicion as to to the purity of their breeding.

---

#### CAVALRY AT THE FRONT.\*

---

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREIHERR VON WELK, GERMAN ARMY,  
RETIRED.

---

THE first six months of the Nations War, which more and more approaches a world's war, indicated that the measure had been given for a manifold new war teaching and a new art of war, that the strategy and tactics which till now had formed the foundation of the art of war and which Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Clausewitz, as well as Moltke had taught us, could no longer lay claim to full authority. It is not easy for a man, who had experience in the wars of 1866 and 1870-71 and learnt the art of war of that time, to correctly locate himself in the art of war of to-day. We will not go back a hundred years to the Napoleonic wars, but will devote our attention to the wars of the middle and close of the prior hundred years, in order to reach the conclusion and knowledge that the present war, almost in all departments and from every point of view, presents absolute originality. This comes at once into view when one considers the size of the opposing armies. In the place of tens of thousands there are hundreds of thousands and instead

\*Translated from the *Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine* of February, 1915.

of hundreds of thousands there are millions. The direction of this massive army commands, on account of its size, originality and because it is more or less surrounded by a veil of secrecy. On the outbreak of the war of 1870-71 one knew after the first days the formation of both armies, the combination of army corps into armies and their leaders; the combination of cavalry divisions; all operations of the two armies were made known by timely dispatches from the army in formation, and from the press; no one was in doubt as to where this or that organization was or as to which troops had taken part in the different battles and campaigns. The art of war consisted, as it had before, in marches and combinations, more or less sharply separated from one another and limited by time and space. When on the 18th of August 1870 a severe battle, for that time comparatively, had taken place, one knew a few days later at home that the battle of St. Privat had been fought. The means of fighting were in the main the three principal arms: infantry, cavalry and artillery. There could be no surprise in their relation on either side, for one knew exactly the weapons of the opponents and its qualities before the war began, so that the superiority of the German artillery and the superiority of the French infantry—considering the armament—offered nothing unexpected. The French army was supplied throughout with a new weapon, the mitrailleuse, but it was without great result and could not have in any case influence upon the art of war. Also the strategical principles and the method of fighting of the opponents were known. The entire war, and also in the years following, consisted in combining at the determined moment. The armies rushed upon one another, there was a battle, the enemy was defeated, he must retreat and be pursued or be captured (Sedan). At first when new troops were at call, new undertakings took place; there was modern fighting or battle, and so continued the entire war in combinations and sieges, whose result decided finally the entire campaign. New phenomena and measures in the domain of tactics made themselves current for the first time during the Russo-Japanese war but only up to certain limits—spade work and employment of heavier artillery or field artillery—and in the Balkan war, where in addition aeroplanes were employed

in very limited numbers. The teachings of these two wars were intelligently followed by the general staffs of the great powers of Europe and perhaps were considered and developed by the directors of the present great war. This is made manifest in the main in the employment of the motor car, of telephones, of high angle fire artillery, of search lights, of air ships and flying machines, and especially the enormous use of the spade by infantry and artillery.

Here the question presses upon us: What influence have the new tactics and the completely changed manner of the conduct of war exercised, especially upon the cavalry? Has a change in the employment of cavalry generally taken place, and have the first six months of this war brought forth the proof that the time of the cavalry is past; that it has no longer a value as a fighting arm opposed to the operations of the powerful long range fire arm of the artillery and infantry, and that the important duty of reconnaissance has completely gone over to the airship and aeroplanes? That was the opinion expressed on many sides, in the press and at public meetings and also in military circles. It would be going too far were we to touch on such opinions and decisions. We will only recall the discussions of the German Reichstag in the year 1913, where on the subject of the present value of cavalry much was said on the occasion of the proposal of the Government to provide the cost of the raising of six new cavalry regiments for the protection of the eastern boundary. It was there, especially Representative Noske, who spoke very decidedly against it and who ended a long speech with a collection of evidence to show that it was entirely incontestable, that in all great wars of recent years the cavalry has exercised a trifling or no influence upon the result of the campaign. Also another opinion—that the request for six regiments of cavalry indicated an overestimate of the value of cavalry. War Minister von Heeringen spoke warmly as to the value of the cavalry, and likewise for the requested increase. "We need," he said, "not only the reconnaissance work of the cavalry, but also its help to carry on the fight. It is completely incorrect, if it is ever said again that the rôle of the cavalry in future wars is played out. No, directly the opposite is my understanding of the case." He

continued this at length and touched in closing upon the indispensability of the cavalry for pursuit. The fruit of the attack, which one must gather after sustaining great loss, lies in the pursuit. There is the cavalry in its place. It stamps half results with completion and under circumstances thousands and more thousands of new victims are spared. The ready, well led, numerous cavalry can not only decide a campaign, but above all things, end it. That future which was referred to here by both sides in coming to a decision as to the necessity or no need of cavalry has come, the question lies before you: Who was right? Now, the value that our cavalry performed in the first three months of the great war, and what the lack of performance of the French, Belgian and also the English cavalry cost, lies clearly before all eyes. We refer in this connection to our review in the October and December number of this periodical.

In the second three months the relationship of all things greatly changed, because the campaign had taken another course. In the Western theater of operations the armies stand, after contact had been won by the great main bodies, opposite one another on a long front, waiting for the moment that will favor an offensive advance, as two fighters who opposed stand on guard and await an opening which the opponent may give. The activity of the two cavalries is employed in seeking to go round our right flank and the French left flank and in supplying suitable protective measures. Most frequently the opposing cavalry withdrew, especially the French, at every serious contact and left us unhindered in front and flank to press forward. We find our cavalry in the first days of October advancing on Antwerp, whose siege was thought unnecessary, and in the 3d of October they pressed over Dursel to Linth (on the R. R. Mechlan-Antwerp, west of Lierre).

In the north of France our mounted troops could advance still farther, and a French dispatch of the 6th of October says that they have been informed that upon the left (French) flank the front is still more extended and that large and important German cavalry masses are in the vicinity of Lille. There west of Lille and of Lenz our knights threw themselves upon the enemy's cavalry and drove them back. Two days later

we are already in the vicinity of Armentieres, where we had another conflict with the French cavalry. The French flank attempts and also the designed advance on Arras, were, according to French reports failures, in the main due to the persistence of the German mounted troops, who waited north of Lille the continuance of the great turning fight. Here on the 10th of October it came to a real serious encounter between the two cavalries, in which the French had a full cavalry division, and at Hazebrook—also still farther West of Armentieres—another division was defeated with heavy loss. This was corroborated by the French official report of the 12th of October.

At the same time as these fights, October 10th, the 9th Strassburg Hussar regiment in conjunction with a cavalry division had a hand to hand struggle rich in results. The regiment while reconnoitering as a flank detachment surprised 200 young Frenchmen in march to their clothing depot. They were taken prisoners. Some three kilometers further a convoyed wagon column in march was discovered. The first squadron of the Hussars attacked it, they received a strong rifle fire; but as the three other squadrons hastened to its assistance, the French threw up their hands and surrendered. They were taken prisoners 5 officers and 250 infantrymen, and as booty 36 horses and 23 wagons. The mounted men, accompanying the column, about twenty, took to flight and the three accompanying flank cuirassier squadrons, who should have thrown themselves against the Hussars, vanished as the regimental call of the Hussars sounded. It is to be mentioned that among the captured wagons was found a beautiful coupe, in which an elegant Frenchwoman sat, smoking a cigarette. The Hussars lost three men and six horses, while two officers and some Hussars were wounded.

In these days an English journal stated, that the German cavalry is already near Dixmude (22km. south of Ostende) and the war correspondent of another English newspaper, the *Daily Chronicle*, relates that he and a French correspondent had a narrow escape from being taken prisoners by a German Uhlan patrol at a railway station of north France, and appends the remark that this episode shows in what a bluffy manner the German Uhlans arise everywhere and then vanish. "Num-

erous (strong) German cavalry" he continues, "has arrived from the Belgian border—fugitives relate that the enemy's mounted patrols reconnoiter between Armentieres, Bethune and the forest of Dieppe. They ride in small detachments calmly through the villages of this district, demanding information and food from the few people who have remained and pressing further forward. Distant from the main army's main body, they explore the positions of the Allies. These patrols are disquieting by their sudden appearance from the lonely farm yards near the important railways. Their quick advance on various places, as Hazebrook, put the occupants of more distant districts west of Lille and south of Bethune in anxiety, so that all roads are black with fugitives, who are cut off from using the railway."

We may here well comment, that in all the reports of our opponents concerning the keen advance of small cavalry detachments in the enemy's land never therein is mention made of the least impropriety against the inhabitants. In contrast with this is the conduct of the Russian cavalry in East Prussia.

But more and more the activity of the cavalry was restricted by the appearance of mentioned circumstances, by the terrain and atmospheric conditions as well as by the methods of conducting war by both sides. Contact was won and the attempts to go around or break through lead to no special result. So there developed a position war which took on the character of siege warfare. The pioneers pushed into the first line and the spade many times displaced the hand weapon. By the end of October it was reported that our dismounted cavalry work with the spade and fight with the carbine by the side of the infantry in the firing trenches. A newspaper of the 25th of October under—"The Campaign in Flanders" states: "Also the cavalry which can only move with great difficulty on the overflowed and saturated terrain dismounted, dig firing trenches and fight with the carbine." In an English report it is said: "On the northern district which is very flat and some what rolling, the communications are bad, there one stands fixed upon a morass, cut by numerous dikes and canals. The enemy is composed mainly of cavalry, supported by Jäger

(rifles) on foot with many machine guns." In a war letter of the 2nd of November one writes: "Dismounted with the carbine we have fought and with it have earned laurel leaves." One can well say that the cavalry was at the front and under the stated conditions and by the demands made upon it did everything well in the fire trenches with spade and carbine. Ever hence will this employment of cavalry be considered by us as an emergency aid, and when it is possible, they will again mount in the saddle and fight with the saber and lance. There took place in this time, here and there small contacts with the English cavalry. In an English report an attack of the English cavalry upon the heights of Godewaerswalde and Baileul is spoken of, by which the German power had been broken. Also during the battle of Ypern, in the first days of November, according to a report of the *New York Herald*, the English cavalry came up but suffered terrible loss.

The French cavalry departs more and more from the ranks of cavalry fighting troops. Not alone the difficulty of the terrain, which had also a great influence upon the employment of our cavalry, caused the change, but the French cavalry suffered under the insufficient training of men and horses, the result, among many other things, of a two year training period. From the reports of French newspapers of the end of October, one can see that in France itself the cavalry is considered of inferior value. The opinion is expressed that they may only be considered and employed as mounted infantry and that they completely refused the cavalry task of opposing the German cavalry. The want of trained reserves of men and horses makes itself particularly felt. In a field letter of a German officer fighting near Lille he said: "A cavalry division succeeded in capturing a train of 700 French horsemen, ununiformed children and old men—a pathetic picture." The military critic of the *Corriere della Sera* expressed the view that the French army in general is much shattered, and says in regard to the cavalry, that the greater part, due to the great mortality of horses, only fights on foot. It appears to be similar with the artillery, but not to the same extent as with the cavalry. When we, as said above, employ our cavalry in the firing trenches as infantry with spade and carbine, it happens from

tactical reasons, that is to say, under the given conditions they can be so much more useful to us, but not from lack of trained men and horses. That our brave cavalry in the given cases can be employed as pioneers and infantry with excellent results, has gained for them the greatest praise. Could we think of a more beautiful testimonial for our mounted arm than the speech of his Majesty the Kaiser on the 1st of November, to the troops standing before him on parade in a little Belgian town, in which he considered especially the cavalry. With joy has he heard, said his Majesty, that the cavalry had fought faultlessly. To the cavalry in this war had fallen a task, such as he had believed would never come to it. With carbine and spade they have fought, and I have said to General von Marbitz, that the infantry cheerfully and with pride have fought and charged with the cavalry. But he hoped, continued his Majesty, that the cavalry would yet be given the opportunity to make use of the lance. These acknowledgements from the mouth of the highest War Lord are by the cavalry everywhere received with pride and satisfaction and spur it to new efforts. Even these acknowledgments are made more valuable, by the publication, almost at the same time, of the comments of the Crown Prince of Bavaria on the German cavalry, in which he said: "The cavalry has demonstrated that with its carbine in battle it will not hesitate before the enemies' fortified positions, and has by its character rendered the highest service in distant fights."

The knightly spirit that moves in our troops and in their leaders, will take care of us so that we will learn to esteem the carbine higher, equal to lance and saber. However, these must remain for us the chief weapons, and we can only feel well and in our element, when we are in the saddle. One must never be able to say of us as of the French cavalry, that we have become mounted infantry and are only usable as such. This view of the French cavalry is expressed not only by the press, but also from more authoritative places, one can perceive it from the known assignment of the present reported recruit contingents for 1915 and the back reports for 1913 and 1914. The entire number called for reached, according to French reports, 220,000 men, of whom 210,340 were assigned to the

infantry. The remainder went to the artillery, engineers and airship troops, while the cavalry got none. Of the greatest influence was this neglect of the cavalry, connected with the mentioned want of horses. France was already put to the necessity of importing cavalry horses, but now one reads that the mobilization of the cavalry and the reserve was accompanied by a great loss in horses in an incomprehensible way; that the entire breeding material, the brood mares were put into the service, and thereby the entire domestic horsebreeding destroyed. In the first weeks of the war hundreds of brood mares must have been finished. The loss sustained thereby will reach hundreds of millions. An indication of the little value apparently placed upon cavalry now in France, is the transferring of manifold cavalry officers to the infantry.

From the last days of the year we learn through an English newspaper, the *Daily Mail*, that, for the first time in this World's War of 1914, a great cavalry attack in mass had taken place, the French cuirassiers and dragoons had ridden against the German position at Nieuport. We are not able, up to the present, to find any German report concerning this attack and we must therefore refrain from a discussion. Had this mass attack really taken place, then were it a proof that the French cavalry has not become so useless as one must accept from the occurrences of the last weeks and the information of French sheets. In any case our cavalry would be much pleased, if the opportunity were offered it to cross lance and saber with the enemy, instead of working with the spade. The English paper says it was the first great cavalry attack in this war. This is incorrect, for on the 24th a great cavalry fight took place with the English cavalry at Thalin in Belgium, in which they were completely defeated. Further, there was a great cavalry fight on the 10th of October at Hazebrook, in which a complete French cavalry division was twice badly defeated. On the Russian border there have been repeatedly great encounters; at Koswinek, at Kolo and other places.

While in the preceding we have pointed out that the French cavalry is lacking in enterprise and especially of little value as mounted troops, the same cannot be said of the Russian cavalry in general. It was far more enterprising than the French and

we met it many times at the front. They constantly made and renewed the attempt to break through the German and Austro-Hungarian lines, and especially to go around the left flank in East Prussia.

In the great battles which took place in the last days of August between Allenstein and Neidenburg, next to the Masurischen lake, General von Hindenburg defeated and in a great measure destroyed the Wilnaer army, to which belonged five cavalry divisions. During September we heard little of the Russian cavalry. First on the 29th of September, after the union of the German and Austro-Hungarian military forces had taken place, it was reported officially from Vienna that the returning movements of the enemy along the Vitsula were in progress and that several of the enemy's cavalry divisions had been pushed before the united armies.

On the 20th of October the Austrian General staff reported that the united German and Austro-Hungarian cavalry had defeated a strong cavalry corps of the enemy west of Warsaw. Further operations of the Russian cavalry in great masses were encountered in the begining of November at Koho, west of Kutno in Poland, where they had crossed the Warta. They were defeated and driven back across the river. They had in any case the task of covering the advance of the army against the German boundary. Their strength was mentioned as fully 10,000 horses, certainly a considerable superiority over our cavalry. Further conflicts which were known, took place at this time at Konin on the Warta (on the 10th of November), where our cavalry surprised a Russian battalion, took 500 prisoners and 8 machine guns, and at Koswinek, east of Kalisch (on the 11th of November) our cavalry drove back a Russian cavalry corps. The official Austrian report mentioned it explicitly as a cavalry fight. Unfortunately at this time informations fails us. In Galicia the Russian attempted to push forward with great masses of cavalry, but were likewise driven back. Special value seemed to have been laid by the Russian army direction upon the turning of our left flank in East Prussia, for a few days after the just related cavalry fight, on the 16th and 17th of the same month, strong Russian cavalry detachments, which had pushed into East Prussia in the

direction of Insterburg, were defeated and driven back upon Pilkallen. In these sections the Russian squadrons continued with great persistency to attempt to put through their design of a grasp and a hold in the heart of East Prussia. On the 18th of December, Great Headquarters made known that on the East Prussian border a Russian cavalry attack west of Pilkallen had been defeated and on the 30th of December it said again that the Russian army cavalry at Pilkallen had been pressed back. What troops on our side were engaged in these repeated defences, whether they were by cavalry or other troops, is not known to us.

Although the Russian cavalry gained no decisive and lasting tactical result, yet they were in comparison with their French allies active, enterprising and many times at the front. On that account we cannot agree with the judgment of a well-known German war correspondent, without reservations. Among other things, he wrote in the middle of October, in speaking of the end of the Russian offensive: "It is a matter of fact, that the Russian cavalry, also army cavalry, has in some way broken down, to an extent not thought possible." And some days later in his observations concerning the Russian army, he said further that the cavalry from the beginning had failed; especially in reconnaissance work had they been extraordinarily bad. The Cossacks are denied every military value and at this time the Russian cavalry are hardly to be seen anywhere at the front. General von Hindenburg stated, in the beginning of November, that the Russian cavalry "are not used for anything." Later they must have improved, for we have seen that they came often upon front and flank and offered the opportunity for conflicts with our cavalry. That these conflicts were without exception victorious for us, in spite of the numerical superiority of the Russian cavalry, and that in every case the enemy was frustrated in his attempt to break through and to outflank, we attribute to our known factors of good leading, good training, superior material in men and horses and to our heroic bravery.

Since these factors are common with all our troops so must and will final victory come to us.

WHAT HAS THE WORLD'S WAR TAUGHT US UP TO  
THE PRESENT TIME THAT IS NEW IN A  
MILITARY WAY.\*

BY AN OFFICER OF HIGH RANK—BERLIN, GERMANY, FEBRUARY, 1915.

\* \* \* \* \*

II.

OUR CAVALRY.

**W**HEN aviation first came to life some ten years ago and the perfection of the flying machine advanced more and more, there arose a great whisper in lay and professional circles that the last hours of the cavalry had struck. As first understood, the aviator was suited to reconnaissance service in war to a comprehensive degree.

Generally there were at that time many prophets who pronounced the death sentence of the mounted arm and denied it any but a small, special place as an assistant in battle. In spite of them, our responsible men sufficiently understood the question to urge with special energy, at the various army increases, for a further increase of the cavalry. Although at first our worthy public representatives did not appear very willing to favor this dear and expensive arm, it was kept before them that during a war good new infantry masses could be comparatively easily trained, armed, and sent to the front, but that we could not have in time of peace enough cavalry and artillery, because the completion of these organizations by newly recruited bodies remained always a makeshift. He who has only learnt to sit tolerably well upon a horse will not ride far. If man and horse have not become the proverbial inseparable

\*An article of eight chapters of which only the one relating to cavalry is here reproduced. The others, with an introduction and a conclusion as to political considerations, cover the several questions of: Large caliber field howitzers; Our aviators; Our Zeppelins; Our special troops; The position war; The field kitchen; and Our submarines.—*Editor.*

whole, then such emergency trained cavalry remains an assistance of the second class.

As a result of this we have formed new regiments and need not complain that we lost an opportunity. In spite of that, we will learn a wholesome lesson from the battles fought up to the present time, by giving to our cavalry, in the coming years of peace, more consideration than formerly. Relative to the enterprise of our mounted troops things have taken a new turn, as we divined and foresaw. As to what occurred relative to reconnaissance (we will comment upon the valuable service of our aviators in another chapter) it can be said, in spite of the performance of our self-sacrificing aviator officers, that the cavalry has more than formerly indicated its indispensability. We believe that it can be accepted that our cavalry look back with pride and satisfaction upon their path up to the present. Any one who ventures to assert that the glorious time of the cavalry lies at Hohenfriedberg, Liebertwolkwitz and Mars Latour, would be derided.

No, the glorious days for the cavalry have again become young and we have lived to see mounted combats in which powerful masses of the enemy's and our own cavalry struggled, where the saber and the lance accomplished bloody work, where thousands of panting horses pressed shoulder to shoulder contesting every foot of the wide earth, and expedited the end to the fight by putting the enemy in aimless flight. Immediately following such a victory they gathered the fruit. The enemy's reconnaissance was prevented, the position of our army screened and a long time was required before the enemy could reform his shattered squadrons for renewed operations.

Throughout, the cases have been rare where cavalry charged infantry. They were limited to the moments when a force had expended its ammunition, or was demoralized and in flight, or where a weak, unsuitable artillery escort was struck by a superior force of cavalry.

We saw cavalry fight against cavalry and the success, which was generally upon our side, will later, when the history of this war can be written, be estimated at its full value.

The results of special patrols, which in the main were conducted with special ability, enable one to perceive that the cavalry was well suited to its task from every viewpoint. Be-

fore the great position war in the West began, it was preceded by keen riding. Thence the dismounted cavalry was employed with good results in the firing trenches, where they adapted themselves to the circumstances and proved very useful.

Their tactical superiority showed itself conspicuously when opposed to the Cossacks, who still lived upon their old fame as military centaurs. This was completely destroyed when they had to accomplish anything in close attack. With mounted infantry there is nothing to be attained. That is the second wholesome lesson of the war of 1914. We believe that when in the future a minister of war again goes before the Reichstag and urges an increase of our cavalry, in order to be able to protect the East Prussian fields from a Russian invasion, there will only be needed the illustration of the conspicuous energy of the cavalry in the last World's War to bring the gentlemen who stand on the extreme left to vociferous friendship and pride for our brave mounted troops.

The cavalry has not only not become an antiquated arm, but it has by meeting all conditions of war in such an apt way dovetailed into the frame of this newest of all wars. Its *raison d'être* is more than only proved.

\* \* \* \* \*

---

## THE TURKISH CAVALRY DURING THE TURCO-BULGARIAN WAR.\*

---

BY LIEUTENANT DJEMIL MUNIR BEY, TURKISH ARMY.

---

### PREFACE.

**D**URING the recent war in the Balkans the only Turkish division of cavalry operated in Thrace. The account of its actions by Lieutenant Djemil Munir Bey, son of Salih Munir Pacha, former Turkish Ambassador to France, is the subject of the following pages.

---

\*Translated from "*La Cavalerie Turque Pendant la Guerre Turco-Bolgare*" by Lieutenant Henry J. Adair, Tenth Cavalry (first four pages), and Colonel C. H. Hunter, U. S. A., for the War College Division, General Staff.

After taking the course at the French school at St. Cyr, Lieutenant Djemil Munir Bey served a period with the 27th Dragoons at Versailles, then another with the Prussian Hussars at Dantzig. After returning to his country the lieutenant was put in the General Staff.

General Salih Pacha got him from the General Staff at the beginning of the war, to use him for the chief of staff of the cavalry division which General Salih Pacha commanded. During the campaign Djemil Munir Bey had such a brilliant career that he was recommended at the time to be promoted to the grade of captain and for the Military Gold Medal for Merit.

The very distinguished war correspondent, M. George Raymond, of "*The Illustration*," with the Turkish army, had occasion to know Djemil Munir Bey during the campaign in Thrace. The following is the picture that he draws of him in the letter of November 17, 1912: "Djemil Bey is a most agreeable companion. He has been raised in France, has passed through St. Cyr, Saumur, and has been a dragoon at Versailles. He has the manners, gaiety and gestures of the French, and also the bearing of one of our cavalry officers."

The operations of the Turkish cavalry in Thrace have been very successful, and as they are the actual testing of the principles of the French cavalry, they do honor to the young Turkish officer of French military training, who in them has filled positions far above his grade.

*General Bonnal.*

---

OPERATIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT CAVALRY DIVISION  
OF THE ARMY OF THE EAST.

At mobilization the Independent cavalry division consisted of six regiments, (three brigades), of two batteries of horse artillery, of three machine-gun troops, of a detachment of engineers, and of a telegraph section.

The First, Second, and Fifth Brigade were composed of the following regiments, viz.:

*First Brigade (Col. Zia Bey), Constantinople:*

First Lancers (Lt. Col. Hassan Bey), Constantinople.  
Second Line (Major Halil Effendi), Constantinople.

*Second Brigade (Col. Mustapha Bey), Constantinople:*

Third Line (Lt. Col. Yussuf Bey), Constantinople.  
Fourth Line (Lt. Col. Irfan Bey), Constantinople.

*Fifth Brigade (Gen. Selim Pacha), Adrianople:*

Ninth Line (Col. Osman Bey), Dimotica.  
Eleventh Line (Lt. Col. Sohit Effendi), Adrianople.

The regiments whose peace footing was five squadrons entered the campaign with four squadrons. The fifth squadron which remained at the depot, completed the effective strength of those who should go. Several days before the beginning of hostilities, the light brigade from Adrianople was attached to the division. This brigade at mobilization had been ordered to cover the ground between the Maritza and the Toundja. The first and second light regiment formed this brigade. The brigade was commanded by Col. Iotahim Bey, Captain and Adjutant Ali Riza Bey was chief of staff. The brigade consisted of about 1,200 sabers, and had in addition a battery of horse artillery, a machine-gun company, and a detachment of engineers.

The division contained about 3,600 sabers with its four brigades.

The cavalry regiments were armed with a saber and a Mauser carbine (range 1,800 meters, load five cartridges, German "S" sharp pointed bullet.) Only the First Lancers were in addition armed with the lance which weapon can never be too highly recommended for use in the cavalry.

Their regimental trains and others were composed of wagons drawn by horses and bullocks, requisitioned by the regiments in their garrisons, and in general lacked strength.

The convoy guard was obtained from the men the regiments were unable to mount on account of lack of horses.

Of the eight regiments of which the division was composed, the 1st, 2d, 9th, 11th and 1st and 2d light were mounted on imported horses (Hungarian), while the two others, 3d and 4th,

had native horses (pure blood Arabs, or very nearly pure blood). The quietness, endurance and sure-footedness of the latter is above praise.

Each brigade had at its disposition one machine gun company bearing the brigade number. Each company had four guns, Maxim model.

The battalion of horse artillery was composed of two four-gun batteries (Krupp rapid fire cannon, caliber 75 mm.). The strength of the group in men and horses was very much below what it should have been. The battery of the light brigade was also composed of four Krupp guns, rapid fire, 75 mm.

The two engineer detachments of two sections each under the command of a second lieutenant, have not been of very much use during the course of the campaign. As the men had to follow on foot, they constituted rather an embarrassment. The division used them later as train guards.

As for the wireless telegraphy, it might have been very useful to us, if the equipment placed at our disposition had not been too old, and particularly, if the officers and operators had been familiar with their work.

The cavalry division was commanded by Brigadier General Salih Pacha, chief aid-de-camp of H. M. I., the Sultan. It is not for me to praise my chief. I may only say that Salih Pacha, who completed his military training in Germany, showed proof during the whole campaign of much bravery, good sense, and energy, the whole allied to a spirit essentially knightly.

The division staff was composed of:

One chief of staff (Lieut. Col. Youssouf Izzet Bey).

Two assistants to the chief of staff (Majors Hamdi and Irfan Bey).

Three aids (Captain Ferhad Effendi; Captain Nazim Bey; Lieut. Djemil Munir Bey).

One captain attached to the staff (Capt. Kadri Effendi).

One captain clerk (Captain Assaf Bey).

One lieutenant commanding the headquarters guard of the division.

Two lieutenants commanding the detachments of escort orderlies and division train.

At the mobilization of the end of September which began in October, 1912, the division had received orders to assemble at Soulu-Oglou—Tchiftlik, to the west of Kirk-Klisso, (see sketch No. 1.) The 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th regiments, and the group of artillery, which was also in garrison in Constantinople, as well as division headquarters, were transported by rail as far as Baba-Eski. The 9th and 11th regiments, which were in garrison at Dimotica and Adrianople, had, the same day, received orders to proceed at once to the frontier, and to cover the terrain between the Toundja and the line Kirk-Klisso—Kofdjighaz-Alatli.

On the 9th of October the division was united at the place of assembly.

As soon as the division was assembled at Soulu-Oglou, the general ordered a reconnaissance of the terrain. Reconnoitering squadrons had been sent forward to prepare against any eventuality on the frontier from east of the Toundja as far as Devletli-Agatch.

One regiment, the 11th, which was at Hadji-Danishmend, had sent forward a reconnoitering squadron to Waysal; the First Lancers had one at Eumer-Abbas, with fixed posts (platoons), at Devletli-Agatch and Malkotchlar.

In spite of the precaution taken by the Bulgarians on the frontier, (militia organizations in the villages, reinforcements of frontier guards, etc.), our emissaries were able to get into Bulgaria, and inform us upon their movements of the troops. But as these spies were almost all recruited among the peasants, the information that they brought us had to be taken with caution, as far as numbers were concerned. We knew, for example, that the main bodies of the enemy were assembling toward Kutchuk and Buyuk-Boyalik, Ambarli and Arabli; that a mass of cavalry was in the direction of Gaibler; that there was artillery near Derekeuy and that the population of the villages, women, old men, and children, were at work digging trenches along the frontier, a fact that our reconnaissances and patrols were able to report as having seen themselves

and that the frontier, guarded by militiamen, was very difficult of access for all.

The plan of the Turkish commander-in-chief, Abdoullah Pacha, was to take the offensive with the whole army, composed of the 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th army corps. In this operation the right wing of the army, constituted by the third corps (Mahmoud Mouktar Pacha), was to develop an enveloping movement, while the rest of the army, 2d, 1st, and 4th corps, would pivot around Adrianople. Under these conditions, it would seem preferable to have the bulk of the cavalry on the right wing. This was, moreover, the point of view of the division commander, who would have gone there on his own initiative, had the state of the terrain not prevented.


In fact, the reports of the officers sent to reconnoiter the terrain, as well as the emissaries that had been able to get in from the other side of the frontier, corroborated what was shown by a simple reading of the map. There were no roads; the terrain, very broken and heavily wooded, was not suited to a rapid march in dense formation, and it was almost impossible for artillery. This partly explains the absolute lack of pursuit on the part of the Bulgarian cavalry after the battle of Kirk Kilisse, the hostile cavalry being unable to overcome the difficulties of the terrain in time to be of use.

There, as everywhere else, the Bulgarian cavalry showed its absolute lack of teeth and claws. It is very sure that the appearance of one or two hostile squadrons would have had a most disastrous effect upon the unfortunate troops of the III Corps when in retreat. And the Bulgarians certainly had these two squadrons at their disposal; what was lacking, was the punch.

In the case that the commander-in-chief should have preferred to attack the enemy on the Adrianople—Kirk-Klisse line, which would have been certainly wiser and more reasonable, the place of the cavalry would have been on the right wing, anyhow.

The main body of the division was at Sulu-Oghlou, and communications with the rear, and particularly with the commander in chief, were already even before the declaration of war, extremely difficult. At Sulu-Oghlou there was not even

a telegraph office; we had to go to Kirk-Klisso, Adrianople, or Baba-Eski, to find a reliable one. It is true that wireless stations had been installed at Sulu-Oghlou and Baba-Eski.



SKETCH NO. 1.

But the installation was old style Marconi of short range, and as it was poorly served; it never did work.

There was also a combined telegraph and telephone line, parallel to the frontier, passing by Kirk-Klisso—Devletli-

Agatch—Waysal—Hadji-Danishmend, and ending by way of Lahna-Pacha at Adrianople. These lines were of a certain amount of use to us before the beginning of hostilities, but were useless after the Bulgarians had entered Ottoman territory, as the Bulgarians destroyed them at once. Our communications with the rear were so uncertain that we could not warn the independent cavalry division in time for it to act, on the declaration of war, and this division should have been the first to be warned.

As for the supply service, the center was at Baba-Eski. As long as there was no rain, this service worked pretty well, in spite of the very great distance (about sixty kilometers). But when it rained it was impossible for the make-shift teams that we had at our disposal to drag themselves through the deep and sticky terrain, and we had to requisition rations and forage on the spot.

Two days before the commencement of hostilities, Wednesday, October 16th, the division having received from the commander-in-chief the news that the war was imminent, Salih Pacha decided to approach the frontier. To do this the first brigade was sent to Waysal, the fifth to Hadji-Danishmend, and second in reserve to Sari-Talishman. (See sketch No. 2.) The group of artillery followed the fifth brigade, while the machine gun companies remained with their respective brigades.

As for the Adrianople light brigade, which had just come under Salih Pacha's orders, it was at Lahna-Pacha.


The division had sent forward reconnoitering squadrons to Devletli-Agatch, Eumer-Abbas, Kutchkuk-Eunli, and Demirkeuy, these squadrons sending forward on the principal roads fixed reconnoitering patrols.

The division knew that the enemy's troops were assembling in large numbers near Gaibler, Derkeuy, Buyuk-Boyalik, and Buyuk-Derbend, villages situated a few kilometers from the frontier. (See sketch No. 1.) Now, the reconnoitering squadrons were placed at points through which led the principal roads leading into the interior. At the first signal they were to push forward their reconnaissances into Bulgaria.

To guard against all mishap, the troops had received orders to secure themselves carefully on the march, as well as in camp,

and to double their watchfulness at night, as a surprise was always possible.

During this time, the main body of the army, composed of the first corps (Constantinople), the second (Rodosto), the third (Kirk-Klisso), and fourth (Adrianople), were assembling south of the line Adrianople—Kirk-Klisso.



The third corps, at Kirk-Klisso of which the Turkish "Ney," General Mahmoud Mouktar Pacha, had just taken command, was in advance near Kirk-Kilisse, and its personnel was complete. This army corps, the strongest of all of them, had about 40,000 men.

Farther south, in the direction of Lule-Burgas, was the Second Corps (Chevket-Tourgout-Pacha), about 20,000 men.

Toward Baba-Eski was the First Corps (Eumer Yaver Pacha) about 25,000 men.

The Fourth Corps (Ahmed About Pacha), which was formed of one active and one reserve division, had to leave one division at Adrianople to help in the defense of the place. It was hardly 15,000 men strong, and was in front of Ouzun-Keupru.

Army headquarters, Abdoullah Pacha commanding-in-chief, was at Lule-Burgas.

#### OPENING OF HOSTILITIES.

On Wednesday morning, October 18th, the division commander, ignorant of what was happening, was setting out, accompanied by his staff and aids, in order to reconnoiter the terrain before Hadji-Danishmend, when he heard rifle-firing. (See sketch No. 2.) At the same time a courier brought him a report saying that: "The enemy, about two battalions strong, had crossed the frontier, had captured the blockhouse on hill 518, and was marching on the villages of Hadjlar and Kutchuk-Eunli, which would probably be occupied by him by the time he had reached the general." The inhabitants of the villages very near the frontier had evacuated them a few days before at the order of the civil government.

As I have said above, Salih Pacha not having been warned of the declaration of war, considered the reports of his advance guard exaggerated, as far as the strength of the enemy was concerned, and believed that he had in his front irregular bands of "comitadjis." Indeed it was usual to see Bulgarian bands more or less regular passing the frontier, coming to attack our blockhouses, and to pillage the Mussalman villages near the frontier.

The general not doubting that at the first attack by the troops that he had at Hadji-Danishmend, these bands would disperse, ordered the main bodies of his advance posts to pursue the enemy as far as the frontier, but not to cross it in order to avoid provoking a *casus belli*.

This order had just been sent when Colonel Zia Bey, who was at Waysal with his brigade (the 1st), reported that hostile troops, apparently the advance guard of a strong column, had marched, at about nine o'clock in the morning, upon the villages of Malkotchlar, Buyuk-Kanara, Kutchuk-Kanara, had captured the blockhouse of Malkotchlar, had set it on fire, as well as the aforesaid villages, and had retired toward Kizildjikli-Bayir. At the same time that he reported this aggression, Zia Bey sent word that a hostile battalion having just captured the Turkish blockhouse of Bakadjik, north of Waysal, the brigade, dismounted, supported by the machine gun companies, had been sent against this battalion.

In fact, Colonel Zia Bey, at the head of four dismounted squadrons, had succeeded in recapturing the Bakadjik blockhouse from the battalion, and while pursuing it vigorously had entered with it into the Bulgarian blockhouse, situated 3,000 meters farther on, where he had been stopped by two Bulgarian battalions supported by cannon, and solidly entrenched.

Having sustained until five o'clock in the evening the enemy's fire, Colonel Zia Bey received orders to retire, and retreated in good order bringing away his wounded and without being pursued, upon Waysal and from there upon Hadji-Danishmend, keeping contact with the enemy by means of his reconnaissance and detachments. From the uniforms of the killed and wounded, the 1st brigade had been in contact with troops belonging to the 1st Bulgarian army.

After the retreat of the 1st brigade of the Turkish cavalry, the enemy had moved forward and occupied the heights north of Waysal, the village where the Turkish reconnoitering squadron of the 11th regiment had passed the preceding night. Later, the Bulgarians had set fire to the village. It must be noted that the Bulgarians systematically burned all Mussulman villages from the frontier to Lule-Burgas. There is no exaggeration in this; it is unfortunately but too easy to prove.

As for the hostile advanced guard that proceeded by Hadjilar upon Hadji-Danishmend, one dismounted squadron sufficed to hold it until evening; the main body of the 5th

brigade, and the divisional artillery that was at Danishmend did not have to intervene.

The light brigade received the order to watch the zone comprised between the Toundja and hill 350, west of Hadji-Danishmend. As soon as it should be notified of the declaration of war, it was to cross the frontier, and reconnoiter the zone between the villages of Kourdalan, Arabli, and the Toundja. Upon receipt of the order from the division, the light brigade had sent forward a reconnaissance squadron upon Demirkeuy. This squadron having been stopped at the outlet of the village, word was sent back to the brigade, which hurried forward to break through. The brigade which had brushed aside the weak detachments that had come as far forward as Demirkeuy was definitely stopped at Hamzabeyli by superior forces. Its reconnaissances having reported that the division was engaged in a battle in the direction of Hadjilar, the brigade retired upon Boyonli.

After receiving the information from the 1st brigade and reports from the light brigade, neither of which made mention of hostile cavalry, Salih Pacha rightly estimated that the latter must be, as the scouts were telling him, opposite the right wing of our army. In fact, the cavalry was on this flank as is stated by M. de Penennrun in his interesting book "The Balkan War." But my French comrade has been led into an error by the Bulgarian staff which informed him about the skirmishes of the first day, the Waysal and Sari Talishman fights in particular, (pages 94 and 95 of M. Penennrun's work). There was at Waysal only the solitary brigade of cavalry (the 1st) that I have just spoken of, no artillery and no infantry, the nearest infantry elements being about twenty kilometers away at the time the combat took place. In my opinion there is no more flattering compliment for cavalry fighting on foot than to be taken for infantry, and this after several hours of fighting.

Fearing to see the Bulgarian cavalry interposing between himself and his reserve brigade, and dreading particularly a night attack by the infantry elements of the enemy's advance guard, Salih Pacha decided to unite the division, the light brigade excepted, at Sari-Talishman.

In consequence, the 1st and 5th brigades, leaving one squadron before Waysal and another at Hadji-Danishmend, marched at nine o'clock in the evening to go into bivouac at Sari-Talishman.

Information received during the night of October 18-19th at division headquarters had confirmed the information of the evening of the 18th, and the reconnoitering detachments had been the objects of no attack on the part of the enemy. In the morning the light brigade reported that hostile troops of the strength of about a division were moving upon Hanli-Yenidje. Also, the Hadji-Danishmend and Waysal squadrons informed the general that long columns of hostile troops of all arms were marching upon these points. Indeed, reconnaissances from Eumer-Abbas and Devletli-Agatch were made that reported that three hostile columns estimated at a division each were advancing in these directions.

The rôle of the cavalry division being to retard and annoy the march of the enemy's columns, Salih Pacha decided to send forward the whole division to make a frontal attack with his three brigades upon the enemy advancing from Hadjilar and Waysal upon Hadji-Danishmend, while the light brigade should take him in flank.

The mixed detachment (three battalions, two batteries, one squadron) of the Adrianople fortress were on hand to reconnoiter the enemy's column advancing upon Hanli-Yenidje, and force it to deploy.

As the Bulgarian column marching upon Hadji-Danishmend was descending the Hadjilar hill, we could see and count the regiments of which these troops (one division of about 20,000 men) were composed.

The three artillery batteries of our division were in position; they waited to open fire until the enemy should have reached the bottom of the valley. The distance was from 6,000 to 6,500 meters. About two o'clock in the afternoon the artillery had succeeded in stopping the enemy, and thanks to its very accurate fire had caused him sensible losses. On its side five regiments of dismounted cavalry was engaged with the enemy. Three regiments, mounted, constituted the division reserve, two between Sari-Talishman and Suleiman-

Danishmend, and one near hill 350, west of Hadji-Danishmend.

The fight had begun very favorably for us. Indeed the very rough terrain was hindering the Bulgarians from getting their batteries in position rapidly, and our fire was greatly annoying the Bulgarian battalions that were trying to deploy against us. At this moment the approach of a brigade of hostile cavalry, coming from Waysal, was signalled, and Salih Pacha gave an order to the regiment in reserve near hill 350 to march upon the right flank of the enemy, and then set out himself at the head of his reserve brigade to attack the Bulgarian cavalry.

The terrain was almost level, and made an admirable ground for a cavalry fight, but the enemy did not wait for the shock, but turned about, and went at full speed back in the direction of Waysal.

This is the first and the last time in all the campaign that we had a chance to see—but alas! without being able to charge it—a large body of Bulgarian cavalry.

The dismounted fight lasted until about four o'clock in the afternoon. At this moment the Bulgarian infantry was deployed and his artillery had gone into action. As the mission and strength of the division did not contemplate a serious battle against an enemy very superior in number, General Salih Pacha gave orders to the division to withdraw, and to go into bivouac, the 1st, 2d, and 5th brigades at Sulu-Oghlou, the light brigade at Achtali.

The reconnoitering squadrons that had been sent or left at Keremitli, Sari-Talishman and Tashli-Muslin maintained contact with the enemy.

At five o'clock in the afternoon, Salih Pacha reported to the commander in chief in the fortress of Adrianople, as well as to the commanders of the First, Second and Third Corps that two hostile divisions accompanied by two regiments of cavalry, had advanced from Buyuk-Derbend upon Hadjilar and Hadji-Danishmend and that they had occupied the heights south of Hadji-Danishmend. The general reported also that another division was marching upon Demirkuey, while three others were moving in the direction of Devetli-Agatch.

During the night of October 19-20th, the commandant of the fortress of Adrianople informed General Salih Pacha that Lahna's Pacha's mixed detachment, whose guns we had heard all day, had retired upon Adrianople, while maintaining contact.

On the morning of the 20th, Salih Pacha received an order to detach a regiment to the Third Corps. The Second was sent to it.

As the reports sent in by the squadrons and the reconnoitering parties foreshadowed an advance by the enemy along his whole line, Salih Pacha resolved to move with his whole division, less one brigade, the light, which was to protect the left flank, to the heights of Geredeli in order to take up on them a temporary position.

The Third Corps was on our right and abreast of us; and the Bulgarian columns advancing upon Kirk-Klisso must have been already in contact with the divisional cavalry of Mahmoud Muktar Pacha. We, therefore, had nothing to do with them. The division had only to delay the enemy on the front of the First and Second Corps, in order to give the latter time to come abreast of the Third Corps.

The heights northwest of Geredeli, wooded and dominating the whole terrain in front, constituted an admirable defensive position with an extended and open field of fire.

The Bulgarians had resumed in the morning their prudent and slow march forward.

Before continuing the relation of events, I must speak briefly of the service of security on the march used, and I believe invented by the Bulgarians. At first there were few or no reconnaissance or patrols of cavalry on their front or flanks. The Bulgarians rely upon their peasants who hate the Turks for information about our movements, which was very conscientiously given. But when it was a question of numbers or strength, they could no longer count upon the peasants. These are just like all other peasants everywhere; they see a thousand men where there are only a hundred. This explains, in my humble opinion, why the Bulgarians, at first, advanced with such prudence. And truly this prudence after the battle of Lule-Burgas was quickly replaced by an excessive rashness which

was responsible for a part of the great losses that the Bulgarians experienced at Tchalaldja.

The enemy has always exaggerated our strength. Thus, in the fights known as the battle of Kirk-Klisso, they always saw 160,000 men, when there were in reality only from 65,000 to 70,000.

The Bulgarian service of security on the march was thus organized: In front there was a thin line of infantry sharp-shooters or skirmishers (a platoon to a company occupying a front of about 1,000 meters), some 500 meters behind these skirmishers a cavalry point of from six to eight men, then a whole platoon. Afterward there came a battalion, and behind them, with proper intervals, the rest of the advance guard. As soon as this advanced guard was fired on, all the infantry lay down, while the cavalry disappeared not to reappear. This way of having the infantry precede the cavalry may truly appear extraordinary. I should not have dwelt upon it, if it had not been a matter of common report. I know many officers who, like myself, would be curious to know the why of this queer method.\*

I return to my story. The Bulgarians advanced guard line having approached, the artillery had opened fire. The enemy, after having retired out of cannon range, did not dare to adventure farther all day, and finally retired upon Sari Talishman. The explanation of this extreme prudence of the enemy is that he believed, as M. de Penennrun said, in the presence of two Turkish battalions?

Some reconnaissances of the Bulgarian infantry were easily repulsed. We took a few prisoners that day, sixteen exactly. These men, who belonged to the 16th division, complained of hunger. At nightfall, the division left a reconnoitering squadron at Seymen and another to support this one at Sulu-Oghlou, and retired upon Arifi-Baba—Tchiftlik—Kodja-

\*Note by General Bonnal: During the Spanish War (1808-1814) in mountainous and very rough countries the advance guards of light cavalry preceding the columns were, they say, preceded habitually by a detachment of light infantry; and the French Regulations of 1832, upon field service, recognized this method in certain cases.

Note by T. R. Mo.: Probably mounted scouts or mounted officers and orderlies.

Hidir, to pass the night there in bivouac. The light brigade had been assigned to Moussoutch.

In the night of the 20-21st, a hostile battalion marched against Seymen, and the squadron occupying that locality had to retire to the heights north of Sulu-Oghlou. On the other hand, the commander-in-chief of the army of the East, Abdoul-lah Pacha, informed the general commanding the cavalry division that a detachment composed of a regiment of infantry, the First Rifles, and of a battery, had received orders to proceed to Geredeli to support our division. He made known at the same time that the First Corps should have reached the evening of the following day the line Hasskeuy—Yenidje, and that the cavalry division was to retard until that time the enemy's march.

After reading this order, Salih Pacha decided to go back near Sulu-Oghlou and reoccupy the positions of the evening before.

All day the cavalry awaited the enemy, which according to information received was occupying with important forces the line Pravadi—Tashli—Muslim—Tartarlar. The march of three strong columns, which appeared to come from Tchesh-mekeyu and to be moving, one upon Keremithi, the two others upon Erikler and Eski-Poloz, was recognized and reported to the commander-in-chief.

About five o'clock in the evening the infantry regiment and the battery mentioned arrived at Geredeli; after that the cavalry retired, still keeping up contact, and bivouacked in the positions of the evening before.

In the night of the 21-22d, the division received from the commander-in-chief the following dispatch:

"As the imperial army is tomorrow to take the offensive and attack the enemy's army, the independent cavalry division will coöperate in this movement and will proceed to the extreme left, between the first mixed division from the fortress of Adrianople, which is to make a sortie, and the left of the Fourth Army<sup>7</sup> Corps."

(Signed) ABDOULLAH.

Consequently, Salih Pacha decided to proceed with all his troops on October 22d, as easily as possible, toward Hadji-Eumer.

BATTLE OF SULU-OGLHOU—GETCHKENLI.

(*Battle of Kirk-Klisso.*)

On October 22, 1912, during its march upon Hadji-Eumer, the cavalry division constituted for the Fourth Corps a sort of flank guard, as it followed the road leading to Hasskeuy and, from that point marching across country via Arpatch toward Hadji-Eumer. (See Sketch No. 3.)

To our right was marching the Ismid Division of the Fourth Corps, composed of reservists, men of from thirty to forty years old, well-made and well-trained, since they had been under arms for more than a year, having been mobilized at the time of the Turkish-Italian War and sent to the Dardanelles.

Just as the division arrived at the heights to the southwest of Kukiler, we saw a hostile squadron charged by a squadron of the advance guard, which retreated quickly upon Getchkenli, drawing our troops toward its own infantry.

Reconnoitering parties sent toward Seymen, Atchali, and Ortakdji reported that they could not get through, as the enemy was occupying an entrenched line passing to the north of Sulu-Oghlou, and ending to the north of Hadji-Eumer.

Moreover it was known that a large body of the enemy, with an advance guard of three battalions, two batteries, and two squadrons, had bivouacked the evening before at Ortakdji.

The plan of the commander-in-chief of the Turkish Army of the East was to take the offensive along the whole line, while the Third Corps would turn the enemy's flank, and throw him back upon the Toundja.


The Army Corps were to be on the line Kirk-Klisso—Adrianople, the third in front of Kirk-Klisso, the second between Petra and Keremithi, the first between Keremithi and Getchkenli, the fourth between Getchkenli and Kara-Ypussoff, the cavalry on the extreme left.

In fact, the offensive of the army degenerated into a real series of casual encounters, the divisional cavalry not having been, so they said, on to its job. In this connection it must

be remarked that it is the usual thing to unload all mistakes upon the cavalry. So at maneuvers the side that has been beaten always begins by saying that its cavalry has not brought in the proper information.

The Third Corps moved forward, and was attacked by the army of General Dimitrieff (who, by the way, executed an excessively dangerous but lucky maneuver), while the Second

*Croquis 3.*



SKETCH No. 3.

Corps, which should have come up abreast of it halted some kilometers away at the time when the battle was fully joined.

The Third Corps had succeeded in keeping the enemy in awe, and would almost surely have succeeded in driving him back, had the Second Corps pushed forward and drawn upon itself a part of the hostile force.

The First Corps had two divisions in line and kept another at Geredeli, and was able to reach the battle field, but in a state of complete exhaustion. In spite of this, this corps victoriously resisted hostile attacks until the evening.

The Fourth Corps had only two divisions. It was able to put only the reserve division in line, and that without artillery, because its other division, the Twelfth, had halted quite near the battlefield, at Gabiler, its chief refusing to go farther on the pretext that his troops were fatigued.

About two o'clock in the afternoon the battle was joined along the whole front. The Second division (First Corps) was repulsing successfully the hostile attacks. As to the Third division (First Corps), which was worn out with fatigue, when it arrived on the field of battle, it had had to stand particularly violent attacks, it had had a moment of disorder, and had even lost some guns. But the Ismid division (Fourth Corps) at its left, though having no artillery, had made impetuous attacks and had detached two battalions to help its neighbor. Thanks to these reinforcements, the third division had succeeded in recapturing the guns that had temporarily fallen into the enemy's power.

The cavalry was to the northwest of Hadji-Eumer and was enfilading the whole line opposite to the Ismid division. In order to contain the hostile troops at Ortakdji, which did not appear, for the moment at least, disposed to advance, Salih Pacha had designated the light brigade. The latter had placed its battery in position, and had deployed some squadrons dismounted. If the enemy at Ortakdji had moved forward during the action, the position of the cavalry and that of the Fourth Corps would have been very critical, and moreover it would have forced the immediate retreat of the whole left wing taken in reverse. The First Corps was in the center of the line, and would have been obliged to retreat under deplorable conditions, attacked as it would have been on the front and the flank. For reasons that escape me, the enemy attempted nothing from this direction, the detachment at Ortakdji being perhaps the flank guard of the Bulgarian column engaged near Kara-Youssouf against the mixed divisions from the fortress of Adrianople. However it was, the position of

our cavalry division was excellent. In effect, it was engaged, with its artillery, with the enemy's reserves that were fighting the Ismid division, and at the same time it was harrassing, in dismounted combat the extreme right of the line of Bulgarian skirmishers.

If the division of regular troops (the 12th), of the Fourth Corps, had taken part in the fight, it could have occupied the position of our cavalry division. What could not be hoped for from a well-trained infantry division of some 10,000 men, having with it a regiment of artillery, and occupying so advantageous a position?

*A propos* of the Ortakdji detachment, permit me to digress and tell an affair of which I unfortunately was a witness: Obeying an order from Salih Pacha to obtain information in this direction, I went with a Turkish squadron that had approached too close to Ortakdji. A Bulgarian advanced post received it with a sharp fusilade that cost us some troopers killed or wounded. Among these was a non-commissioned officer, very seriously wounded, who begged me as I stopped to see what I could do for him not to leave him there. It was impossible to move him, and it was important above all to avoid further losses. When we returned some minutes later to the same point to carry off our wounded, they were dead or dying and all dreadfully mutilated, their noses, ears, and genitals cut off and their eyes dug out. The German lieutenant-colonel Veit, who had obtained permission to follow as an amateur our cavalry division, photographed, I believe, these unfortunates. This is not, moreover, the only time that I have had to see such a sight. It is possible that the Turk is not so refined as the European soldier. I have had the honor of serving in the two greatest armies of the world, and I have not noticed much difference between the Turkish soldier and the French and German soldier, except that the latter are better educated than ours. What is certain, and I affirm it on my word of honor as a soldier, is that our unfortunate troopers exhibited during the campaign great humanity. The few French war correspondents that have had a chance of seeing the Turkish soldier near to, have been the first to recognize this.

The battle continued, bloody and fierce, till night. The Ismid division, who had rushed upon the enemy with a "*furia*" worthy of all praise, had in a short time lost many of its men and almost all its officers. However, it kept its place, and even made some progress, thanks to the support of the cavalry, whose well-protected batteries did wonders against the Bulgarian reserves. At night fall our brave reserves, fixing bayonets, charged the enemy and put him to flight. During its charge, the infantry was supported by the Fifth Machine Gun Company, whose chief, Captain Salih Effendi, had moved by his own initiative upon the right of the Bulgarians. At this moment we were the conquerors, in spite of the absence on the battlefield of the Second Corps, of the Twelfth Division, and of all the artillery of the Fourth Corps.

Indeed, the Bulgarians, who had attacked in three columns, had already begun to retire before the front of the Ismid division and the third division of the First Corps. In the distance could be seen big fires, and a sort of large lanterns, that the Bulgarians had lighted, to indicate to their troops the direction of the retreat, already noticed at six o'clock in the evening, by our combat patrols.

At this moment, the situation on our side was as follows:

The second division, whose commander General Prince Aziz Pacha was wrongly accused of having occasioned the panic, was having difficulty in holding the position that it occupied in front of Geredeli.

The third had been in peril during the afternoon, but had pulled itself together, and had even succeeded in gaining a little terrain to the front.

As for the Ismid division, it had, as I have shown, gained the first line of the hostile intrenchments.

At nightfall the fire ceased on both sides, and the cavalry was sent to Galiler, to pass the night there. Light detachments maintained contact, and one regiment of cavalry was left at Hadji-Eumer, to support them or to rescue them.

But then the rain, implacable enemy of the Turks, and whose effect on poorly disciplined troops is greater than that of shrapnel, began to fall with the greatest violence.

The soldiers were harrassed with fatigue, and most of them had eaten nothing for forty-eight hours, and they were to get no bread that night. Moreover, it was the first time that they has been under fire, and the day had been a particularly warm one. The Ismid division had lost more than one-fourth of its strength, 2,000 killed or wounded. The third, about as much; the second had been very harshly tested. The cavalry division alone had had a pretty easy time.

The losses in officers had been very heavy. Battalions which, after the action, had only two officers were not rare.

The sanitary service did not exist; there were plenty of doctors, but no ambulances, no dressing stations. For the wounded, the instructions were, *to get out*.

Discipline, *which is the chief strength of armies*, already mediocre before the war, I shall tell why later, was much injured by this state of things, and the depressing cause I have just enumerated made of our incontestably brave troops an armed mob.

The enemy had retired, carrying off his wounded, while ours lay on the wet ground, and filled the darkness with their groans.

About half past eight while the rain was raging, heavy firing that lasted about thirty minutes broke out in front of the reserve division. To this fusilade, there succeeded a general rout.

The third division without knowing why, followed the movement, then the second, then the first, which has been in reserve all day, and had not been under fire.

The senseless flight of these men, whose features betrayed their terror, was a spectacle to break the heart of an officer or the least attached patriot. Should I live a hundred years, I shall never forget the moral suffering endured during that unhappy night.

The cause of the panic? One battalion of the Ismid division, seeing something moving in front of it, imagined that it was the enemy, and opened fire on it, and it turned out to be the leading battalion of its own division. On its side, believing that the Bulgarians were attacking it, it opened a vigorous fire. There were no officers at the heads of these battalions.

Such was the origin of the panic resulting from the lack of discipline and cohesion, which had as a consequence Kirk-Klissee, Lule-Burgas, and the loss of Roumelia.

To return to the battle, we have the right to believe that if the First and Fourth Corps had held the battle ground, the Second Corps and the 12th division would have come up the next day abreast of the others, and that the issue of the battle of Kirk-Klissee would have been entirely different.

Once informed of the disaster, the cavalry division hurried forward detachments to stop the fugitives, while remaining itself at Galiler. Next morning, October 23rd, the reconnaissances had lost contact. As there was no trace of the enemy on the battlefield of the evening before, the work of our division was limited to collecting and evacuating the wounded, and afterward to bringing back the cannon that the divisions of the Fourth Corps had abandoned in their panic flight.

During the whole of the 23rd of October cannon were heard and the bursts of shrapnel seen near Kirk-Klissee. But on the Hadji-Eumer front, south of Sulu-Oghlou, no important hostile troops were reported. Weak detachments alone occupied Sulu-Oghlou. Toward noon, contact was resumed. The enemy occupied solidly the line Ortakdji-Seymen. Some groups of Bulgarian cavalry that had ventured upon Hadji-Eumer had been driven back. Reconnaissances showed great movement of troops in the direction of Keremitli.

After having evacuated wounded and cannon upon Hasskuey, the detachments retired upon Oulou-Pacha, and there passed the night of October 23rd-24th.

The excessively heavy terrain in which wagons sank to their hubs (Did I say that paved roads existed not even on paper), explains the terrible losses in artillery suffered by the army corps in retreat. The cavalry division had with it three batteries. During the march from Galiler to Oulou-Pacha a whole brigade was assigned to each one of these batteries. Officers and troopers, dismounted, harnessed themselves to the guns, and it was thus that the division succeeded in realizing this tour-de-force, and it really was one, of abandoning nothing to the enemy.

To conquer, it is essential, as this war has proved, that the troops should be perfectly disciplined, and the generals able to initiate. If the Turkish infantry had been as well disciplined as the cavalry, with generals having the same moral qualities as ours, we should not have been conquered.

Before the war we all used to think the cavalry the least efficient of the three arms. During the war, it has shown to the best advantage. Why? Because it has from the start more discipline, and was better under the control of its chiefs.

In 1908, a fraction of the army, opening the unhappy era of pronunciamientos, had required of Sultan Abdul Hamid the application of the constitution. This result obtained, instead of stopping there, and of going back to their work, our officers, who had enjoyed playing politics, continued to play it, and the commanding generals, who had succeeded through them, and had been helped by them, did nothing to remedy this capital defect. Under these conditions we could no longer count upon the army as a war tool, the only thing it was good for was to overturn governments.

An army that plays politics is a ruined army. That is what happened to us. History is there to show that when the Turks led by real officers, and not by politicians, they did not run away. Let us hope that our governing classes will very soon admit this truth, which has been forgotten by them for five years.

If the cavalry has done well, it is because it has been stationed for the most part outside the cities, where the officers had not such a chance to join in political clubs and cafés, as their infantry comrades. Besides, training and conditioning horses is for cavalrymen a most absorbing occupation; so there were many reasons for the maintenance of discipline.

On October 24th, the cavalry continued to patrol the field of battle of the day before, and verified the fact of the inaction of the enemy upon the front Ortakdji—Sulu-Oghlou, while the battle was continuing toward Kirk-Klissee. The main body of the division stayed in bivouac at Oulou-Pacha, while one of its regiments occupied Hadji-Eumer, and another Hass-keuy.

Upon an order from the commander-in-chief directing the cavalry to retire at once upon Lule-Burgas, Salih Pacha decided to proceed next day by way of Hawsa, upon Koule.

During the daytime of the 25th, the early part of which had been devoted to rest, the regiment at Hasskeuy reported a hostile column marching on that locality, at the same time that reconnaissances announced the approach of a large body of cavalry, about three regiments strong. The division marched with three regiments toward Hasskeuy, for the purpose of assembling there its two other regiments, while the light brigade, forming the rear guard, remained at Oulou-Pacha, in order to let the division trains retreat toward Koule.

The enemy seeing us in force, did not approach, and the division continued its march upon Koule. Some minutes after the light brigade had left Oulou-Pacha, a hostile battalion whose approach had passed unperceived, occupied this village! Such an example shows, once for all, the necessity of allowing no relaxation even for a few minutes in the service of security.

The division arrived at Koule about midnight, and found that this important place had been burned by the Bulgarian *comitadjis*, and so had to pass the night again in the open air.

On the morning of October 26th, the march was resumed upon Baba-Eski, into which place the remnants of the fleeing infantry continued to flow.

With two platoons under my orders, I was directed by Salih Pacha to proceed to Baba-Eski, and maintain order there until the arrival of the division.

I arrived at the city about ten o'clock in the morning, and found there the traces of indescribable perturbation. Civil and military authorities, postal and telegraph employees, merchants and Mussulman inhabitants, everyone had fled. They had not even taken the time to destroy the telegraph apparatus and to burn the important documents which covered the office desks. And yet there was no hurry, since two days afterwards the Bulgarians had not arrived in the city. There remained in it only the Jewish, Greek and Bulgarian inhabitants, the dregs of the city, ready to receive and to entertain the enemies of Turkey.

After my arrival at Baba-Eski the inhabitants saw Turks coming instead of Bulgarians, and began to change their tune. The representatives of the different races hastened to me to denounce one another and to accuse one another of the gravest misdeeds and ill-usage, when a great rumor and a headlong flight of all this rabble informed me that something serious must be happening. I finally learned that a large body of hostile cavalry was advancing from the north upon the city. Immediately as you may guess, these people showed a hostile face to me and my handful of men.

Now the division on its march upon Baba-Eski had found it necessary to protect its left flank, as a large body of hostile cavalry had been seen in this direction. The light brigade had therefore been ordered to serve as flank guard, and to follow the route Koule—Koufaldja—Baba-Eski, and it was this brigade the Babieskotes had taken for the enemy, and which had occasioned their temporary panic.

In effect the reconnaissances of the light brigade which was in contact with the hostile cavalry, reported its march upon Baba-Eski. Our division remained at Baba-Eski from noon till five o'clock in the evening in order to give the trains and stragglers time to retreat upon Lule-Burgas, and served in a way as a general rear guard for the retreating army, leaving the city in perfect tranquility, without any disturbance on the part of the enemy?

For its march upon Lule-Burgas, the division took the Alapia—Sartchal—Lule-Burgas road, in order to profit if only for a few kilometers, by the paved road Baba-Eski—Alapia. After Alapia the track called a road was a veritable swamp, where it was exceedingly difficult, if the word impossible were French I should employ it, to extract guns, limbers, and caissons, which sank up to the hubs.

The division could not reach Lule-Burgas the same day, as the men were crushed from fatigue, obliged as they were, to dismount every instant to pull out the mired cannon. As the division was no farther than the outskirts of Sartchal at ten o'clock at night, it could move no farther, and formed its bivouacs at Sartchal and at Sarmoussakli.

The next day, Sunday, October 27th, the cavalry reached Lule-Burgas in the morning. The valley filled with troops without order or cohesion offered a spectacle impossible to describe. Regiments seeking their division, battalions their regiments, companies their battalion, men their companies, were in one chaotic mass. The impression prevailed that this time *it was the end*, that never an army could be made of this immense herd. In two days, however, the Turkish staff succeeded in uniting these isolated elements, who with empty bellies and without supplies fought heroically for six consecutive days.

The 27th and the 28th of October were devoted by the cavalry to rest, of which it had great need. The light brigade of Adrianople had been sent to the right wing, to Visa, where under the orders of Mahmoud Mouhtar Pacha, it was to function as independent cavalry. Mahmoud Mouhtar Pacha had just been appointed commander-in-chief of the group of armies of the right wing.

During these two days of rest, the division had sent forward reconnoitering squadrons to Tatar-Tchiftlik, Ayvali and Sartchal.

Reconnaissances reported that the enemy was occupying the line Kavakli—Kavakdere, with cavalry toward Baba-Eski. However, it was not possible to get information upon the strength of the hostile forces, especially upon those of the cavalry.

On the evening of the 26th a dispatch from General-in-Chief Nazim Pacha directed the division commander to send out three officers' reconnaissances in the direction Lule-Burgas—Uskub—Kirk-Kilisse, Lule-Burgas—Yenidje—Petra, and Lule-Burgas—Kara-Youssouf. These reconnaissances were to communicate directly with the commander-in-chief, whose headquarters were at Tcherkesskeuy.

These three reconnaissances were started that very evening; they were composed each of twenty men and an officer, each trooper carrying two days' rations.

The first and third had to turn back at the end of a few kilometers. The second\* started about one o'clock at night,

\*It is through modesty that Djemil-Munir Bey does not give the name of the officer who commanded this reconnaissance.—Note by General Bonnal.

passed the Turkish advanced posts established northwest of Lule-Burgas, and then took the road Ayvali—Kavakdere. Reaching the edge of the wood of Kavakdere, the reconnoitering party, seeing lights and hearing voices, hid in the woods and took a few hours rest, half of the troopers sleeping, the other half watching.

On the 27th, at break of day the reconnaissance moved forward and, continuing its march in the woods, was able to determine the apparent extent of the enemy. The commander of the reconnaissance estimated its strength, around Kavakdere and Tchiflik-Mandra, at more than two divisions of infantry, and reported the fact at once.

After making an examination in the south, the reconnaissance, having discovered nothing in this direction, turned again to the north with the intention of passing to the east and north of Kavakdere, which could not be done as the country was too unsafe, as there were too many hostile infantry. Finally it passed the night quite near the road Kavakdere—Lule-Burgas, face to face with a Bulgarian bivouac, whose neighborhood, needless to say, was very disagreeable.

The rations carried by the troopers was consumed, as well as the barley for the horses, and it was impossible to get any on the spot or in the vicinity. Fatigue was making itself severely felt, and besides the mission of the reconnaissance, which was to indicate the position and strength of the main body of the enemy was accomplished, and it could retire. As to being relieved by another reconnaissance, it was not to be thought of.

The next day, October 28th, at dawn, as the reconnaissance was marching along the edge of the wood, on the Koumbarlar—Ayvali road, it met east of Koumbarlar a group of seven or eight hostile troopers. The lieutenant in command of the reconnaissance could not resist the temptation, and charged the enemy at a gallop. It was the only way he had of rewarding his troopers, who had performed their duty very well, and it was an error. However this may be, scarcely had the reconnaissance approached the group of Bulgarians troopers, when there was seen advancing behind them a hostile squadron. Turning about immediately, the lieutenant hurried

to take refuge in the woods of Kavakdere, with the intention of taking the road Kavakdere—Lule-Burgas. But at the moment when he thought himself out of reach, he fell upon an entire cavalry regiment of three squadrons marching in the direction of Lule-Burgas. The reconnaissance though pursued was able to retire upon the Turkish advanced posts, while observing the enemy's march, and lost only one trooper, who fell from his horse while jumping a wide ditch and had not the time to remount. This unfortunate man, probably made prisoner, must have been massacred.

The cavalry regiment which pursued the reconnaissance must have been the flank guard of a Bulgarian column on its way that day to Kara-Agatch.

---

BATTLE OF LULE-BURGAS.

*Left wing and center of the army. See Sketch No. 4.*

The Turkish troops that took part in the battle of Lule-Burgas were as follows from right to left: The Third Corps at Viza, of which Mahmoud Mouktar Pacha, on the 27th of October could rally but part, was about 10,000 strong.

Near Sarai, the Seventeenth Corps, Tchuruksoulou Mahmoud Pacha's, composed of two divisions of reserves, about 15,000 strong, was still on the march.

Likewise on the march toward the battlefield and behind the third and seventeenth, was the Eighteenth Corps, Hamdi Pacha's, also composed of two divisions of reserves, some 15,000 men.


The independent brigade of cavalry, the light brigade of Adrianople, was already under the orders of Mahmoud Mouktar Pacha, who, as I have said, was the commander-in-chief of the army called the Army of the East.

The First, Second and Fourth Corps, Commander-in-Chief, Abdoullah Pacha, occupied a line parallel to the river of Kara-Agatch (Kara-Agatch Deressi), the Second Corps, between Kara-Agatch and Turk-Bey, the First Corps between Turk-Bey and Lule-Burgas, the Fourth Corps between Lule-

Burgas and Mouktar-Tchiftlik. The cavalry was on the extreme left.

The total forces of the Turkish army that took part in the battle may be reckoned at about 120,000 men.

That the enemy were marching from Kavakdere was reported the morning of October 28th to the Second Corps, and this latter which had parked its trains in the village of Kara-



SKETCH No. 4.

Agatch, resolved to send them farther to the rear, in order to protect them against surprise. For this purpose one regiment of infantry, the 10th I believe, was sent forward to protect the march of the train.

At the moment when this regiment was arriving at the edge of the woods before Kara-Agatch, it met Bulgarian

infantry superior in number. The engagement was so fierce on both sides that the commander of the Second Corps, Chevket Tourgout Pacha, seeing the danger that the regiment ran, sent to its help another regiment, accompanied by a battery. The latter was disabled by the hostile artillery before it could even get into position. The two infantry regiments killed many of the enemy, but had difficulty in withdrawing, about six o'clock in the evening, to their former positions. While these regiments were engaging, there commenced along the whole front of the Second Corps a violent artillery duel, which lasted until nightfall.

The next day, Tuesday, the enemy, about eight o'clock in the morning, attacked vigorously and along the whole line, the positions occupied by our troops.

The advanced post of the Fourth Corps, which had retired upon the heights west of Lule-Burgas, were reinforced by the cavalry division, fighting on foot. Until one o'clock in the afternoon, the troopers sustained the attack of a superior force of Bulgarian infantry, without being able to prevent its making progress. At this moment the position of the cavalry had become very critical. If it did not retire immediately, it would find itself obliged to retire up a part of the valley under the fire of hostile infantry and artillery occupying the heights west of Lule-Burgas, the Kara-Agatch river being fordable only at the entrance of the city, where moreover there was a bridge.

Besides, a hostile column had just been reported to the south of the railway. Salih Pacha therefore gave the order to cease firing and to remount and proceed toward the railway station. When it had arrived at this point, the division, which had been poorly informed by its combat patrols, was violently assailed by a group of hostile artillery, whose very accurate and rapid fire caused us sensible losses. Toward evening, the division which had been able to reform after this deadly cannonade, to the north of Bedirkeuy, was sent forward again. In the meanwhile a large body of hostile cavalry was reported in the direction of Aladja-Oghlou, and the Fifth Brigade had been sent that way. The divisional artillery, which had been lent for the time to the left division

of the Fourth Corps (the 12th), was then in action two kilometers north of Sousouz-Muslin.

The battle continued until nightfall with the same violence as at the start. The Bulgarian artillery, abundantly provided with ammunition, fired more than ours, and its batteries were provided with telemeters, while ours were not, and therefore had an advantage over ours upon opening fire.

The day had been propitious for us, although we had not advanced. The army had resisted the attacks of the Bulgarians, and had inflicted heavy losses upon them.

The troops slept upon their positions, while the cavalry went and bivouacked at the farm of Omourdja.

I had been sent in the evening by Salih Pacha to the headquarters of the commander-in-chief at Sakizkeuy, to hand him a report of the events of the day, and to complete it by word of mouth, if necessary, and to take his orders for the next day. There I learned that a retrograde movement of the enemy's whole line had been verified. It was known too that on our left wing, Mahmoud Moukhtar Pacha had repulsed the enemy, and was marching upon Pounar-Hissar, and that the Seventeenth Corps after fortunate actions near Tchongra, was coming up abreast of the Third Corps.

The general, therefore, prescribed a general offensive for the next day, October 30th.

For this purpose the Second Corps was to proceed toward Youvankeuy, the First toward Tatar-Tchiftlik, the Fourth toward Ayvali. The cavalry was to go to Sakiskeuy, where it would hold itself at the disposition of the general-in-chief, Abdoullah Pacha.

This general order, which had an excellent effect upon the morale of the troops, was distributed during the night of October 29th-30th.

Next morning the Bulgarians, whose retrograde movement of the day before had been more apparent than real, opposed a desperate resistance to Turkish attacks, but toward evening they showed evident signs of fatigue.

The fierce fight continued along the whole front with alternations of success for the First Corps and reverses for the Fourth, which began to give away. In the meanwhile a Bulgarian

train which appeared to come from Kirk-Klisso disembarked some troops, who soon pushed forward. The position of the Fourth Corps then became critical, its left being threatened by an enveloping movement. Abdoullah Pacha then ordered the cavalry to stop at any cost the forward movement of the enemy, even it itself should be entirely sacrificed.

The enemy, whose advanced guard was composed of one battalion, its main body not having yet disentrailed, was advancing in the direction of Sousouz-Muslin. As is shown by Sketch No. 4, the terrain is flat. The cavalry division therefore had to march exposed to fire. It was supported by its artillery and two battalions of infantry placed at Bedirkeuy, which were to join and reinforce the center of the Fourth Corps. The cavalry division moved forward, its general at its head, and after a lively and short saber fight, obliged the enemy to retire precipitately, while its train which was unloading, had to go to the rear. From this moment until nightfall, no enemies were seen on this side. After this affair the cavalry retired in the direction of Bedrikeuy. Let those who hold that the cavalry no longer amount to anything on the field of battle consider this example! Evidently, there are sensible losses. But a charge vigorously carried through with the firm resolution to come hand to hand will always succeed.

Toward evening a brigade of the enemy's cavalry was seen in the direction of Buyuk-Karakarli and Saiih Pacha sent a brigade against it, but the enemy did not wait for the shock, and retired in the direction of Sinanli.

In the evening, the position of the Bulgarian army on the Lule-Burgas—Kara-Agatch front was very critical. You could feel that the enemy was worn out; his attacks and counter attacks were becoming rarer and milder. With our field glasses we could see officers striking their men with sabers to make them go forward, but even so, the latter were retreating. While on this subject I must render homage to the bravery of the Bulgarian officers. Finally, a retreating movement was very noticeable. On the other hand, the artillery fire grew more and more violent. You would have said that the enemy was begining a rear-guard fight, seeking

by artillery fire to stop pursuit by the enemy, in order to disengage his infantry.

On our side, ammunition especially that for artillery began to grow scarce. By evening, the guns had only a few rounds left. In order to supply them it was necessary to go to Tchorlou or to Seyidler, for it was to these points that the trains coming from Tchorlou were to bring ammunition.

As at Kirk-Klisse, Sulu-Oghlou, and Getchkenli, the rain, that implacable enemy to Turkey, had made its appearance with the same violence as in those battles.

The army occupied a front of about thirty kilometers, (I am speaking of the center and left wing of the army) and was connected with the commander-in-chief by no telegraph or telephone lines. Material was not lacking; the supply corps had at their disposal telephones, and 3,000 meters of wire per regiment. The installation of a telegraph line at a position where it has been decided to await the enemy does not take much time. Was it ignorance, heedlessness or carelessness, or all three at once? The fact is that the general-in-chief, Abdoullah Pacha had to wait more than two hours before receiving information coming from his left wing, for example.

Likewise, Mahmoud Moukhtar and Abdoullah Pachas could communicate with each other only by mounted orderlies.

During the night of October 30-31st, the cavalry division which was stationed at Evrensekiz, was awakened about four o'clock in the morning by a violent firing, the din of which was not echoed by any return fire.

The cause of the disturbance? A division of reserves which had acted badly the evening before, and which they had not had the time to relieve by active troops.

In the middle of the night the reserves had left their position and fled in inexpressible disorder, remaining deaf to the reproaches and threats of the officers, and throwing away their cartridges, which they really considered an useless burden.

After the flight of this division, the Bulgarians crowned the breach thus produced, the equilibrium of the entire Turkish line of battle was broken.

The general-in-chief, having at hand no fresh troops to oppose the enemy, was constrained to order a general retreat.

As to the famous bayonet attack executed at night, and thanks to which the Bulgarians were supposed to have pierced the Turkish line of battle, it had no existence except in the imagination of the enemy's staff. It is now time to destroy this legend, were it only in the interests of truth, and to replace it by the very honorable, but more modest story of the success obtained by the Bulgarians over more than mediocre soldiers.

At eight o'clock in the morning of October 31st, the Turkish army was in full retreat upon Ergene, where Abdoullah Pacha wished to reorganize his troops, and fight a new battle with the enemy.

#### OPERATIONS AFTER LULE-BURGAS.

*See Sketch No. 5.*

On October 31st, when the order for retreat had reached the troops, they retired in a stampede. The officers whose number had greatly diminished were no longer able to hold together or lead their men.


In retiring, the Second Corps was to follow the Tatartarli—Kara-Mehmed road; the First Corps, the Ahmed-Bey—Osmanli-Tchiftlik road; the Fourth Corps, the Karishdiran—Tchorlou road.

By evening, the troops were well up to Ergene, but in a state of disorder impossible to describe. Distribution had completely ceased. It was impossible to live on the country, almost all of whose inhabitants had fled. The commander-in-chief, Abdoullah Pacha, had been relieved of his command. In short, it was anarchy in all its horror.

In spite of this disorder, the troops in retiring had left nothing in the hands of the enemy.

During the night an order arrived from the general-in-chief, directing the troops to retire upon Tchataldja; the march was resumed upon this locality.

The Second Corps was to follow the road from Tcherkesskeuy; the First the Tchorlou—Silivri—Buyuk-Tchek-medje road; the Fourth, the Tchorlou—Tchanta—Tchataldja



SKETCH No. 5.

road. The cavalry had to proceed without delay toward Tcherkesskeuy.

At the moment when this order from the gerenalissimo was communicated to the troops, the Second Army of the East, Mahmoud Moukhtar Pacha, was continuing to repulse the enemy. There was no need to hurry to retreat. It would have been better to try and assemble as many troops as possible, and to hurl them upon the enemy. We should have had in this way a chance of success since the Second Army was making progress.

On the morning of the 31st, receiving the order for retreat, Salih Pacha, who was getting ready to march upon Tcherkesskeuy, received a report addressed by Mahmoud Pacha commanding the Seventeenth Corps, to Abdoullah Pacha. As the officer who carried the order spoke of gains upon the right wing and as Abdoullah Pacha had departed for an unknown destination, Salih Pacha took it upon himself to open the report.

Mahmoud Pacha reported that his army corps, sweeping back the Bulgarians, had advanced, that he had inflicted serious losses upon the enemy, made prisoners, taken machine-guns, and that the commander of the Third Corps, on his right, sent him word that he too was advancing.

After having considered this report, Salih Pacha came to the wise conclusion that there was no necessity for his marching upon Tcherkesskeuy, but that it was necessary to protect the retreat of the corps, and particularly of their trains, left as they were at the mercy of a surprise by hostile cavalry.

He therefore took the initiative of keeping touch with the enemy, and of retarding his march, in case he should move forward.

After the battle of Lule-Burgas the cavalry division was reduced to its most simple expression.

The night of October 30-31st, by the order of the commander-in-chief it had put one of its regiments (the 4th) at the disposition of the First Corps. What was left represented at most 600 sabers! The division was then not as strong as one regiment on a war footing.

The artillery horses still in service were literally dropping from fatigue, the greater part never to rise again. Salih Pacha,

thinking that one battery capable of following him everywhere was worth more than two incapable of advancing decided to assign the best horses to one battery, while the other should proceed to Tchorlou and rest its teams there until the arrival of the division at that point.

The morning of the 31st, the skeleton division marched on the Karishdiran—Lule-Burgas road to protect the army trains following this road to reach Tchorlou.

Reconnaissances sent toward Lule-Burgas had reported that the enemy was entrenching himself upon the heights east of the city. The most advanced Bulgarian element was a company occupying the farm of Omourdja, northeast of Lule-Burgas.

The division patrolled all day, without report anywhere of the enemy's cavalry.

After having left one squadron at Kutchuk-Karishdiran, and two platoons at Aktckekeuy, the division (I shall continue to call it so, since on paper it represented one) retired to Mac-hinli to pass the night.

Since the morning of the day before the troops had had no bread. As for soup, the men had forgotten the taste of it.

The real family life lead by the cavalry, the aristocratic arm par excellence, contributed a great deal, in my humble opinion, to the maintenance of discipline, and even of good humor among our troopers, who saw their officers with the general at their head lodged just as badly as themselves.

One of the greatest privations was the lack of tobacco. the Turk, always a great smoker, smokes still more in war time. Everyone's supply of tobacco had been exhausted for a long time, and we had been able to procure none either at Baba-Eski or Lule-Burgas, as the infantry who had passed through before us had taken everything.

As the region through which we were passing was a center of tobacco production, the troopers used to pick the fresh leaves which they later dried at the fire and cut into strips. It was simply atrocious, but "*à la guerre comme la guerre*," and we had to be content with it.

It was also difficult to procure any half-way drinkable water, all the wells in the villages we passed through having

been filled up. As for the springs they were either dried up or polluted, and we had to go to their sources in order to drink without too much risk. Happily the weather was cool, and did not cause too much thirst.

At Mechinli where we were to pass the night of October 31st-November 1st, we were able to find good lodgings, the village being inhabited by Greeks, who had thought it best not to run away, and who had discounted the arrival of their "saviors," who were eager to pillage their houses and violate their wives and daughters, because they were Greek. It is remarkable that the Bulgarians hated the Greeks as much, if not more, than we did.

At Mechinli we had also found flour, thanks to which we had had a good supper, the troopers having made cakes, which appeared to us exquisite.

The next day, November 1st we started again on the road to Karishdiran, but this time with the fear of seeing appear the hostile cavalry, which up to this time we had joyfully sought the occasion of charging. Alas! What could we have done with our 600 sabers, of which we had only 500 together, the other 100 being on reconnaissance and detachment duty etc., while the enemy's cavalry, which had nowhere been seen in battle, must have had its strength if not complete, yet at least nearly so.

The division was a little south of Karishdiran, watching the march of the trains, which was nearly ended, when we saw about 6,000 meters away seven squadrons in close order preceded by one squadron as foragers, charging at a gallop upon the trains.

While its battery in position was opening fire, the division hurried forward at a gallop. The difference in strength between the two cavalries was not very great. The Bulgarians were hardly twice as numerous as ourselves. But the morale of our troopers was so high that there was no hesitating. This time again the enemy did not await the shock, but retired without having succeeded in reaching our trains, or even slackening their march.

This is what had caused the unexpected retreat of the Bulgarians.

One of the division aides who had been taking an order to the front, was returning quietly on the road the trains were taking.

At the moment when he saw the hostile cavalry coming toward the trains, he commanded "Halt," and took command of the wounded, marauders, or sick that were following the trains, and made them lie down under the wagons. As soon as the hostile squadron that was advancing as foragers approached, the lieutenant opened fire. The forty men or so collected by the lieutenant had been enough to repel this first attack, but the main body of the enemy was approaching. Things were beginning to look desperate for the trains and their guard, when the first shrapnels of our battery burst, and seeing this, the enemy retired. The reconnaissance that followed this cavalry reported that it was moving toward Seyidler.

Meanwhile the division had received orders to blow up the railway bridges between Seyidler and Tchorlou, in particular, that of Mouradli.

In consequence an expedition consisting of one squadron was sent to this place, and the destruction ordered was done in all tranquility, but as the squadron was retiring, a regiment of hostile cavalry pursued it.

This appearance of a very superior number of hostile cavalry, for the scouts reported at least five regiments, along the railway, could not fail to worry Salih Pacha, and he resolved to pass the night at Ouhlass-Tchiftlik, leaving reconnoitering parties at Mechlini and Sandikli.

During the night of November 1st-2d, contact with the enemy was again lost, and as some reconnaissances reported him near Karishdiran, our cavalry went forward to try and resume contact. Some mixed hostile detachments had been seen towards Kutchuk-Karishdiran, Aktchekeuy, Evrensekiz.

At Karishdiran it was our unfortunate privilege to confirm by our own eyesight the misdeeds of the Bulgarians. The fifty Turkish wounded who had taken refuge there after the battle had been massacred, and were lying on the slopes west of the village.

We retired for the night at Evlan-Bey-Tchiftlik (Osmanli-Tchiftlik), and had found stables and abundance of straw for the horses, and lodgings for the men, but nothing to eat.

The next day, November 3d, as we still had no news of the hostile cavalry, Salih Pacha moved forward. The enemy continued to remain inactive. Its cavalry had made a movement upon Karishdiran, and then retired. That was all that was known about it.

The division passed the night of the 3d-4th at Aktchekay. Hunger was making itself cruelly felt. At Yeniler, abandoned by its inhabitants, a quantity of barley, of which, men and horses, we made our food. It was the third day since we had eaten bread, and we were at the end of our resources. Salih Pacha had ordered one of his aides to go next day to Tchorlou and send by the division wagons that were there two rations of bread per man. The wagons were to wait there until they were searched for, on the heights overlooking the bridge of Ergene, between Kara-Hassan and Evlan-Bey-Tchiftlik.

All day November 4th, our cavalry moved about on the Karishdiran plain, showing itself more or less everywhere, in order to give, as on the stage, the illusion of a large force. In fact, this maneuver, as will be seen by the Tchorlou affair, succeeded perfectly.

We finally retired for the night to Kara-Hassan. The aide that had been sent to Tchorlou for bread, had at the same time brought back dispatches from army headquarters.

The generalissimo expressed his satisfaction to Salih Pacha that he had gone forward on his own initiative, instead of conforming to his orders, and directed him to blow up the great masonry bridge at Ergene, which is between the villages of Kara-Hassan and Evlan-Bey-Tchiftlik, on the Karishdiran-Tchorlou road. After having caused this destruction, the cavalry was to retire slowly upon Tchataldja, passing by Tchorlou.

The destruction of this bridge was to delay and obstruct the enemy's march, since the river was very high on account of rains, and was fordable nowhere. An officer of cavalry, thoroughly acquainted with the country, was drowned the

same day trying to cross the river at a point where the evening before the whole division, including the artillery, had passed.

The hostile cavalry had again made its appearance between Seyidler and Mouradli, and appeared to be trying to get to Tchorlou.

The day of November 6th was devoted to rest, of which our horses had great need. The battery detached at Tchorlou had been sent to Tchataldja to rest its teams there and these few days rest had done it more harm than good. At the same time the trains were sent to Buyuk-Tchekmedje.

After the last infantryman had left the city, we worked hard to send away, by the last trains to leave, the arms, ammunition and supplies that remained in the depots, and to destroy all that could not be carried away.

The commander-in-chief had left at Tchorlou a detachment composed of three battalions and one battery with directions to delay the enemy's march.

The next day, Thursday November 7th, they had reported the march of one and later of two battalions of the enemy, apparently coming from Karishdiran.

In the meantime, an emissary sent by the general commanding the Bulgarian troops on the march toward Tchorlou had presented himself to Salih Pacha to tell him that the Bulgarian general had planned not to burn the city, but to establish himself there, and to advise the Turks to retire, in order to avoid useless bloodshed.

At this last insult, Salih Pacha, who was already preparing to leave the city, decided to remain there, in order to teach the enemy a lesson.

Let me say that the decision taken by my chief not to leave the city, whose name I bear, without firing a few gun-shots, caused me great joy.\*

A certain Mr. Wagner, who called himself an Austrian officer and who was for some time in the rear of the Bulgarian lines as a war correspondent, making himself noticeable at the time by his fantastic reporting, had telegraphically announced a "great battle of Tchorlou," all of the details of

---

\*Tchorlou was the patronymic of the Munir family.

which he gave. Doubtless it was by the inspiration of the Bulgarian general staff, and not due to his own imagination, that the reporter in question gave himself up to these fantasies. However, the last one was so extravagant that the Bulgarians found it advisable to disavow their noisy friend. All the same, as we are going to see, there was some truth in Mr. Wagner's lies.

At the moment when the two before-mentioned hostile battalions were reported, Salih Pacha with the aid of the detachment commander was busy placing his battery and that of the Tchorlou detachment on a little hill at the eastern exit of the village. From the position they occupied the batteries had a good field of fire and were out of sight of the enemy. Likewise the cavalry machine guns had been mounted in batteries on hills right and left of the city, on hills commanding the valley or ravine that the enemy had to cross to make an entrance into the city. One battalion had occupied the houses and gardens at the north-west entrance of Tchorlou. The two other battalions and the cavalry were held in reserve at the eastern exit.

Tchorlou by its position commands the terrain north of the railway, as well as the road passing there, that is the one followed by the enemy.

Unit commanders had been ordered to open fire only when the enemy should have penetrated well into the ravine.

About one o'clock in the afternoon, a hostile squadron which had moved forward at a gallop had occupied the barracks built in front of and to the west of the city, without however pushing even a reconnaissance toward Tchorlou. The railway station had been also visited by the enemy's cavalry. Shortly afterwards, the battalion that had followed this squadron deployed and moved upon the city in rather a compact formation. As soon as it entered the ravine, it was received with a very rapid fire, which caused it heavy losses. Some time later two other battalions after having deployed moved against the city, but in a formation more suited to the situation. Like the one that preceded them, these battalions were halted in the ravine. A movement toward the west executed by about a hundred infantrymen was checked by

machine gun fire. About three o'clock in the afternoon there arrived the main body of the Bulgarian division. After it had very methodically deployed in front of the city, and out of reach of our artillery fire, it delayed moving forward until its batteries were in position.

In the meanwhile, Salih Pacha considering resistance impossible, first sent off the two battalions that he held in reserve, then the battalion occupying the border of the city, which was replaced by dismounted cavalry. The battery of the detachment rejoined the column at a trot, after the last battalion had quitted Tchorlou.

Then while the Bulgarians were furiously bombarding the positions in which they thought we still were, the cavalry had retired quietly upon Ermicheli, where it passed the night.

Until five o'clock in the evening the skeleton division of cavalry about 500 horses strong held in awe a division of 20,000 men.

#### SKETCH NO. 5.

##### *Battle of Tchorlou, November 7th, 1912.*

The defense of Tchorlou had cost the division and the detachment together one man slightly wounded in the hand. As for the enemy's losses, we have a right to estimate them at a minimum of 300 killed and wounded.

The next day, November 8th, we had again lost contact. We knew only that the Bulgarians were not advancing. The exceedingly difficult terrain, the paths or roads shown on the map, that either existed no longer or had never existed, were not propitious for a cavalry action whose principal quality, speed, could be of no use. Only the roads of Tchanta—Silivri and of Kinekli—Silivri could be dangerous, and they were sharply watched.

Continuing its slow march upon Tchataldja, the cavalry passed the night at Djudje-Seyban.

The 9th of November just as the division was beginning its march, a despatch from the generalissimo addressed to Salih Pacha informed him that the division, forming a single regiment with what remained of it, was to be put under the

orders of Colonel Ibrahim Bey, commanding the Adrianople light brigade, with which they were to form one brigade of three regiments. The light brigade being at Akviran, the regiment division was to proceed there that same evening, while General Salih Pacha was asked to report at the headquarters of the army to the generalissimo, at Hadimkeuy.

The independent cavalry brigade thus constituted retired on November 12th behind the lines of Tchataldja, and had nothing more to do. The two opposing infantries were in contact, and the wings of the army rested upon two lakes close to the sea, and did not offer a passage sufficient to launch the cavalry upon the rear of the enemy.

#### PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THE DEFEAT.

I am going to say a few words about the causes that have brought about the defeat of the Turkish army.

First, there was the numerical superiority of the enemy, of which no one has spoken. Indeed the allies, who had no frontier to guard, could put, and did put under arms, about 900,000 men under arms, while Turkey was able to mobilize only about 700,000 men, and this sometime after the allies had finished their mobilization.

Then, as I have stated in the body of this article, it is to the meddling of the officers in politics that I attribute first and foremost our defeat. All the rest comes from it.

So, at the moment when all the European armies are trying to find young officers for the subordinate grades, we have done all that is humanly possible to get old ones.

Under the pretext that certain officers who stood well at court had had, under the deposed Sultan Abdul-Hamid too rapid promotion, which is true, they made a law called the "Revision of Grades," a law based solely upon seniority. From one day to the next, the important generals of the army, such as Mahmoud Moukhtar, Hassan Riza, Pertew, Zia Pacha etc., who, although young, had already shown their capacity and did not owe their advancement to favor alone, were "promoted" colonels or lieutenant-colonels and therefore could not be utilized as they should have been. They were either provisionally retired from the army, or were employed in posi-

tions other than those in which they ought to have been used. Useless old men, who had been either forgotten in some bureaux, or had been removed from the army for notorious incapacity, took the places of these young energetic generals. As for the company, squadron, or battalion commanders, they were also replaced by "veterans."

In the East, where one grows old quickly, a man of forty is not as good as far as his physical qualities are concerned, as a man who was born and who has lived in the West. This is why units were found in the hands of elderly men whose professional instruction was not up to the exigencies of modern war. In fact, under the reign of the Sultan Abdul Hamid, field service excercises, maneuvers or others, did not exist even on paper. With a few rare exceptions, and they were the men rapidly promoted, the officers were not on to their jobs. Now the deposed Sultan having reigned about thirty-three years, the more seniority officers had, the less account they were.

At the time that this law, required by the politician officers for reasons easily surmised, was passed, a promotion law was promised, but the Ministry has not yet, five years after the revision law, presented it to the Chamber. Therefore officers have been promoted by seniority, which is not a very good way to encourage hard work. One example among a thousand: The commander of the Third Corps, who had just been made a division commander, saw himself, the very day his nomination was officially announced, relieved of his command and his place taken by a brigadier-general. This division commander did not receive during the whole campaign a command. He was then an incapable. But why did they have to reward him?

Besides, the army already was short of officers, and was deprived of many of its company officers, the same politicians having required the dismissal of the officers who were promoted from the ranks. The measure seemed logical, since many of these promotions scarcely knew how to read and write, but it was disastrous.

In the first place, these men, used to discipline, and knowing the soul of the soldier better than the newly made young second lieutenant from the military school, were playing, more

or less, in the companies and battalions the rôle of the French first sergeants and sergeants major.

In the second place, these officers could have been trained. I had some in the different squadrons that I commanded. All of them wanted to learn, provided there was some one to teach them, and they followed the courses of study that I laid out with close attention; their progress was astonishing.

The scarcity of officers with us was such that at mobilization battalions with but three officers were not rare. In the course of the campaign and thanks to Nazim Pacha the unfortunate generalissimo-minister assassinated in so cowardly a manner, they decided to resume the old method, and appoint as officers the non-commissioned officers that had distinguished themselves during the campaign, but it was unhappily too late.

Another cause of the lack of success was the organization of the army into army corps.

Until March, 1911, the military forces of Turkey were distributed among seven armies and two independent cavalry divisions. The headquarters of the armies were at Constantinople, Adrianople, Erzindjan, Damas, Bagdad, Yemen, and those of the independent cavalry divisions at Tripoli and Hidjaz.

In accordance with their importance, the armies were formed into two divisions or more. The divisions comprised four regiments, or two brigades, and the regiments had four battalions.

In 1912 at the declaration of war, the army comprised fourteen army corps and five brigades of independent cavalry. The army corps were in three divisions, the divisions in three regiments, the regiment in three battalions.

At the moment of mobilization the battalions were to be of about 600 men, while formerly they were to count about 1,000 men. Each division had as its disposal one regiment of artillery and one squadron of cavalry.

This organization which I shall neither praise nor criticise was scarcely completed at the moment when the war came. It is then not astonishing that the army lacked bread and supplies.

As to clothing, equipment and armament, every one is agreed they could not have been better. This justice must be rendered to Mahmoud Chevket Pacha, the grand visier of yesterday, who as minister of war knew how to clothe the soldiers.

This was unfortunately not sufficient to conquer.

Another cause of our defeats was the sending home of soldiers that had completed their time just before the mobilization.

Under the pressing counsels of the minister of foreign affairs, who wished to prove to Europe that we wished for peace, and that we were not animated with warlike intentions, the minister of war, persuaded that the Balkan nations would not attack us, had let these men go. For this reason, the battalions with the colors lost their best elements.

Finally, Turkey was neither morally nor materially ready to make war.

One closing remark:

The Turkish soldier has been sharply criticised; he has been even accused of cowardice.

I protest against such an assertion with the greatest energy.

Unfortunately, there are cowards everywhere. But I affirm that the very great majority of our soldiers did not deserve such a name.

When one knows how to ask the Turk to get himself killed, he does it without making a fuss, and with the greatest gallantry. The Bulgarians know something about this, and are the first to recognize it. But like all soldiers in the world, the Turk needs to be commanded.

The troops with the colors have done well. This is shown by the heavy losses they had. As for the reserves, most of them did not know how to handle, load, and unload the guns they held in their hands. The others that were well drilled, like the Ismid division that has been the subject of this paper, conducted themselves admirably.

The officers have redeemed with their blood the errors of peace time. I do not know exactly the percentage of their losses, but it cannot be less than forty per cent. I need not

say how bravely the Turkish officers have fought; these figures have their eloquence.

Of the different soldiers, Armenians, Greeks and Jews, admitted by the constitution to the honor of serving, the Armenians alone fought bravely, very bravely. I prefer not to speak of the others, hoping for the honor and security of the Turkish army, that they have figured in our ranks for the first and last time.

The army that ran away at Kirk-Klisso, fought heroically for ten days at Lule-Burgas, less than a week later.

Established behind the famous Tchataldja lines, composed almost entirely of shelter trenches, this same army, attacked as it was by the cholera which carried away thousands of men a week, conquered, the 18th of November, sixteen days after the battle of Lule-Burgas, the Bulgarian army full of enthusiasm, which from the beginning of the campaign had known only victories.

That is not the work of cowards.


We must seek other causes than cowardice to explain the defeats of the Turkish army. As may be seen by reading this article, written without affectation and with the greatest impartiality, the Turkish cavalry, in this unfortunate war, did its duty, and its whole duty.

If these lines fall under the eyes of my former French professors or commanding officers, I shall be grateful to them if they will send me their criticisms upon the operations of the division of Turkish cavalry. I shall joyfully translate and have published in the *Turkish Military Review* their ideas upon this subject.

Now, more than ever, Turkey and her army must work, as they have a revenge to take.

For this work of regeneration we cannot do better than to take example by France, tested as we were in 1870, and which possesses today, thanks to its patriotism and persevering labor, one of the finest armies in the world.

## MILITARY NOTES.



---

### CHANGE IN HEADQUARTERS OF THE CAVALRY ASSOCIATION.

---

**T**HREE are good grounds for the belief that the effort to remove the headquarters of the Cavalry Association and the CAVALRY JOURNAL from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Riley can be ascribed largely to that sentiment pervading the cavalry in recent years, which tends to scoff at the so-called "highbrows" and, at times, asserts that the course prescribed at the Mounted Service School offers the only instruction essential to the proper training of a cavalry officer.

No single influence has been stronger than that of the Mounted Service School in rejuvenating the cavalry. While often definite and perceptible in its effects, it has, also, in countless indirect ways, contributed to the efficiency of the arm. Horseshoeing, horsetraining, equitation, horseshows, polo, and greater knowledge of horseflesh, will have, each, its own important bearing upon the fitness and professional readiness of our officers and men, and upon the quality and training of our mounts, should we ever go to war.

Without depreciating the value of this work or restricting, in any respect, its field in the future, let us not forget that special knowledge and headwork on the part of cavalry officers will be required to plan and direct the operation of our cavalry organizations, and mayhap, contribute some necessary element to the making of their efficiency. It will not be the special knowledge acquired or the mental processes exercised only in the riding hall, the show ring or on the polo field, however much these realms may subscribe to physical fitness and mental alertness, but, on the contrary, it will be that indispensable equipment secured only from the diligent and continuous study of all that pertains to the science and art of war.

Special knowledge limited to the sphere of "*hands*" and "*haunches-in*," availeth little in war. It is for war that we are training.

Let the Cavalry Association remain where it is. Let us send more Leavenworth graduates to Riley and more Riley graduates to Leavenworth, to the end that the training of a cavalryman may be better balanced, and that, in the presence of the enemy, we may not be confounded.

GRADUATE, MOUNTED SERVICE SCHOOL.

---

#### ORDERLIES FOR MOUNTED OFFICERS.

**D**URING the last few years various orders, circulars, etc., have been issued by the War Department to encourage and require officers to own better mounts, but nothing has been done to make it practicable for them to keep such horses.

We all, especially the subalterns, not in command of organizations, are continually running against the difficulty of having our horses properly cared for.

A horse of the type described in the War Department circulars needs intelligent and constant care, yet it is often impossible for us to provide such horses owing to the lack of provision in our army for orderlies for mounted officers. Many of our superior officers, troop commanders or post commanders,

fail to see why a valuable thoroughbred, when he comes in heated from drill, cannot be turned loose in the corral to catch a cold or be kicked by the troop horses. Such a horse must be walked when heated, have his legs rubbed after hard work and should be well groomed and constantly looked after. He must be properly bedded and have a stall where he cannot injure himself or be injured by other horses.

At present the excusing of men from any duty to care for officers' horses is not allowed. Most of us cannot afford the high cost of a civilian groom. Our mounted pay does not nearly represent the cost of our horses, equipments, losses, etc., for unless one is a real horse trader, accidents will more than make up for the occasional profit on a horse deal.

While we sometimes serve under a troop or post commander who takes enough interest in horses to allow us to have ours properly cared for, they cannot excuse, under the regulations, an orderly from any duty, and in many instances they do not wish to so excuse them, even if they could, some troop commanders even going so far as to make it very difficult for their subalterns to have an orderly. Half the time he will be on guard, old guard fatigue or on some special duty. Meanwhile one of the stable police probably looks after our horses, with bad results as we have often found to our sorrow.

If a lieutenant does not belong to a troop he is usually still worse off. The headquarters' orderlies are taken by the higher ranking officers, or are on duty as telephone operators or at the Post Exchange. The headquarters' farriers and blacksmiths, who receive no extra pay, are such in name only and often even no stable is provided. As a Squadron Quartermaster, I have had to go begging from troop to troop for a place to keep my horses and for a man to look after them. I have had to pay for shoeing, etc., and constantly had to look after my horses myself to see that some stable sergeant, who did not want extra horses in his stable, did not allow something to happen to them.

If an officer is on duty at such a place as West Point, matters are even worse. There everything is regulated by Post Orders and otherwise to make it difficult for a mounted

officer to keep horses, and to do so costs him about three times his mounted pay.

An order from the War Department allowing mounted officers orderlies to care for their horses would do much to encourage the owning of better horses. The following is a brief statement of the points that such an order might cover:

Every mounted officer who provides himself with a suitable mount, at his own expense, may have an orderly detailed to care for them and for his horse equipments. These orderlies should be carried as such on the morning reports. In order that they may properly care for the horses in their charge, they shall be excused from all other duties except mounted drills and target practice. They shall be chosen from men who have had at least eighteen months service and who are proficient in their military duties.

In order to insure uniformity in the amount given by officers to their orderlies, it is suggested that they receive five dollars per month for caring for one horse and for the performance of such other duties as are usually performed by them and an additional two dollars for each additional horse cared for.

A LIEUTENANT OF CAVALRY.

---

#### THE ARMY HORSE REGISTER.

**I**N the April number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL there appeared a reprint of a report made by the undersigned to the War Department, proposing a new system of identification of public animals, taking the name of distinguished brother officers, perhaps in vain, in endorsement of his idea. He has very properly explained to the Department that he had no part in the publication of that official matter, and that it was printed without his connivance or assent. But reforms are born amid agitation and controversy. He will, therefore, for want of any other opponent so far revealed, enter into a controversy with himself, in these pages, to show how inadequately his

proposition was presented and how greatly it may be improved upon.

He was mentally torpid in failing to present the practical utility of the *Army Horse Register*, sample partial pages of which are appended to this article, to enable the reader to visualize its use. He failed lamentably, too, in the usual appeal to passion by born reformers, when he did not expound the hitherto almost unrecognized principle that our animals possess personality, at least in the affections of the mounted service. They are, as much as we, part of the flesh and blood of the army. So why did he not emancipate them as chattel property, and propose that they be no longer so accounted for, but be taken up on the rolls of the organizations to which attached, by number, as possessing immortal souls? Practically souls are less easily lost than chattels.

He was deficient, too, in the quality of intolerance which characterizes all true reformers, and proposed a limited three place system to appease the supposedly existed faction which prefers to brand horses as, in England sheep are marked, on the inner side of the lip in India ink. As if a horse grows a coat of wool and must needs be branded on the inside of his anatomy, rather than on the outside, where he who runs may read! No, he should have frankly expressed his own conviction that a four place system is best, enabling the branding of 100,000 animals on any one quarter, either cheek, side of neck, shoulder, or hip,—800,000 in all, if the military exigency should ever demand it.

He failed to note that the only novelty of the system consists in applying to living animals a mark which has long been used on inanimate objects, notably bank notes. Even so, the publication of the letter did not show, what Captain Short said, that the London Bus Company has a similar system already in use. Also, on authority of the same incomparable horse-master, the device is now in use, on a smaller scale, in certain great breeding establishments. The gentlemen who have been so fortunate as to attend the Mounted Service School know, too, that horses there from the Diamond Ranch bear on their cheeks a numeral indicating the year they were

foaled. If they do not know then here is proof of its inconspicuousness.

He also failed to say that the characters of the new brand need not be larger than half the size of those of the present U S, or that they will be imposed on a surface which has first been carefully clipped. Nor will the characters be so coarse as the letters U S, but be drawn in finer, almost hair lines, the surface thereafter to be kept clipped, when necessary, to insure easy legibility. For this the stable police of the mounted service will bless his memory every Sunday afternoon henceforth, forever, as in every orderly room thanks to him will daily go up for the abolition of the descriptive list, with its bizarre attempt to apply the Bertillon system to equine subjects, who, not which, are incapable of crime.

But it is true he conceived the printed pamphlet containing lists of horses purchased each year, and now unto us the child is born, and christened, the *Official Army Horse Register*.

It will issue annually, and since appropriations for the purchase of cavalry and artillery horses are, and must always be, for the fiscal year, that will be the period covered. Successive annual issues will reprint no matter appearing in previous numbers, except in the casualty list. In that will be found the longevity of animals condemned, the name of the officer who made the original purchase, and the name of the inspector who made the condemnation, without having to refer to back numbers. It is part of the intent of the system that the names of these officers be identified with the career of the animal. It is believed this device will induce deliberate and careful judgement in the performance of their duty, as well as more care in their selection by higher authority.

With the inauguration of the system, without applying it in any way to animals now in service, the annual casualty list will increase in length, and ultimately approximate that of the horses purchased during the year. It will be of value mainly for statistical purposes, while the record of living animals must be made very easily accessible for ready reference.

As previously proposed a letter was to be assigned for the foals of each calender year. That was merely to illustrate the striking possibilities of the scheme. But it will be better

to have the year of purchase indicated by the letter, so one may know at once in which number of the *Register* to look. The ages of horses purchased in the same year vary but little, while the year of foaling may be found exactly in the *Register*, when necessary, to decide bets, make sales, or discover liars.

With the four place system, in time of peace, the brand being placed only on the left shoulder, each letter of the series will provide for 4,000 animals. The annual appropriations for the purchase of cavalry and artillery horses, for a long period of years, have not permitted the purchase of nearly so many. Instituting the series, with a letter for each year, the alphabet will last for twenty-five years, when the first purchases, under the letter A, will all long since have gone out of service, and the series will again be available for use from the beginning.

It will not be difficult for the remount service to keep the series of brands imposed in strict alphabetical and numerical sequence. Each purchasing officer, or several operating at the same time, in various parts of the country, will be given a list of brands to use, according to the number of horses he is to buy. Unused blanks of these lists will be used at the nearest station, enabling the *Register* to be made up with few blank lines, or even with none at all. The whole system, of course, implies a high degree of concentration of control, but in the very nature of things the remount service is a centralized function, like the recruiting service, at least so far as reports, returns, and the allotment of funds is concerned.

The office of the Editor of the *Register*, pleasantly situated in Washington, is hereby created. Aspirants may fall into line in advocacy of the proposition. If the publication be properly edited, statistical data, in any form, required by the committees of Congress, the remount service, or by horse-breeding associations, may be quickly culled from its pages. The breeding associations already have their own registers, as is well known.

Let the editor-elect note that the result of his annual toil must not approach, in typographical bulk, that of the monthly list and directory of the human commissioned roster. Dressing his equine publication in the most compact style of the Government Printing Office, a dozen copies, bound together,

may be carried in any field desk, in smaller compass than that of the present descriptive lists. This is an imperative consideration which should guide his editorial policy and determine his tenure of office. Students of the appended sample pages will agree that this literary creature may not exceed the license granted by his creator.

Twenty years ago the writer endeavored to procure the adoption, in aluminum, of the ancient, and then familiar, whiskey flask, in lieu of the dangling tin cup and canteen. Time and tide achieved the end. For five years he has tried, and with thirteen more years to serve, he hopes to leave his mark upon our horses.

---

OFFICIAL ARMY HORSE REGISTER.

FISCAL YEAR 1914-15.

(Series A000 to 197A.)

3198 Animals.

F. Y. 1914-15.

Page 1.

<i>Brand</i>	<i>Bought</i>	<i>Where</i>	<i>Buyer</i>	<i>Foaled</i>	<i>Price</i>	<i>Color</i>	<i>Class</i>
A000 ....	Apr.	Va.	W. W. W.	1910	\$158	Bay	Cav.
A001 ....	Oct.	Ky.	C. H. C.	1909	\$158	Sorrel	L. A.
A002 ....	Jan	Pa.	L. H.	1910	\$162	Black	H. A.
A003 ....	Dec.	W. Va.	W. S. V.	1909	\$162	Brown	Rid.
A004 ....	Feb.	Mont.	H. P. H.	1910	\$125	Bay	Cav.
A005 ....	etc.	etc.	etc.	etc.	etc.	etc.	etc.
A006 ....							
A007 ....							
A008 ....							
A009 ....							
A010 ....	etc.						

---

## OFFICIAL ARMY HORSE REGISTER.

FISCAL YEAR 1915-16.

(Series B000 to 56B2.)

2563 Animals.

\* \* \* \* \*

## Casualties Reported F. Y. 1915-16.

<i>Brand</i>	<i>Bought</i>	<i>Where</i>	<i>Buyer</i>	<i>Foaled</i>	<i>Price</i>	<i>Color</i>	<i>Class</i>	<i>How disposed of.</i>
A000 .... etc.	Apr. etc.	Va. etc.	W. W. W. etc.	1910 etc.	\$158 etc.	Bay etc.	Cav. etc.	C. & S. Insp., J. G. G., etc.

GUY H. PRESTON,  
*Major Fourth Cavalry.*

## USE OF THE AUTOMATIC PISTOL BY CAVALRY.

EVERY cavalryman probably realizes that in our automatic pistol we have a wonderful weapon, and, at the same time, one not in general use by any other nation. However, it is a question as to whether we are prepared to use it to the greatest advantage. While the following suggested use may be but another variation of the old *pistol versus saber* controversy, the automatic feature of our present arm cannot fail to add strength to the claims of the pistol.


Briefly, this plan contemplates the use of the pistol mounted while in column of twos (half squads) against an enemy charging in line (single or double rank) with the saber. The men on the right (odd numbers) fire to the right-oblique or right, while those on the left (even numbers) fire to the left-oblique or left. Of course it should be the object of the unit commander to conduct his command so as to strike the enemy

as near the center of his line as possible. The following rough diagram may assist in illustrating the meaning.

In this illustration, the charge of an enemy's platoon of 24 men in double rank is met by a charge in column of half-squads using the pistol, the men on the right firing to the right-oblique or right, as they approach their target, the men on the left firing to the left-oblique or left.

Our charging platoon will be led by its lieutenant and file-closer, and it is believed they will have no difficulty in penetrating the enemy's line, either by shooting their way through, or on account of the enemy avoiding the shock. It takes no great amount of skill to hit a target as large as will be presented at ranges twenty yards or less, and the platoon should

Enemy's platoon in line, with sabers



Platoon half squads with pistol.

CONDITIONS JUST PRIOR TO COLLISION.

do effective shooting as they ride through. One hundred and eighty-two shots fired at such a short range ought to produce decisive results.

It is not believed that the enemy will be able to damage us very much, as they must come very close to use their sabers, and the closer they come the easier they will be to hit. In any case they will be thrown into confusion and their usefulness as a formed body will be at an end.

Of course this use of the pistol contemplates that men should be taught to use their left hand when shooting to the left with the automatic pistol which is not a very difficult feat. There is always some danger involved when firearms are used, but it is believed that there is much less danger in this method than in the charge as foragers with the pistol.

It will be noticed that the column of half-squads is a very convenient formation for maneuver, easily adopted, easily handled, easily led. It utilizes, too, to an unusual degree, the psychology of the mass.

Only the platoon versus platoon has been considered in this discussion, but its application to larger bodies and varying conditions readily follows. In this connection it should be borne in mind that in a terrain such as ours, actual charges by large bodies of cavalry will not be frequent—a platoon will charge much oftener than a regiment.

It is believed that if the method outlined herein be given a thorough test, it will be found that our cavalry will have a big advantage over any enemy that we may meet, and more extensive tactical uses will naturally present themselves.

C. BURNETT,  
*First Lieutenant First Cavalry.*

---

#### FIELD SERVICE POST CARDS.

---

THE authorities of the British Army have a form of Post Card that is issued to those in their service at the front and which are transmitted through the mail free of postage. These cards are of the usual size and bear on the front the following: "Field Service Post Card." "The address only to be written on this side. If anything else is added, the post card will be destroyed."

On the back of the card appears the following:

Nothing is to be written on this side except the date and the signature of the sender. Sentences not required may be erased. *If anything else is added, the post card will be destroyed.*

---

I am quite well.

I have been admitted into hospital.

(sick) and am going on well.

(wounded) and hope to be discharged soon.

I am being sent down to the base.

I have received your { letter dated.....  
telegram dated.....  
parcel dated.....

Letter follows at first opportunity.


I have received no letter from you { lately.  
for a long time.

Signature only.....

Date.....

---

Postage must be prepaid on any letter or post card addressed to the sender of this card.



**St. Privat,  
German  
Sources.\***

St. Privat.

Of these the most important consists of extracts from "The 18th of August, 1870," written by the Great German General Staff. So far as the account of the troop heading in the battle is concerned, the latter article is itself built up from many sources, most of which are available to but few historians; and as the General Staff has failed in many cases to give references to the sources on which their statements are based, it would be difficult to go behind those statements in order to determine for ourselves their degree of accuracy, even had we access to the original sources.

On the other hand the great value of Captain Conger's collection lies in the fact that the articles have been so chosen that we find in them evidence which is not necessarily in accord with the more important statements made by the General Staff in their work; and, consequently, the student of history can weigh for himself the conflicting evidence on certain points,

\*"ST. PRIVAT—GERMAN SOURCES." Translated by Master Signal Electrician Harry Bell, U. S. Army. Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 498 pp. 1915. Price \$1.00.

such as in the dispute as to whether the Guards or the Saxons brought about the decision at St. Privat.

There seems to have been an impression among military men that the historical section of the German General Staff was the last word on the historical subject on which they might write. But a perusal of the German criticisms of the General Staff account, and a careful comparison of that account with some of the other articles on the same subject, impress on the reader the conviction that not even the German General Staff is free from a willingness to give to events the coloring which political considerations may make expedient.

Were the only merit of this collection of articles the revelation of this fact, it would be well worth while. But it also full of concrete examples of the results of the application or non-application of accepted tactical principles—examples which have to be dug out by the student, it is true, but which are consequently of more value to him.

The translation is very clear; the volume well gotten up, with bibliographical notes, and biographical sketches of the authors whose articles appear.

A complete and well arranged index is not the least of its excellent features.

---

**Military  
Field  
Note-Book.\***

This is another of those handy manuals of condensed information that one is expected to carry around in his pocket, but never does.

Half the bulk of the book is made up of a pad of message blanks that can be replaced by a new filler when the originals are exhausted. This blank is less satisfactory in form than the official message book and lacks the latter's facilities for making duplicate copies.

The remainder of the book (except sixteen blank pages for keeping the owner's detached service record) is text, most

---

\*"MILITARY FIELD NOTE BOOK." By Lieutenants George R. Guild and Robert C. Cotton. Geo. Banta Publishing Co., Menasha, Wisconsin, 1914. Price 75 cents.

of which pertains to matters fully covered in the Field Service Regulations.

A few of the pages of condensed data, if printed in pamphlet form on one side of the paper so the sheets could be removed and pasted in one's Field Service Regulations would be useful.

---

**European  
War.\***

This is an analysis, in popular form, of the matter contained in the published diplomatic correspondence that preceded the European War made by an authority on the interpretation of state papers, together with comments on the European political situation based on the deductions made, on the political and economic history of the nations concerned and on the psychology of peoples.

The author is pro-German in his sentiments, but not violently so. He displays a profound knowledge of, so called, "public opinion" as will be seen from the following quotations:

"It is a fact of history \* \* \* that the majority is generally on the wrong side of every great question in the beginning." "We have not yet formed any real public opinion about this war. Everybody feels, but only relatively few really think, and very few possess the knowledge upon which to found a sound judgment."

Those who wish to make it appear that wars are caused by rulers against the will of their people will derive very little comfort from such passages as the following:

"It is a general feature of political history that the governmental system tends to adjust itself to the economic." " \* \* \* the sphere of \* \* \* influence, as they call it, which is nothing less than the preliminary to annexation."

This is a strong, well written work, much above the average of the numerous books that are appearing under the same or similar titles and which are mostly violent expressions of prejudice founded largely on the author's emotions.

---

\*"THE EUROPEAN WAR OF 1914. ITS CAUSES, PURPOSES, AND PROBABLE RESULTS." By John William Burgess, Ph. D., J. U. D., LL. D. A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago. Price \$1.00.

**History  
of The  
War.\***

The only volume of this work which has appeared as yet is entitled "The Battlefield of Europe." Other volumes can be looked for as the present war in Europe progresses.

This first volume, which contains several hundred excellent illustrations and maps, is divided into twenty chapters as follows:

- I. Political Antecedents to the War.
- II. The Army and Fortresses of Belgium.
- III. The German Invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium.
- IV. The German Army and German Strategy.
- V. The German Army—1870-1914.
- VI. The German Army in the Field.
- VII. The German Theory of War.
- VIII. The British Army.
- IX. The Army of the Dominions.
- X. The Native Indian Army.
- XI. The Rally of the Empire.
- XII. The British Theory of War.
- XIII. The French Army.
- XIV. The French Theory of War.
- XV. The Story of Liege.
- XVI. The German Advance to Brussels.
- XVII. The First French Offensive in Alsace.
- XVIII. German Conquest of Belgium.
- XIX. The German Advance on Paris; Battle of Namur, Charleroi, Mons.
- XX. The Retreat to the Marne.

It will be noticed that this first volume deals chiefly with preliminaries. It is also noticeable that the English point of view colors the entire volume, which is not a defect, as when German and Austrian sources become available, the two conflicting views can be harmonized.

It is unfortunate that the names of the authors of the different chapters are not given. To the military student the work

---

\* "THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR—THE BATTLEFIELD OF EUROPE." By *The London Times*. American Edition. 1915. Woodward and Van Slyke, Inc., New York. Price unknown.

would be much more valuable were this done, and were a biographical sketch of each author appended. There is no doubt that men versed in things military have contributed to the pages of this volume, however.

The book is on the whole of intense interest, of great value to every trained officer, and should find a place in his library. Future volumes are awaited with interest.

---

**Military  
Hygiene.\***

This excellent work has been revised carefully, and brought up-to-date by its author, and is a book well worthy of study by Army Officers.

The chapter on Camps, has been entirely rewritten and the new text presents the subject, in a more practical manner to the reader. The section treating of camp latrines is particularly good.

Chapter XII has also been very materially altered and made more interesting to the lay reader. The author strongly recommends that individual drinking cups or bubbling fountains be used in barracks; but he did not note, that the Army was far behind civilian development along these lines.

It is noted that in the Canal Zone mosquitoes have been known, under favorable conditions, to fly more than a mile from their breeding places. This statement is extremely interesting as it explains the occasional failures in anti-malarial work and brings home to us very forcibly the great care necessary in sanitary surveys of localities occupied by our troops. This entire subject has been very carefully treated and the chapter is far from being a mere statement of facts.

A separate section treating of louse-borne diseases is extremely interesting at this time, particularly as Typhus Fever, so much before the public at the present, is considered and means of prevention suggested.

---

\*"THE ELEMENTS OF MILITARY HYGIENE." Especially arranged for Officers and Men of the Line." New and Revised Edition. By P. M. Ashburn, Major Medical Corps, U. S. Army. Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston and New York. Price \$1.50, net.

The supplement on prevention of mental and nervous diseases, which has been added to this edition, is very timely, and attention is called to the great importance of these diseases in the armies of the present.

All in all, this book is excellent and should be in the hands of all officers.

---

RECEIVED FOR REVIEW.

---

"MILITARY SKETCHING AND MAP READING FOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS—ILLUSTRATED." By First Lieutenant Loren C. Grieves, Thirtieth Infantry. 1915. U. S. Infantry Association, Washington, D. C. Price \$1.25, postpaid.



## Editor's Table.

### THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY DIGEST.

---

This new periodical, as its title suggests, is a monthly digest of everything of value published on any military subject, either at home or abroad, and along lines entirely different from any military publication heretofore published. It will be to the military reader what the "*Literary Digest*" and other similar reviews are to the general reader.

It covers a broader field than does the valuable bi-monthly publication of the "*Index to Current Military Literature*" which is published with the *Journal of the U. S. Artillery*, or the "*Recent Publications of Military Interest*," which now appears as an appendix to the quarterly published by the British Imperial General Staff under the title of "*The Army Review*."

The scope of its work is set forth in the following extracts from the Editorial Foreword appearing in the first number:

"It is the purpose of the *International Military Digest* to furnish to its readers each month a synopsis of the contents of the current issues of all the leading military periodicals of the world. It is manifest that in performing this service, the principle of selection must be applied to some extent. By specifying the leading military periodicals, it is implied that some of lesser importance are not included.

"The Editors feel sure that they make no mistake in assuming that the readers of the *International Military Digest* will prefer that the principle of selection be applied still further. In the present issue, the attempt has been made to give digests

varying in length and completeness with the character and professional value of the articles reviewed. Some articles are covered merely by notes indicating their scope, usually in cases where the reason will be apparent. Others have been omitted entirely. In the future, it is the intention to give in somewhat greater detail digest of articles published in those languages with which few are familiar, because reference to the original articles would be difficult or impracticable.

"In this initial number, it has been impossible to include digests of articles from a considerable number of foreign periodicals which are recognized as important. This has been due mainly to the irregularity of the mail service with European countries, which has made it impossible in the time available to secure the issues of all the periodicals desired. The European War has also apparently caused the temporary suspension of publication of all of the French and part of the British, German, and Austrian military periodicals. The status of the Russian periodicals is not yet known. This suspension will, however, be more than compensated for by their added value when these periodicals resume publication.

"January 1, 1915, has been selected as the origin of the subject matter of the *International Military Digest*. It has not been possible to review all of the back issues of the periodicals taken up in the current number of the *Digest*. These will be brought up to date as soon as practicable. Such additions as may be possible will be made within the next two months to the list of periodicals under review. The digests of these periodicals will also be carried back to January 1, the back issues being reviewed and published in the *Digest* as opportunity offers between now and the close of the year. In general the whole list of publications to be reviewed will be revised at the beginning of next year.

"A considerable number of the more important non-military publications will also be scrutinized, and any articles of technical military value or current military interest appearing in them will be included in the *Digest*.

"The Editors have necessarily relied largely upon their own judgment in the preparation of material for publication in this first issue. It is their desire that the *International Military*

*Digest* shall meet the requirements of its readers. To that end, they will always welcome criticism. Suggestions as to additional periodicals to be included, or as to the character of the reviews will be especially valuable.

"The Editors of the *International Military Digest* need the assistance of officers familiar with different languages in preparing digests of articles in foreign military periodicals. Some such editorial assistance will be needed immediately, and other later as additional publications are taken up for review.

"The Editors desires to hear from officers who are willing to help with this work, particularly those familiar with Italian, Portuguese, Norwegian, Swedish, and Russian. Terms will be made known to those offering their services."

It is proposed to make every third number a Cumulative Digest of all that has been noticed in the two previous numbers, and finally to make the last number of each year a Cumulative Digest of all that appeared during the year. This plan is the one followed by the well known "*Cumulative Book Index*," which, however, is simply an index and not a digest and which covers only such books, on any subject, as are published in the United States.

The Editors-in-Chief are Colonel C. DeW. Willcox and Lieut. Colonel E. R. Stuart, Professors at the U. S. Military Academy, and they will be assisted by a corps of Associate Editors from every branch of our service. The well known ability of the Editors-in-Chief and the listed Associate Editors give assurance that their work will be well done.

This publication will fill a long felt want in our service as well as those in foreign countries.

## ARMY HORSE INSURANCE.

Since the appearance, in the April, 1915, number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, of the editorial discussion of this subject several of our mounted officers have written requesting further information and urging the formation of an Army Horse Insurance Company for the purpose of insuring the private mounts of officers in our service.

Some additional data has been obtained on this subject, the principal points being as follows:

It has been learned that another company, in addition to the two mentioned in our April number, that insures horses, it being a branch of the well known Hartford Fire Insurance Company. From their circulars, it would appear that their principal business in this line is to insure race horses, although they write that they will also insure officers' mounts, *but not in time of war*. In fact, it is understood that none of these Horse Insurance Companies will insure horses of officers except in peace times.

The Hartford Company insures four classes of horses and at a varying rate according to the age of the horses and the class to which they belong, which rate ranges from six to eight per cent. of the amount for which the horse is insured, and horses from yearlings to those twelve years old. They do not insure horses over the latter age, except at a special rate, to be determined by them in case the risk is found desirable.

The application blanks for insuring in all of the companies have a more or less extended list of questions to be answered, which cover the history of the horse, his pedigree, former ownership, his description, his medical history, so to speak, the condition of his teeth, etc., some sixty or more questions in all.

All of the forms of policies issued have the usual numerous conditions that are supposed to be necessary in insuring the property of the average civilian in order to protect the company against fraud, and, of course, for which the honest man has to pay a higher rate than would otherwise be the case.

In forming an Army Horse Insurance Company there are many things to be considered and that should be carefully thought out. Among these are the classes of horses to be insured, whether only officers' official mounts are to be included or whether polo ponies, brood mares, ladies or childrens' horses or ponies, owned by an officer, are to be insurable, and the varying rates for these several classes.

It is the opinion of your Editor that the plan should be as simple as possible and somewhat along the lines of the Army Co-operative Fire Association and have but one rate for all classes of horses insured, barring, if deemed advisable, stallions and brood mares, which are deemed extra hazardous risks by all the companies mentioned. There should be, of course, a small increase of the rate over the estimated cost of insurance, in order to build up a reserve for the prompt payment of claims which reserve should be made up of the amounts remaining to the credit of the individual members after paying their proportionate share of the losses. It would also be necessary to have a small per capita tax on each member for expenses.

As a starter, it is suggested that there be eight classes, according to the value of the horses insured, ranging from \$150 to \$500, there being the common difference of \$50 between each class. Also, as a starter for discussion, it is suggested that the rates be six per cent. of the value of the horse until the member's credit in the reserve fund has reached a certain proportionate amount, say two or three times his annual assessment, after which he shall pay only his proportionate share of the losses for each year. Six per cent. of the value is suggested as being the lowest rate given by any of the commercial companies, under the most favorable circumstances. All losses should be adjusted by a board of officers, members of the Association, if practicable, and stationed at the same garrison as the officer sustaining the loss, the same subject to revision by an Executive Committee.

It is believed that losses by fire should not be included as nearly all mounted officers now have their horses so protected by the Army Co-operative Fire Association.

## PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR.

In his address given in New York recently, Dr. Lyman Abbott Editor-in-Chief of *The Outlook*, and a clergyman of great repute, took a broad view of the question of preparedness for war.

Dr. Abbott briefly traced the progress of this country in his life time, which began in 1835, and metaphorically handed the country over to his younger hearers with a word of caution as to the problems they must meet in their own life times. He said:

"Who, looking with those telescopic eyes which the press furnishes us, across the Atlantic Ocean, and listening to the boom of the cannon and the rattle of the infantry, and the groans of the dying, and the sobbing of the women and children, who can doubt that there is in this world yet a barbarism that regards might as right and acknowledges no allegiance and no loyalty except to force. We cannot assume that there are no burglars in New York, and therefore we need no police. We cannot assume that there are no mobs in Colorado, and, therefore we need no militia. We cannot assume that there is no militarism in the world, and, therefore we need no army and no navy.

"I recognize to the full the danger of a standing army to a republic. Gentlemen, I am not here solving the problems of the future. I have done what little I could toward the solution of the problems of the past and simply put the problems of the future before you, and I say this that a self-governing nation must be a self-protecting nation. Nor is it enough that we have a million men who have the courage to meet the guns—a million men unprepared to work together no more constitutes an army than eleven boys who can kick a football make a college team.

"We have got to find some way—you have got to find some way. It is not my problem. I am quit of it. It is your problem to show how you can make out of a citizen soldiery an organized body of men, equipped, prepared, accustomed to team work, and habited to give prompt obedience to authority."

## THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE, INC.

That the public at large is aroused as to the necessity of a larger and better equipped army and navy is evidenced by the present attitude of the public press on this question, but more particularly by the formation of societies or leagues for the purpose of influencing legislation in favor of such measures as will, in their opinion, place these services on a proper footing.

The National Security League, composed of some of the most prominent and influential men of the country, has been organized for the purpose, so its circulars state, of advocating: A preparedness of the United States against war; legislation to carry out the moderate suggestions to that end of the General Staff of the Army and of the Naval Board; insurance of our nationality on a scientific and economical basis under the direction of a General National Defense Board; and to conduct a country wide campaign to convince Congress of a demand for absolute preparedness for war.

There was held recently in New York, under the auspices of this League, a "Peace and Preparation Conference," which was attended by delegates from a majority of the states, as well as from national associations, commercial organizations and patriotic societies. At this conference, which was addressed by many speakers of repute, final action was taken in the form of the following resolutions:

WHEREAS, The events of the past year have demonstrated the fact that war, no matter how greatly it may be deplored, may suddenly and unexpectedly occur, notwithstanding the treaties of peace and amity and have also shown that nations who were unprepared have paid and are paying the price of their delinquency; and,

WHEREAS, The reports of our military and naval experts have made clear that the defensive forces of the country are inadequate for the proper protection of our coasts and to enable our government to maintain its accepted policies and to fulfill


its obligations to other states and to exert in the adjustment of international questions the influence to which the Republic is entitled; therefore be it

*Resolved*, That we appeal to the President, if consistent with the public interest, to call the early attention of Congress to the pressing need of prompt and efficient action so that the resources of our Great Country can be utilized for the proper defense of the Republic, and

*Resolved*, That the National Security League be urged to continue the work which it has already undertaken, of bringing the American people to a full realization of our deplorable state of unpreparedness and of the necessity of action by Congress.

---

In the literature sent out by this League, it is stated that: "They favor an army and navy with citizens reserve which will be sufficient only for the adequate protection of the United States. They do not believe in a large standing army or in any form of militarism." In this we most heartily concur, provided that we agree as to what they mean by *a large standing army, citizen reserves and militarism*. We believe in a standing army that is kept at full war strength at all times so that when needed it will be fully trained for field service and will not have to wait several months to train and assimilate from forty to fifty per cent. of raw recruits before being fit for service, as has always been the case in the past. As to its size, it is not, under the present restrictions, proper to discuss. As to a citizen reserve for the Regular Army, no scheme with the possible exception of the one advocated by General Carter in his recent work, entitled "The American Army," has been brought forth as yet that is practicable. As to militarism, we do believe in a more extended propaganda towards instructing the young men of this country in all that pertains to military life through the medium of student camps, instruction along these lines at our colleges and universities and in the formation of rifle clubs, etc.



## Publisher's Notices.

### **The Army and Navy Co-Operative Company.**

The attention of those in our service is called to the advertisement of this company which appears in this number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL. This organization has for its object the supplying of officers of the Army and Navy with the best of articles at the lowest practicable cost. Such co-operative companies have been successful in foreign countries and should be in this.

---

### **Bailey, Banks & Biddle Company.**

This old and reliable firm has become one of our advertisers and we bespeak for them the patronage of our members and subscribers. Their reputation for fair dealing is so well established that it needs no recommendation from us.

---

### **The Perkins-Campbell Co.**

This firm is the successors of the Whitman & Melback Saddle Co., of New York. They carry a full line of horse equipments and those interested will do well to procure their catalog and terms before purchasing elsewhere.

---

### **John Schoonmaker & Son.**

Every officer who has ever been stationed at West Point knows full well this old firm and their reputation for doing the square thing. They supply every thing required for personal wear or for the home.



